WHO GLORIFIES TERRORISM? WE DO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201290002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201290002-9
t APP LOS ANGELES TIMES
"F*'-. 5 28 March 1986
Who Glorifies Terrorism? We Do
U.S. Must Become Factual, Balanced-and Quietly Lethal
By ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
Taken at face value, the United States
has just completed a successful military
action-entering the Gulf of Sidra without
loud posturing, waiting for Libya's Col.
Moammar Kadafi to make the first move,
and replying with just enough force to
show that we retained freedom of the seas.
Unfortunately, America's latest encoun-
ter with Kadafi cannot be considered
outside its broader historical and political
context. From this perspective the United
States has been far less successful. The
limited encounters in the Gulf of Sidra fell
far short of being a convincing demonstra-
tion of American strength, and they did not
give credibility to President Reagan's
overblown rhetoric.
Seen from within the Middle East, the
United States is still the nation that lost
in Vietnam and "redeployed"
from Lebanon. It is the nation
that could do nothing to prevent
Israel from invading Lebanon,
and that could not save the Shah
of Iran or later protect its own
hostages. It is now the nation
that made threat after threat
to Kadafi but proved unable to
hurt him or to remove him from
power.
The Gulf of Sidra incident,
then, is a situation where the
United States could not benefit
from exerting legitimate rights.
To most of the Third World the
action has done nothing but
demonstrate that Kadafi can at-
tack a U.S. fleet and get away
with it. It has not discredited the
Libyan strongman: it has dis-
credited the United States. He is
the mouse that roared, and we are the cat
that failed to catch him.
If we are to change this situation in the
future, we have to understand the world
we live in. The unfortunate reality is that
Reagan's rhetoric may play well in Peoria,
but it does little more than weaken or
embarrass most of our allies.
They feel that the President has done
far more to glorify terrorism than to fight
it. They feel that he has "spoken stickly
and carried a big soft." The terrorists
get a maximum of publicity and self-
glorification, with very little fear of "mar-
tyrdom." In fact, most of our closest friends
in the Middle East feel that Reagan has
again made Kadafi seem to be the Arab
who can challenge the United States
without suffering more than the loss of a
few ships and a Soviet-supplied surface-
to-air missile site.
Arab perceptions are even more nega-
tive, and are influenced by much broader
policy issues. The United States seems to
have stopped any real efforts at bringing
peace to the Middle East, and seems to lack
any clear policy or strategy for supporting
friendly Arab states like Tunisia, Jordan,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Reagan
Administration seems to be unable to move
its defense and security assistance program
for the Middle East through Congress. We
make no friends in the Arab world when
we cannot both maintain our commitment
to preserve the security of Israel and
provide military support to Jordan, Saudi
Arabia or other conservative Arab states.
Partly through the carelessness of the
American media, and partly through the
carelessness of the Administration and
Congress, the United States also seems to
be unable to distinguish between a true
terrorist like Kadafi or Abu Nidal and the
rest of the Arab world. Terrorism is not just
a problem for Americans. Far more people
die of terrorism incidents in Lebanon in any
given week, and indeed the bulk of all its
victims are from the Middle East. American
politicians survive even their worst postur-
ing about terrorism; moderate Arab leaders
and spokesmen have often given their lives
for that moderation.
We also seem to be unable to balance our
condemnation of Palestinian terrorism
with a demand for human rights for the
millions of Arabs who have been under
Israeli occupation since 1967. More than
half the Arab world is under age 16 and has
lived its entire life during a time in which
Israel has occupied Gaza and the West
Bank. When America or Israel is attacked,
much of the Arab world perceives what we
call "terrorism" to be self-defense.
This does not mean that we should
tolerate terrorism or abandon Israel. It does
mean, however, that we need a far more
realistic and professional approach to the
problem of both terrorism and dealing with
the Middle East:
-First, the President and senior Ameri-
can officials should stop making threats
or publicizing the terrorists. When terror-
ists are publicly attacked, it should be in
the form of hard evidence of their involve-
ment provided by U.S. intelligence o icers
or specialists with real expertise or credi-
bility. The United States should speak
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201290002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201290002-9 0t
quietly and carefully, and in a form that
few could deny.
-We should attack the roots of terror-
ism by pressing hard for a peace settlement
in the Middle East. It may be years before
the United States can bring Israel and its
neighbors to the peace table under condi-
tions that both give Israel the security
guarantees that it needs and the Arabs
in the occupied territories at least some
degree of sovereignty. But, meanwhile,
Washington should preserve balance in its
dealings with the Arabs and Israel and
condemn every violation of human rights,
whether terrorist or not.
-While the United States should con-
tinue to give both military aid and secur-
ity guarantees to Israel, it should also
provide similar aid or arms sales to friend-
ly Arab states. It should not abandon its
Arab friends for short-term gains in do-
mestic politics.
-The United States should also support
its European allies and Arab states in using
police procedures and the rule of law
wherever possible. It should focus on
creating professional expertise and organi-
zation to arrest terrorists or halt them
before they can act.
-Finally, the United States should
quietly identify the. true leaders of terror-
ist movements that make strikes against
Americans. In those few cases in which
terrorists prove able to exist outside
the rule of law, the United States should
resort to covert action-or, to be blunt,
assassinations. Such terrorists should
no longer feel safe, count on public glory
or hope for some statute of limitations
to excuse them from their acts. But only
at the proper time and in the proper con-
text should U.S. military force be used.
Granted, these recommendations will
please few U.S. politicians who are seeking
cheap publicity rather than an end to
terrorism. The mix of hard and soft
measures will also displease conservative
and liberal alike. The fact remains, how-
ever, that we can only really fight terror-
ism if we act responsibly and take full
account of the political realities outside the
United States. We cannot fight terrorism or
even political extremism in the Middle East
by remaining part of the problem. We
cannot continue to give domestic politics
priority. A superpower can remain a super-
power only by dealing intelligently with
friend and foe alike.
Anthony H. Cordesman is an adjunIt
professor at Georgetown University and
vice president for Washington operations-
of the Eaton Analytical Assessments Center
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201290002-9