UPROAR OVER IRAN: WHAT IS KNOW AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE LEARNED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201830020-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 17, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201830020-9
NEW YORK TIMES
ARTICLE AP?Ei n 17 November 1986
nN PAGE
Uproar Over Iran: What Is Known
And What Remains to. Be Learned
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 - A succes-
sion of senior Administration officials
have sought in the last few days to quell
Congressional and public anger over
Washington's dealings with Iran.
Despite their statements, many key
questions about the diplomatic con-
tacts and arms shipments remain
clouded or unanswered. The House and
Senate intelligence committees have
not yet been briefed, and closed meet-
ings are scheduled for Friday.
Here are some questions that the
committees can be expected to raise,
and what is known, what is suspected,
and what remains to be answered:
Arms Shipments
Q. What quantity and type of
arms were shipped to Iran, and by
whom?
A. The national security adviser,
Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, said to-
day that the weapons sent by the
United States or authorized for de-
livery by others would fill one cargo
plane. The Administration says the
weaponry was defensive, such as parts
for antiaircraft batteries or antitank
weapons. The Congressional commit-
tees plan to demand specifics.
Administration officials say each of
three releases of American hostages in
Lebanon in the last year roughly co-
incided with a shipment of arms to
Iran. The first, in September 1985, is
said by Administration officials to have
been an Israeli delivery. At least two
other deliveries are believed to have
been facilitated by the Administration.
These include a plane sent from Yugo-
slavia to Iran last July that was de-
scribed by Iranian dissidents as con-
taining American arms, and a boatload
of arms loaded by members of a Dan-
ish seamen's union and delivered to
Iran late last month.
President Reagan denied reports
that Iran had been "using Danish ships
to carry American arms," but he did
not mention the possibility that Israel
had done so. Israeli officials say they
have been sending arms to Iran and re-
ceiving replacements for those arms
from the United States.
It is not known if countries other than
Israel aided Iran, but it is possible that
some, such as China, were involved.
Q. Could the shipments have
shifted the military balance in the
Iran-Iraq war?
A. Administration officials say no.
Iraqi officials and military analysts
are less certain. Iraq's strategy in its
six-year-old war with Iran centers on
air attacks, and a defensive weapon
like radar for an antiaircraft weapon
can thus have a decided effect. Iraq has
detected signs in recent months of im-
proved Iranian abilities, including
more flights by Iranian fighters. The
Administration says aircraft parts
were not shipped.
Consultations
Q. Why were members of Con-
gress and some officials in the
State Department, the Defense De-
partment and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency kept from knowing
about the operation?
Q. Are there any other Presiden-
tial orders authorizing covert
operations that have not been re-
ported to Congress?
A. Administration officials say no;
members of the intelligence commit-,
tees want to be sure.
Q. Why did the Administration go
ahead with the operation when it
was opposed by Secretary of State
George P. Shultz and Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger?
A. The decision was made by Mr.
Reagan, and only he can say for certain
why he chose to disregard the advice of
two such senior officials. A senior Ad-
ministration official said that Mr. Rea-
gan had taken considerable personal)
interest in the fate of the American
hostages in Lebanon and that the issue
arose at fully one-half of his daily brief-
ings on foreign policy.
Contacts With Iran
Q. Why did the Reagan Adminis-
tration decide, in mid-1985, to
make overtures to Iran?
A. For years, Iran had been strongly
attacked by the Administration as a na-
tion supporting terrorism. In an essay
published this year, Mr. Casey wrote
that "probably more blood has been
shed by Iranian-sponsored terrorists
during the last few years than by all
other terrorists combined."
Nonetheless, Robert. C. McFarlane,
the national security adviser at the
time, has said he felt overtures could
be made to moderates in Iran in an ef-
fort to forge a geopolitical realignment
in the Middle East. Officials have
stressed the strategic significance of
Iran and its location astride the
Persian Gulf.
The importance of Iran in the region
was underscored last year by the crisis
over the hostages on a Trans World
Airways flight diverted to Lebanon.
The Administration learned then that it
.was Iran, and not Syria, that held the
key to dealing with Shiite Moslem ex-
tremist groups, officials say. "Syria
controlled the territory," one official
said. "Iran controlled the groups."?
The Administration has asserted
that its major opening to Iran came to
include talks about the hostages held in
Lebanon. Some Administration offi-
cials, critical of the program, assert
that these statements are window-
dressing, an after-the-fact cover story
for a misguided attempt to negotiate
freedom for American hostages.
A. Administration officials say that
to maintain secrecy, they informed
only a small group of officials to pre-
vent unauthorized disclosures. it ap-
pears that members of the Administra-
tion were informed on a "need to
know" basis. Among those left out was
Adm. William J. Crowe, the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of
six officials on the National Security
Council. AdMir.9l Poindexter said Ad-'
miral Crowe had not been told because
it was anintelligence operation, not a
military. nne-_
A classified finding by Mr. Reagan -
a form o executive order that sets in
motion a covert intelligence o ration
- ih a ect instruct William J. Casey,A
the Director of Central Intelligence. not
to inform Congress because of "se-
curity risk ." Mr. Reagan cited a
provision of the law on intelligence. that
allows him to forgo briefing Congress
r ra s or reports in s1
I nv
"timely fashion" on such o rations.
Congressional officials sa the can
1 -vear
reca no o er instance in M hp
.., of oversight of the C.I.A. in
which a Presidential finding was not
reported tote committees.
Q. Did the Administration violate
the law?
A. Administration officials insist not,
but some in Congress are very un-
happy about the 10-month lag between
the signing of the Presidential order
and the briefing of Congress. They say
the law was intended only for unusual
circumstances of short duration.
Q. Why is Congress being briefed
now?
A. Largely because the operation
was disclosed by a pro-Syrian maga-
zine in Beirut and was in turn con-
firmed by American press reports.
f/
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Q. Do "moderates" really exist
in Iran?
A. Mr. McFarlane said today that the
crucial question in assessing the pro-
gram was, "Are there elements in Iran
or not who wish to reorient Iran's poli-
cies?" The Administration says it was
reaching out to elements in Teheran
that wanted to end the Iran-Iraq war
and to improve relations with the
United States.
Regional specialists inside and out-
side the Government question this idea.
One Administration official not con-
sulted about the operation said, "There
are no moderates in Iran." There has,
been speculation that figures in Iran
may have portrayed themselves as
friendly to the United States in an at-
tempt to dupe the Administration into
1 sending arms.
Q. Why were arms chosen to fur-
ther talks?
A. Administration officials say spare
parts were sent as a means of showing
"good faith" to the Iranians, whose
armed forces depend almost entirely
on American-made weapons. They say
that in the early days of the contacts
with Iran, negotiators for both sides de-
manded evidence that the talks were
serious. Administration officials say
the arms shipments were intended to
bolster the so-called moderate factions
and prove they were directly in touch
with the White House.
Q. With whom was the United
States dealing in Iran?
A. Mr. McFarlane has said he met
with officials at the highest level of the
Iranian Government on a trip to Tehe-
ran in May. A State Department offi-
cial has said Mr. McFarlane met with a
group of officials, including Prime
Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi.
When the Lebanese magazine re-
vealed the McFarlane trip, the Speaker
of the Iranian Parliament, Hojatolis-
lam Hashemi Rafsanjani, came for-
ward with his own account. He de-
clared that Mr. McFarlane came to Te-
heran in July carrying a cake and a
Bible but was rebuffed and imprisoned.
Administration officials strenuously
deny this account. There has been
speculation that Hojatolislam Rafsan-
jani or his aides may have been in-
volved in the talks and that his account
was an attempt to protect his position.
Mr. McFarlane has said those with
whom he met now risk execution.
Achievements
Q. What did the United States
achieve in the talks?
A. American officials cite two con-
crete achievements: the release of
three hostages and an Iranian pledge to
stop supporting terrorism against
Americans. But Mr. Shultz said today
that Iran had continued to foment ter-
rorism in the Middle East. He also said
groups that have kidnapped Americans
in recent months have ties to Iran.
Q. What does Iran say about the
affair?
A. The President of Iran, Hojatolis-I
lam Ali Khameini, said Friday that his
country had received a small amount
of weapons from the United States. He
denied any diplomatic negotiations.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201830020-9