PERLE'S DISTRUST SHAPES U.S. POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402860018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 2, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402860018-6
AnTInf-APP ARED T
041 PP.I
WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1985
erle s Distrust Shp es U.S. P~lkj.
Assistant Defense Secretary Suspicious of Pacts With Soviets
.4. B
y F>edHiatt '
e
Richard; N. Perle, `who" did as much as any American to doom de-
tente during the 1970s.. thinks that
,the, Soviet Union is -a place where
everyone lies all thefime.".
As-. the Reagan "'administration`
`'}resumes a' dialogue-, with the Sovi-
ets, that opinion- may - be crucial.
'Despite his relatively low-ranking
job as assistant secretary of defense,
for international security policy-.
:and despite being a Democrat in a
Republican , administration-Perle
has had more influence on policy
toward the Soviet Union during the
past four years than any other ad-
ministration official, according to
experts in and out of government.
Perle was the. intellectual force
behind U.S. arms-control positions
so stringent that President Rea-
gan's first seccretary of state Alex-
ander M. Haig - Jc., labeled them
.not negotiable" and "absurd." Perle
was the architect of a campaign to
restrict the flow of western tech-
nology to the Soviet Union, and he
played a key role in shifting the de-
bate over arms control to the .ques-
tion of Soviet untrustworthiness
and "verification."
********
Although western technology has
not stopped flowing to the Soviet
Union, Perle and others elevated
what had been a non-issue- into a
Vcentral law enforcement -concern
policed by hundreds of new agents
in the Customs, Commerce and De-
fense departments.
With that 'achievement, Perle
angered U.S. businesses, European
allies, U.S. ambassadors in Europe
who resented his interference and
top Commerce officials who loathed
what they saw as his poaching. 'But
Perle won many of the interdepart-
mental battles, again backed by
Weinberger, despite the secretary's
occasional dismay at how public the
fights became.
"The provision about which there
has been a great deal of dispute be-
tween the departments of Corn-
merce and Defense-Section 10G
of the Export Administration Act-
is the section which I drafted,"
Perle said. "I think I know better
than they do what I had in mind."
.,-The same sense of certainty
t ,,tends to ' silence those who might
take a more moderate position on
arms control-what Perle would
call a more "naive" view-in an ad-
ministration where no one dares
look soft on the Soviets.--
In 1983, for example, the admin-
istration was preparing a draft trea-
ty to ban chemical weapons. Perle .
thought that the Soviet Union
would cheat on such a treaty unless
Washington insisted on far-reaching
inspection procedures allowing U.S.
officials to roam through the Soviet
Union to check suspected chemical=
arms factories.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed
such inspection rules ecause t ev
did not want their stocks subject to
viet snooping. The Central Intel-
l ence Agency feared that the So
vets would take advantage and rv
into unrelated U.S. secrets.
tate Department officials op-
posed Perle's proposal because they
thought that thel.Soviets would nev-
er accept such rigid standards-
and, worse, because the western
allies knew that the Soviets would
not accept them, and so the U.S.
proposal would seem insincere.
At an interagency meeting at the
State Department, Perle placed his
opponents on the defensive.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402860018-6