OFFICER WHO BROKE JAPANESE WAR CODES GETS BELATED HONOR

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000504060002-8
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RIPPUB
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K
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2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 11, 2012
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 17, 1985
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OPEN SOURCE
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STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504060002-8 Officer Who Broke Japanese War Codes Gets Belated Honor By EDWIN McDOWELL Forty-three years after Joseph J. Rochefort broke the Japanese code that helped the United States win the Battle of Midway, the former naval officer is to be awarded the Distin- guished Service Medal. It will be given posthumously, be- cause Captain Rochefort - who was denied the medal twice during his life- time and ousted as an intelligence offi- cer after he was first nominated for it - died in 1976. Military and civilian historians say the Navy's dehision to award the medal, one of the highest honors avail- able to a noncombatant, will help rec- tify a longstanding wrong. A World War II Feud Beyond that, however,'they say the award has helped bring to light the bit- ter feuding within the Navy's World War II intelligence operations. "Not only was Captain Rochefort re- moved from his intelligence command in Pearl Harbor soon after the Battle of Midway," said Capt. Roger Pineau, the well-known naval historian, "but the Washington intelligence community, which was wrong about the time and place the Japanese would strike after Pearl Harbor, tried to take credit for Rochefort's code breaks and accurate intelligence evaluation of Japanese ob- jectives.". 'A spokesman for the Navy said the award to Captain Rochefort was based "solely on the merits of the case." But ;several Rochefort supporters said the award was being given because much of the information in a new book, which gives details of Captain Rochefort's case and the machinations within the Navy intelligence community, had found its way into military circles. The book is "And I Was There" (Wil- liam Morrow & Company), the posthu- mous memoirs of Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton, the Pacific Fleet's intelligence officer from 1940 until the surrender of Japan. Admiral Layton died in April 1984 and the book was completed by Captain Pineau and John Costello, a British historian who has written many books about World War II. The publication date of the book, which has an initial press run of 100,000 copies, is Dec. 7, the 44th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Har- bor. NEW YORK TIMES 17 November 1985 Admiral Layton was one of the few 'He Was Yaoked Out of people present during both the attack The Navy would not comment on the on Pearl Harbor and the ceremony of ( earlier decisions not to award the souri. In 1983, he was persuaded to write his memoirs after the gradual re- lease of classified documents in the Na- tional Archives. A Linguist and Cryptologist Among the documents were more than 300,000 decoded Japanese military and diplomatic messages, which form the basis of the book's detailed descrip. tion of the secret radio surveillance of Japanese communications beginning medal. But Arthur Davidson Baker 3d, an official adviser to the Secretary of the Navy, said this was the first time such a proposal had come before John Lehman Jr., who has been the'Secre- tary of the Navy since 1981. However, he added, "Somebody sure as hell did Rochefort in, because he was yanked out of there and never did intelligence again." Admiral Nimitz's recommendation of the medal for Captain Rochefort was: turned down by Adm. Ernest J. King, chief of naval of operations, who is now, ente t the R h f t , was a oc o, e - - Admiral Layton said two people who `"aptai`L dio surveillance. of that ra "He was a Japanese linguist, an in- worked to undermine Captain Roche- telligence analyst and a cryptologist, fort, and strongly advised Admiral all the skills that enabled him to bring ring against singling him out for the together the missing bits and pieces, ' award, were two brothers, Capt. John said Rear Adm. Donald M. Showers, R. Redman stud Comdr. Joseph R. Red- who worked for Captain Rochefort in', man Captain Rodman had boon offitwr 1942 and who successfully petitioned for the Distinguished Service Medal on his behalf. Installed in June 1941 as officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit - Station Hypo - at Pearl Harbor, one of three stations where intercepted Japanese radio messages were sent for deciphering and translating, Captain Rochefort forged a small, dedicated team of analysts. He provided daily intelligence analy- ses to Admiral Layton, then a lieuten- ant commander. Admiral Layton, in turn, conveyed them to Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Their efforts paid off in late May 1942 when, in translating the latest Japa- nese naval code, the Rochefort team succeeded - despite claims from Washington intelligence officials that it in charge of the research desk at naval intelligence in Washington; Com- mander Redman was deputy director of naval communications. Both are now dead. A Rival Team For Captain Rochefort to have re- ceived the medal, Admiral Layton writes, would have been a tacit admis- sion that the principal intelligence breakthrough had been made by his team. "Worse, it would not have squared with the Redmans' claims that their Negat team was responsible for the crucial cryptanalytic success." Capt. Wesley A. Wright, a leading cryptanalyst of World War II who served in Pearl Harbor and Washing- ton, recently said of the Redman broth- ers, "Their specialty was the Office of Naval Communications, and they were very good at It. They felt strongly that codes revealing the time, date and 'naval intelligence that was derived place of the planned invasion of Mid- from intercepted enemy messages U- 1A Les _#-11-A L.e..l.-; _M1 way .a........ Washington, by contrast, had said the target was likely to be Johnston Is- land or the West Coast of the United States, and later than the date of the ac- tual attack. Acting on Rochefort's analysis, Ad- miral Nimitz dispatched three carriers to positions northeast of Midway, out of range of Japanese observation planes. The ensuing three-day battle crippled the Japanese fleet and, at a time when the Pacific War still hung in the bal- ance, turned the tide in favor of the United States. Immediately after the Battle of Mid- way, Admiral Nimitz recommended the Distinguished Service Medal for Captain Rochefort but the Navy De- partment turned it down - ostensibly because Washington and the Philli- pines had also had a hand in the intelli- gence triumph. "But this was a subterfuge," said Mr. Costello. "To award Rochefort the medal would amount to an admission that Washington had committed an in- telligence blunder." AdmiralKing accepted his chief of staff's recommendation that the medal be disapproved, in part because the in- telligence work done by Washington had been "of as high an order as that done in Honolulu." Captain Rochefort was recalled from Pearl Harbor and eventually reas- signed to command of a floating dry dock in San Francisco. He was "speared like a frog," the au- thors say, "and hung out to dry for the rest of the war when he could have done so much more to help us win it." Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504060002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504060002-8 Nimitz Makes 2d Request Captain Rochefort eventually re- turned to intelligence work in Washing- ton in 1944, but in a position of lesser re- sponsibility. In 1946 he was awarded the Legion of Merit. "But that came with just a general citation that re- flected his total wartime service," Ad- miral Showers said. "It said nothing about his work at Midway." In 1958, Admiral Nimitz again took up the Rochefort cause, sending a two-' page, handwritten letter to the Secre- tary of the Navy. That request was also denied, on the ground that awards for action in World War II had been closed. Joseph J. Rochefort Jr., an Army 'aotain and a graduate cF wrest Point. said his father never complained about not being awarded the medal. "His at- titude was, you can accomplish almost anything as long as nobody cares who gets the credit," he said recently. But colleagues familiar with the case continued to lobby on Captain Roche- fort's behalf. These included J. Wilfred Holmes, a writer who served in Station Hypo. His 1979 book about Hypo, "Dou- ble-Edged Secrets," published by the Naval Institute Press, is dedicated to Captain Rochefort. And in 1983, Admiral Showers, draw- ing upon formerly classified intelli- gence materials, again submitted Cap- tain Rochefort's name. Secret Agreement Claimed Admiral Layton's book makes a number of controversial new claims, including that president Roosevelt made a secret agreement with Winston Churchill that the United States would go to war if British territory in the Far East were attacked, and that the Soviet Union might have known how, when and where the Japanese would attack Hawaii. Not everyone agrees with all the Lay- ton assertions. "It's an intriguing hypothesis, but the book does not prove the existence of a Churchill-Roosevelt pact, and I never found any evidence of such a pact in the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence," said Warren F. Kimball, professor of international history at Rutgers Uni- versity and editor of "Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspond- ence." But Professor Kimball said the Lay- ton memoirs were "the first really new evidence on the subject since the open- ing of the diplomatic archives." The undated citation, signed last month by Secretary Lehman and yet to be awarded, cites Captain Rochefort's "exceptional meritorious service." It says the intelligence information on Japanese naval plans and intentions that the Rochefort unit provided "served as the singular basis for the fleet commander in chief to plan his de- fenses, deploy his limited forces and devise strategy to insure U.S. Navy success in engaging the Japanese forces at Midway." Admiral showers said it was all that he and Captain Rochefort's other ad- .nira' rnrn11A harp hnnpd fny Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504060002-8