DOCUMENT TRACES U.S. LATIN AIMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201090018-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: June 24, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000201090018-4
3 -
ARTICLE APPEAL
ON PAGE~~.
Document
.traces U.S.
'Latin aims
By Alfonso Chanty
Knight News Service
WASHINGTON - President
Reagan, in a secret directive
'signed earlier this year, authorized
.possible new economic sanction
against Nicaragua and diplom;~tie
pressures on Mexico to force both
governments to moderate their poI
icier in Central America.
The directive also instructed
Secretary of State George P. Shults
once again to warn the Soviet
Union, Cuba and Nicaragua that
the United States "will not toler.
ate" the deployment in Nicaragua
of advanced combat aircraft or
Cuban troops. - -
It also ordered the Pentagon tp
activate plans for more military
maneuvers in the region this year
to deter any military activity bjt
Nicaragua against its neighbors
and maintain "steady pressure" 00
the Sandinista government of Nice
ragua. Although administration of`
ficiaLs privately have ascribed rim=
filar purposes to the exercises, pub:
licly Mr. Reagan has denied thel(
had any special meaning.
"I think these maneuvers ark
something we've done before," Mr.
Reagan said in an April cews con-
ference. "They're not something
unusual or aimed at anyone down
there. ... All they are is war
games."
Approval for the admonitions to
Moscow, Managua and Havana and
pressures on Mexico and the San-
dinistas was contained in a Nation-
al Security Decision Document
signed by Mr. Reagan in February:
Portions of the document, stamped
BALTIMORE SUN
24 June 1984
"Top Secret-Sensitive," were examined by
Knight News Service.
A White House official, asked to confirm the
contents of the document, had no comment.
The directive was approved after a National
Security Council session at the White House in
which the president and his chief advisers re-
viewed objectives and options for U.S. policy in
Central America during 1984.
All the objectives, the document said, would
be coupled with an escalation of U.S. "public di-
plomacy" in Latin America and Western Eu-
rope. That would be designed to counter a "Sovi-
et-Cuban-Nicaraguan propaganda campaign"
against U.S. policy in Central America, particu-
larly in El Salvador, according to the document.
"Our diplomatic and communications efforts
should seek expanded political support for El
Salvador from non-Communist governments," it
said.
The segment on Nicaragua asked policy-
makers to "review and recommend such eco-
nomic sanctions against Nicaragua that are
likely to build pressure on the Sandinistas." The
directive ordered the preparation of an "Action
Plan" on these sanctions that was to have been
delivered to the National Security Council by
March 1. That document remains secret.
The document did not specify any concrete
sanctions being considered against Nicaragua,
but an administration source said one possibility
was a ban on Nicaraguan agricultural products
still entering the United States. It is unclear
whether this option was dropped or is pending.
A State Department official said no further
sanctions against Nicaragua are about to be an-
nounced.
Already the administration has succeeded in
denying certain international loans to Nicara-
gua, has reallocated its sugar quota among U.S.
allies is the region and has reduced to a mini-
mum the amount of trade with the country.
A one-paragraph section on Mexico author-
ized officials to "intensify ...diplomatic efforts
with the Mexican government to reduce its ma-
terial and diplomatic support for the communist
guerrillas [in El Salvador] and its economic and
diplomatic support for the Nicaraguan govern-
ment."
The directive said pressure should be applied
"bearing in mind overall U.S. interests and rela-
tions with Mexico," apparently to avoid damag-
ing diplomatic ties between Washington and the
government of President Miguel de la Madrid
Hurtado in Mexico City.
It instructed the State Department to pre-
pare astudy "of ways in which we can supple-
ment our persuasive efforts" with Mexico. That
report, which is still secret, was to have been
delivered to the White House on February 24.
~rOfl~OltB~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000201090018-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000201090018-4 2
According to a source, some administration
officials initially proposed that the directive su-
thorize economic sanctions against Mexico if it
did not comply with U.S. requests. However, the
source indicated that ultimately only diplomatic
:pressure was to be ezerted on Mexico. Other ad-
ministration officials said Mezico might have
:begun to respond, citing its recent moves to up-
grade relations with El Salvador.
The warning against the introduction of com-
bat aircraft and Cuban forces into Nicaragua,
however, constituted the most ezplicit confir-
mation to date that these two developments
would be unacceptable thresholds for the ad-
ministration in Central America.
An administration source said Secretary
Shultz already had carried out this directive in
private messages to the Soviets, Cubans and
Nicaraguans in the last few months. It is not
known, however, if he repeated the warning
when he traveled to Nicaragua June 1 and met
with Sandinista junta coordinator Daniel Orte-
ga. Similar warnings were conveyed to the Sovi-
ets, Cubans and Nicaraguans in 1983.
The directives did not say what the adminis-
tration would do if the warnings were ignored.
But in the past, administration officials have
said such developments possibly could trigger
U.S. military action against Nicaragua.
At one point last year, a senior administra-
tion official speaking to reporters on condition
he not be identified said a "surgical" air strike
against Nicaraguan airfields would be a likely
option if Soviet-built MiG aircraft were discov-
ered in Nicaragua.
Nicaragua has sought the Mies but so far has
not received them. Last year, Nicaraguan Depu-
ty Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco, during
a visit to Washington, said the Sandinista gov-
ernment would delay its request for the planes
' in an effort to induce the United States to ne-
gotiate with his government.
Mr. Ortega visited Moscow last week, and
Western diplomats there said he probably re-
quested increased Soviet military aid. However,
no mention was made of the aircraft.
Turning to U.S. military activity in Central
America, the National Security Decision Docu-
ment instructed Defense Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger, in coordination with Mr. Shultz and
CIA Director William J. Casey, to "conduct U.S.
military activities in the region that are suffi-
cient to reassure our friends and enhance our
diplomatic efforts."
The directive ordered department heads to
"develop and implement plans for new exer-
cises in Honduras and naval activities in waters
off Central America in a manner that will main-
; fain steady pressure on the Nicaraguans and
deter Nicaraguan military action against its
neighbors."
In effect, the directive appears to be the gen-
esis document for the series of military maneu-
vers that took place in Honduras in March as
part of a U.S. effort to provide a framework of
protection for the presidential elections in E1
Salvador.
Another section of the directive showed that
even while President Reagan was asking Con-
gress to approve additional military aid to EI
Salvador in the spring, in February be already
had approved the use of presidential contingen-
cy funds to dispatch emergency military aid to
the country in case Congress did not act in time.
The directive authorized Mr. Reagan to use
Section 21(d) of the Arms Export Control Act to
ship military equipment to the Salvadoran
armed forces because they were said to be run-
. Wing low on supplies.
On April 16, the president did use Section
21(d) to send =32 million in military aid to El
Salvador in light of congressional delays in ap-
proving administration requests.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000201090018-4