CASEY'S POWER PLAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201680004-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 8, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000201680004-4
QUINCY PATRIOT LEDGER (MA)
8 Ivtay 1986
Casey's power .play
The director of central tnteuigence.
Prominent editors of an influential
newspaper. Classified espionage infor-
mation. Threats uttered over the
luncheon table.
.Good stuff for a novel of high-level
intrigue and power plays along the
Potomac.
But they happen to be the real-life
ingredients of the latest skirmish be-
tween government and press over se-
crecy, national security interests and
the right to publish.
The principals are William J. Casey,
duector of central intelligence, the
Justice Department;`~!'ltors of The
Washington Post, two other newspa-
pers and two news magazines.
Casey evidently believes the publica-
tions have classified information they
shouldn't print. He is also aware the
.chance of stopping publication by
direct legal means is very slim.
American courts have a proud tradi-
tion of upholding freedom of informa-
tibn and of the press by rejecting
"prior restraint"-blocking publica-
tion of material the government, for
various reasons, wants to suppress.
One of the classic cases was the U.S.
Supreme Court's 19^1 decision up-
holding The New York Times' right to
publish the Pentagon Papers, key
secret documents accompanying the
government's history of the Vietnam
war.
In order to have any chance at all of
stopping publication, Casey doubtless
knew the U.S. would have to prove the
publications had possession of the
material, and persuade.the courts that.
the information was so sensitive as to
cause irreparable injury to the national
defense-which means judges would
have to review the material.
So Casey decided on another tac-
tic-the scare-'em-off approach. The
U.S. spy chief arranged to have lunch
with Washington Post editors Benja-
min C. Bradlee and Leonard Downie
Jr., at which he warned he would seek
criminal prosecution against the paper
if~t published a story dealing with U.S.
intelligence operations.
"I'm not threatening you," Casey
told the Post editors, "but you've got to
know that if you publish this, I would
rgcommend that you be prosecuted
under the intelligence statute."
` To drive the point home, Casey
dangled the threat of seeking prosecu-
tions against the Post and other publi-
cations, apparently for reporting that
t$e U.S. had intercepted messages
fibm Libya to its missions in East
C~rmany and elsewhere in Europe
dealing with the bombing of a disco
theque in West Berlin. "We've already
got five absolutely cold violations,'
Casey said. The other alleged violator.
he named were The Washington
Times, The New York Times, News
week and Time magazines. Casey knev~
the,editors would munch and tell, anc
that his warning would get around.
His immediate target reportedly i~
to stop publication of information
dealing with the case of Ronald W.
Pelton, a former employee of the
National Security Agency accused of
selling secret information to the Soviet
Union about covert intelligence pro-
jects.
An FBI agent has testified that
Pelton provided the Soviets "specific
information relating to a United
States intelligence collection project
targeted at the Soviet Union," and
that he had access to "extremely
sensitive information relating to that
project."
Casey could have reason for concern
if disclosure of the information he is
worried about would jeopardize impot=
taut ongoing in?elligence activities or
techniques the U.S. might want to
employ again. (It would be interesting
to learn how the intelligence chief got
his information about the material he
thinks the Post possesses.) The press
should weigh carefully the potential
impact on U.S. security interests vs.
the public's ..*ight to know in cases
involving classified material, and Ca-
sey has a perfect right to warn editors
about the possible consequences of
publication.
But threatening prosecution for al-
legedprevious violations of U.S. law to
head off possible publication of other
information is a nasty. tactic, and the
Justice Department should not go
along with Casey's attempt to recruit
its help in intimidating the press-and
its government sources.
On the face of it, the government
would have a hard time convincing any
court that reporting U.S: interception
of Libyan communications damaged
the. national interest.. In_f,3ct, there is
good reason to believe administration
sources leaked the information to give.
substance to U~~.S~~//claims of having
absolutely cond~ing evidence linking
Libya to the Berlin bombing. And as.
Post Managing;_Edi ~ .ow . ~nt_ 5
ed out, "The president imself first
revealed the nature of these intercept-
ed messages. What we reported subse-
quent to that-details of the inter-
cept-did not do anything more to
reveal our intelligence capabilities
than the president himself did."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000201680004-4