NAMIBIA/ANGOLA: TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR 20 JUNE MEETING WITH MR. MCFARLANE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: June 18, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #03116-85
18 June 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Namibia/Angola: Talking Points for Your 20 June
Meeting with Mr. McFarlane
REFERENCE: Your Memo to NIO/Africa, dtd 17 June 85, Subject:
Southern Africa
1 Attached are talking points on the Namibia/Angola negotiation for
use in your 20 June meeting with Mr. McFarlane. Also attached are two
sensitive intelligence reports which are very relevant.
2. I discussed all recent intelligence with
(in John Helgerson's absence), and their
armed points are consistent with that intelli
noted to me that they concurred in the talking points.
3. You may wish to note to Mr. McFarlane that we are currently going
forward with a short fast-track SNIE on the very relevant question of the
changing pattern of US-South African relations.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Atts: A. Talking Points
B.
C.
OCI
DECL OADR
.10
25X1
25X1
DRV HUM 4-82 -" 25X1
s a s and a iev
gence. Both
Ax.~oy
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7
SEC 1- 25X1
18 June 1985
TALKING POINTS: US PROPOSAL ON ANGOLA/NAMIBIA--
SOVIET AND SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSES
The telegrams on Chet Crocker's discussions with the Soviets and the
South African response to US initiatives on Namibia/Angola lead to the
same conclusion: all major players--at least for the present--see US
sponsored diplomatic efforts to negotiate Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW)
from Angola and to attain a full Namibia/Angola settlement as dead in the
water.
The Soviets: Vasev's meeting with Crocker contains no
surprises. The Soviets remain unwilling to assist our efforts
and continue to signal that they have no intention of .
disengaging from Angola. Moscow's continuing willingness to
meet to discuss the issues probably is designed to measure our
depth of commitment to seeking a diplomatic solution.
The South Africans: The South African government's (SAG) reply
to the latest US formulation on CTW is a firm rejection of the
latest US "synthesis" and strongly reiterates the original SAG
position that demands total Cuban troop withdrawal under the UN
435 process. By taking this position, the SAG must realize it
is putting the talks on hold. I believe that the SAG sees time
working in its favor, and as a consequence, is comfortable with
a period of no progress in the negotiations. In particular, it
sees a delay as giving Savimbi's UNITA time to increase pressure
in Angola as well as allow the SAG to reinforce the new de facto
government in Namibia. The SAG installed an "interim"
government in Namibia last weekend.
The MPLA: The MPLA has seized on the recent South African
Cabindan raid as an excuse to temporarily suspend participation
in the negotiations, demanding a "satisfactory explanation" from
the South Africans prior to resuming participation in the
negotiation. The MPLA remains factionally divided on CTW and
currently is preoccupied with a major offensive against UNITA.
State and we both believe that renewed MPLA participation in any
substantive way in negotiations is unlikely until after the
December MPLA party congress. The one factor that can drive the
MPLA into new substantive talks is increased military pressure
from Savimbi's UNITA, which is unlikely in the short term.
UNITA: Savimbi has never been completely comfortable with our
proposals on CTW--he believes it offers the MPLA an infinite
capacity to spin out talks in bad faith. Savimbi has hardened
SE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7
SECRET
his position on US mediation efforts, no doubt with South
African encouragement. He prefers to begin negotiations on what
he sees as the vital issue--MPLA-UNITA reconciliation. This
came through clearly in Savimbi's meeting with Crocker ten days
ago. However, State's assessment that national reconciliation
lends itself even less to US mediation efforts than the Cuban
troop issue is unfortunately correct.
In reality we are in for a lengthy period that lacks even the
appearance--let alone substance--of negotiations on Namibia/Angola. The
growing strain in US-South African relations underscores the fact that
any serious negotiations are unlikely in the near term. (We are
preparing a fast-track SNIE on the changing pattern in US-South African
relations.)
The consensus view--confirmed in a meeting last Thursday in Chet
Crocker's office attended by John, and myself, as well as State
and DoD officials--is that a lower US profile on negotiation efforts
appears to be called for and that a more relaxed, disengaged US posture
will better reflect the on-ground reality. Contacts with major parties
will and should revert to a bilateral context rather than as part of an
overall regional framework.
SEC~7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7
 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7 25X1
Iq
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990024-7