PORTUGAL AND AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7
Memorandum for: THE RECORD
The attached blind memo on Portugal-Africa
relations was prepared by WE/IA.
The request for this information came from the
DCI via the NIO/EUR. It was delivered to
Assistant NIO/EUR on 14 April 1986.
Attachment:
EUR M86-20055
Distribution:
Original - A/NIO/EUR 4 - IMC/CB
1 - D/EURA
1 - DD/EURA
2 - EURA/PS
1 - C/WE
1 - WE/IA Production Book
1 - C/PES
1 - Author
14 April 1986
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7
DATE /.S
DOC NO
M_'aOOSS~
OCR -3
P&PD /
-fi /e
14 April 1986
Portugal and Africa
Although Lisbon divested itself of its African colonies in
the aftermath of the 1974 revolution, it now wants to strengthen
its influence in its former possessions. Portugal's national
identity is bound up with the country's long history of
involvement in Africa, and restoring influence there has become
Lisbon's third foreign policy priority behind maintaining good
relations with Washington and membership in the EC. Because
Portugal's means are limited, many Portuguese leaders--including
President Snares and possibly Prime Minister Cavaco Silva--are
open to cooperative arrangements with the US in instances when US
and Portuguese interests are congruent. Lisbon, for example,
shares the US interest in maximizing Western influence with the
Machel government in Mozambique.
What Portugal is Doing
Portugal has military cooperation agreements with all its
former colonies except Angola and has offered them non-lethal
equipment and training. Portugal's limited resources mean,
however, that deliveries to equipment-starved African countries
generally are infrequent and inadequate.
--Military training--so far limited to Guinea Bissau and Cape
Verde--has been conducted in Portugal because the idea of - 25X1
sending Portuguese troops back to Africa is controversial
both in Lisbon and in the former colonies.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7
Portugal wants to build economic leverage with its former
colonies but its chronically poor economic situation limits
Lisbon's options.
--Lisbon thus is seeking trilateral aid arrangements, under
which it would provide area expertise and manpower for
development projects financed in part or wholly by the US
or other third parties.
--The US and Portugal have agricultural and technical
training agreements, for example, with Mozambique, Guinea
Bissau, and Sao Tome.
--In our view, the Portuguese would be open to further such
cooperation on infrastructure projects, particularly if
they thought such efforts would boost Lisbon's credentials
with existing governments.
Constraints on Portuguese Policy
One problem for Lisbon as it seeks to expand its influence is
the residual bitterness of the former colonies, particularly -
Angola and Mozambique, over the wars of independence. There also
are divisions within Portugal over whether to support existing
governments or rebel forces. These divisions are apparent, for
-example,-in the differing approaches of President Soares and
-former President Eanes.
--Soares's relations with Angolan and Mozambican leaders have
been strained since his tenure as prime minister from 1983
to 1985 because they are convinced he permitted rebel
spokesmen to carry out anti-government propaganda in
Portugal. During the same period, Soares's political foe,
former P s, actively courted the government in
Luanda.
These conflicting approaches persist in current Portuguese
policy toward Angola. The Portuguese.government has quietly
supported the two track approach the United States has followed
in applying pressure through support to UNITA while continuing to
seek a negotiated solution to regional conflicts.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7
--At the same time, the Portuguese are reluctant to identify
themselves publicly with support for Savimbi, however,
because Ljhe risks to their economic interests in Angola.
Social Democratic Prime Minister Cavaco Silva has been in
office less than six months and has no track record on African
policy. We believe he shares the general Portuguese willingness
to cooperate with the US on Africa but he is trying to improve
relations with the regimes in Luanda and Maputo and this may lead
him to publicly criticize US policy initiatives on occasion.
--For example, Cavaco Silva recently expressed "great doubt"
about supporting Savimbi, arguing that this could lead to
intensified Soviet military aid for the Luanda government
and weaken Angolan moderates opposed to the Soviets and
Relations with South Africa
Portugal is publicly critical of South Africa's apartheid
policy, but reluctant to take actions against Pretoria.
--It agreed under EC pressure to withdraw military attache,
but concern for large Portuguese community living in South
Africa holds Lisbon back from supporting strong measures.
--Lisbon also wants to maintain credibility with South Africa
in order to be in a position to serve as a mediator in
Pretoria's conflict with black African states.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403790001-7