U.S. FOREIGN-POLICY DRIFT COULD ALLOW SOVIETS TO WIDEN THIRD WORLD INROADS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000707060033-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: December 15, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/19 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060033-9
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WALL STREET JOURNAL
15 December 1986
,
U.S. Foreign-Policy Drift Could Allow
Soviets to Eiden Third ~o rld I n roads
WASHINGTON
INSIGHT
By ,IccHV W,1u?crlT
Stuff Rvportrr of Tnr: W.u.t. tirner:r J~,t t++~.u.
WASHINGTON-The Iran arms scandal
threatens to plunge U.S. foreign policy into
a period of self-criticism and drift at a
time when the Soviet Union appears to be
mounting a campaign to expand its influ-
ence in the Third World.
Revelations about the bvzantine net-
work of U.S. officials and middlemen that
secretly sold arms to Iran and diverted
some of the profits to Nicaraguan rebels
threaten to destroy public and congres?
sional support for Mr. Reagan's aggressive
anticommunist policies.
Congress has lifted restrictions on aid to
rebels in Angola and Nicaragua, but the
debate over U.S. support for anticommun?
ist rebels still rages. The issue transcends
questions of whether b1r. Reagan was
bamboozled by the Iranians and whether
administration officials broke the law by
funneling money to the Nicaraguan Con-
tras. ~Yhatever the ~rnswers, the debate
over whether and how to combat Soviet ad-
vances in the Third World wrll remain.
Seeking Better Relations
Indeed, the question will become more
pressing if, as some &>vietulugrsts suspect.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev as taking
some important Third World nations more
seriously than his predecessors did. :dir.
Gorbachev appears to be listening to
Karen Brutents, a foreign-policy strategist
nn the staff of the Communist Partv's Cen-
tral Committee. Mr. Brutents argues that
the Soviet Union should seek better rela-
tions with :Mexico, Argentina and other
countries whose relations with the U.S. are
straaned by economic problems and other
troubles.
:qtr. Gorbachev recently returned from
India, a longtime ally, and he wrll try to
stregthen ties with Mexico in a visit early
next year. The Soviets recently upgraded
economic ties with .lrgentina. And in
Chile. ['.S. intelligence anah~sts believe.
93oscow has encouraged Icx~.d communists
LS1eD tin armed atCacks nn Gin augusw
Pinochet's dictatursha >.
Soviet military ai to the gcn?ernments
of Angola and Nicaragua has increased
this year, despite Moscow's economic
woes. Finally, in Iran. increased Soviet in-
telligence activities, awns sales and new
economic ties helped prompt Israeli, L'.S.
and perhaps even some Iranian officuals to
try to improve relations between Tehran
and Washington.
Confronting communism was simpler 30
years ago. The arenas wart' usually mare
familiar, often places of unyuestion im-
portance to the West-Berlin, say, or Cuba.
The rules were different. When leaders un-
palatable to the West took Dower in Iran or
Guatemala. the Central Intellieence
Agency removed them. When the Kremlin
sponsored an insurgency in Greece, Presi-
dent Truman sent military aid to the
Greeks. When Soviet tanks rolled up to
Checkpoint Charlie, American gunners met
them, toe?to-toe.
Less-Familiar Places
Nnw the East-West competition has
shifted to less familiar-and, many argue.
less important-places: Afghanistan, Ethi-
opia, Nicaragua. Instead of employing
tanks or blackmail, as they did in Eastern
Europe, the Soviets have learned to use a
mixture of military power iAfghanistanr,
military aid rNicaragua, Angola and Viet?
namr, proxy forces cAngolar, covert action
ilranr and traditional political and eco-
nomic diplomacy.
The presrdent's effort to replace the
Cold War policy of containment with an ag-
gressive attempt to roll back communism
in the Third World, the so-called Reagan
Doctrine, relies on covert support for de-
signated "freedom fighters," such