WHY THEY SPY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000503980016-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP9
I
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON.PAGE
WASHINGTON MONTHLY
October 1985
LETTERS
Why they spy
Despite its useful gathering of statistics on our over-
burdened security clearance system, William Mc-
Gowan's article, "Why We Can't Catch More Spies"
(July/August), greatly oversimplifies one key aspect of
security investigations-spy motivation. His worthy
proposal to "eliminate, or at least reduce, the bureau-
cratic and personal pressures that produce too much
classification, too many clearances, sloppy investiga-
tion, and too little reinvestigation," while useful to
security needs on a cost-efficiency basis, will not pre-
vent replays of the Walker case.
There is simply not enough evidence to support the
well-intentioned opinions that money is the master
motive of spies today. The Soviets may be paying more
for American secrets, but then so are other foreign
powers. For every spy who receives a considerable sum
over a career in spying, many other spies receive little
or nothing.
The history of contemporary espionage shows that
while spies may appear to spy for one major reason,
there can be a bewildering variety of motives involved.
There are at least seven general motives in spying,
though it is difficult without knowing the circum-
stances of each individual case to rank them in impor-
tance: patriotism, or a sense of duty to one's country;
ideology, including communism, a philosophy, creed,
or religious belief; frustration with one's situation or
life; adventure-seeking; money or greed; vanity; and
coercion, including being forced to spy by blackmail,
physical force, fear or indebtedness to a person or
group. A person may spy for any one or a combina-
tion of these motives, but even after a spy may con-
fess it can be difficult to determine precise motives.
Christopher Boyce and Andrew Lee, for example,
were middle-class Californians arrested in the 1970s
for selling U.S. spy satellite secrets to the Soviets.
Money was one of the drug-dealer Lee's motives, but
he was also a close friend of Boyce, who was alienated
by American politics and was one of the millions of
Americans employed in companies with government
contracts and access to secrets. Neither Lee nor Boyce
were poor or disadvantaged, and they decided to ap-
proach the Soviets.
Lie detectors, elaborate regulations, or a reduction
in the number of persons with security clearances will
not appreciably improve our security without also
greater knowledge of the psychology of spies and a
higher level of public security consciousness.
There will be no easy "solutions," and certainly those
put forward by Senator Sam Nunn and Mr. McGowan
will not be the answer. Nor will they get at the root
of our security problem, which is more moral, psycho-
logical, and political than bureaucratic and mechan-
ical. A more effective counter-espionage program can
work if we take a creative approach to government
research into the psychology of espionage. In the area
of education, our national security can benefit from
educating government employees and our citizenry
about the dangers of espionage. I would include
material on counter-espionage even in civics textbooks.
Finally, Congress should consider stiffening penalties
for espionage, strengthening the counter-espionage
capabilities of the FBI, and reducing the numbers of
communist bloc "diplomats" allowed to reside in our
country.
DOUGLAS L. WHEELER
Durham, New Hampshire
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000503980016-3