ANGOLA: FACING THE COSTS OF US INVOLVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504770001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sl, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504770001-1
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 November 1985
Angola: facing the costs of US involvement
/V
s
By Dam DT ewsom-
T HE United States is about to involve itself once
more in a civil war in Africa.
In his recent speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, President Reagan listed Angola as
one of the countries in which "freedom fighters" were
confronting Soviet surrogates. He clearly had reference
to the UNITA movement, led by Jonas Savimbi. Since
Angola's independence, this movement has been fighting
a guerrilla war against the Marxist-oriented central gov-
ernment in Luanda. a government supported by several
thousand Cuban troops and Soviet-bloc advisers.
Shortly after Angolan independence in 1974, the
Uni States began covert he p to Mr. _avim i. is
was 00 by the eongress under an amen ent spon-
sored v en. Richard Clark of o ; a strong tact r in
support for the amendment was the suspicion of close
ties between Savimbi and the government of South Af-
rica and the desire to resolve related regional problems
through diplomacy
Recently, _.in a different atmosphere and reflecting
growing frustration over the failure of diplomatic efforts
to secure the removal of the Cuban troops and the inde-
pendence of Namibia, Congress repe e t e CIark
amendment. It was inevitable that pressures would start
for renewed assistance in some form.
Proponents of ai to avun i s NITA movement
(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
contend that the Angolan government is undemocratic,
that it is kept in power by Cuban troops and Soviet-bloc
personnel, and that it is, therefore, in the interest of the
US to support the "democratic" forces of Savimbi. This
basically rhetorical argument sidesteps the true issues.
No one denies the nature of the government in Angola
and the presence of the Soviet and Cuban elements. The
true issues are the cost and wisdom of United States in.
volvement in a distant conflict and how most effectively,
in the long run, to preserve US influence in the region.
In the current debate, few raise the question of what
the objectives or expectations might be of any form of US
assistance to Savimbi. Are we seeking to put him in
power in Luanda? Are we hoping that, if we make him
stronger. the govern-
ment in Luanda will ne-
gotiate a settlement of
the civil war'? Do we
hope, by such assis-
tance, to lay the basis
for negotiations of this
and other regional con-
flicts with the Soviet
Union?
Other questions logi-
cally follow Are the pro-
ponents of such aid con-
fident that the requested
amount of $27 million
will accomplish either of
the first two objectives?
Or. as in other cases in
the past, are they hoping to commit the United States so
strongly that we will provide whatever is necessary for
ultimate success? If this is the case, the argument today
should be over the realistic cost of a total effort.
If we intend to negotiate this issue with the Soviets.
have the proponents asked how we will respond to possi-
ble Soviet requests, in such negotiations, to reduce assis-
tance to our friends? The Soviets seldom give away any-
thing for nothing.
Those opposing aid to Savimbi see the issue in Angola
as but one part of a complex set of problems involving
South Africa, Namibia, and the "front line" black states
of southern Africa. In their view, the United States could
pay dearly in resuming such aid, both domestically and
abroad. Increased aid known to be from the United
States would no doubt bring a greater, not a lesser. Soviet
effort on behalf of Angola. Current prospects for a nego-
tiated settlement would recede, not advance. Help to
Savimbi will definitely be seen in the region as support
for a South African objective. This is not the time for the
United States to increase its identification with the re-
gime in Pretoria.
Granted, the efforts to negotiate the complex set of is-
sues in this area of Africa have been long and frustrating.
Undoubtedly, those in South Africa resisting a fair settle-
ment in Namibia hope that the United States will ulti-
mately be persuaded to their view that this is essentially
an East-West issue to be resolved by force of arms.
United States help to Jonas Savimbi can only reinforce
that view and make the diplomatic settlement even more
difficult.
I have seen the United States government pushed by
effective public relations efforts and a simplified ideologi-
cal approach into other unsuccessful and regionally
unsupported efforts in Africa - in Katanga and Biafra. I
find it tragic indeed to see the US once more entering an
African conflict without clear objectives and without fac-
ing up to the true costs and consequences of its actions.
David D. Newsom is associate dean and director
of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at
Georgetown University.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504770001-1