CUBA, NICARAGUA: THE PARALLELS ARE MANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100260018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21 :CIA-RDP90-00965
MIAMI HERALD
` [ ~~~
il,aTtr?~..F APPEARED '~
__ ____ ,
13 April 1986
~~
~
LC
Cuba, Nicaragua: The parallels
are many
~ u,I~INING
he incumbent U.S. administration
T says it wants a negotiated solution
to outstanding problems but won't
negotiate with preconditions. The U.S.
sugar quota is cut. A trade ban is imposed.
Atop politician declares that "the forces
fighting for freedom in exile ...should be
sustained and assisted." He complains that
the "fighters for freedom have had
wfrtually no support from our govern-
ment."
A State Department White Paper
charges that in the past nine months more
than 30 tons of arms valued at =50 million
have been received from the Soviet bloc;
that the armed forces are dependent on
the Soviet bloc for maintenance of their
armed power; that Soviet and Czech.
military advisers and technicians have
accompanied the arms flow; and that
pilots have gone to Czechoslovakia and
the Soviet Union for training a~ jet pilots.
It sounds remarkably like events
related to Nicaragua in recent years.
In fact, the incidents cited all occurred
in the months preceding the unsuccessful
April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.
The parallels are many. And perhaps
not so Ironically, although there is no
evidence to suggest a cause and effect, the
Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) now ruling Nicaragua was born
the same year the Bay of Pigs invasion
was launched from Nicaragua.
relations were broken Jan. 3, 1961, was to
later write in his book, Cuba, Castro and
the United States, "President Kennedy's
inauguration in fact brought with it no
change in the Cuban policy of the United
States government.
"The overthrow of Castro was the
objective of that policy - an overthrow
to be encompassed by all means short of
an involvement on Cuban soil of Ameri-
can armed forces. The program included
the economic measures already described
plus an American-created military force
made up of anti-Castro Cubans to be used
in an operation or operations that would
lead to the downfall of the regime."
Substitute Nicaragua for Cuba, and it
appears to summarize Reagan administra-
tion policy today.
Even the arguments of policy critics
then and now sound eerily similar.
"The administration's imperfectly se-
cret preparations for an invasion of Cuba
by a force of exiles and refugees and the
possibility that American armed forces
might also participate in such an invasion
were responsible for the increasing quan-
tities of arms and military equipment sent
by the Russians to Castro after the middle
of 1960," writes Bonsai.
It is much the same argument that is
given by defenders of Nicaragua's exten-
sive military buildup.
"It's almost usual that if a chief
executive is trying to do something
with his foreign policy he will look to
the ~ CIA as an easy out. , at can e
done ease y an c eaply compared to a
military operation. It's somewhere in
between diplomacy on the one hand
and military action on the other. If it
succeeds, he can take credit. fit fails,
he can blame the CIA: ' ,
s o ic~a , e others, noted
that it is much harder to keep a secret
today than it was in 1961 - a fact that
has brought the debate over Nicaragua
much more into the open than was the
case with Cuba.
He also sees the rhetoric surround-
ing Nicaragua, particularly from the
administration, as much more shrill
than it was regarding Cuba in the
period leading up to the Bay of Pigs.
At the same time, he sees the Soviet
Union as much more muted in its
defense of Nicaragua than it wasln its
defense of Cuba.
David Atlee Phillips in charge of
propaganda and psyc o ogica _ war are
for the Bav o igs o ~era_ ~ion ana -ater
hief of Latin Americancan a~i can
erations for the IA, a so sees some
para e s - as we as major differ-
ences - between Cuba then and
Nicaragua now.
"Disregarding the myth that every-
one expected a spontaneous uprising in
Cuba, there were almost- nightly pro-
tests in the form of bombings, sabotage
and other indications of internal resis-
tance [in Cubaj, much more than you
ever read about regarding Nicaragua
now."
Phillips believes the rhetoric is
considerably more shrill now than it
was prior to the Cuban invasion and
thinks the American public was even
more apathetic about Cuba and Castro
than it is about Nicaragua.
"Castro had a marvelous press, he
was an astute politician in dealing with
the press. the exact opposite of the
present regime in Nicaragua," Philips
observes.
The Herald asked three senior CIA
icia s. now re r w o were ei der
As with Nicaragua now, the incumbent
administration in Washington in the year
prior to the Bay of Pigs (then that of
President Eisenhower), increasingly
alarmed by Soviet Influence in Cuba,
secret) financed, organized and trained
,sn exi a orce un er rec on.
was a orce ~a r si n ennedy
was to inherit upon his January 1961
inauguration and he appeared as commit-
ted to ridding the hemisphere of Fidel
Castro as did Eisenhower.
It was Kennedy during his 1960
presidential campaign against then Vice
President Richard Nixon who had com-
plained that the U.S. government .had
given virtually no support to the Cuban
"freedom fighters."
As Philip Bonsai. the last American
ambassador to Cuba before diplomatic
intimate y invo ve in a planning an
execution of the Bay of Pigs or in the
postmortem on why it failed, if they
saw any parallels between the circum-
stances and atmosphere in the months
leading up to the Cuban invasion and
that regarding Nicaragua now.
All three did, while also noting some
significant differences. Two of the
three asked not to be identified by
name.
"There is a considerable amount of
para a sal one ran ine ormer CIA
official who was involved in dissectin
what went wron at t e a o
` icaragua is ig y rustrating as
far as the president is concerned, as
Cuba was then. As a consequence,
Reagan is groping for something to do.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100260018-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100260018-7
"There was not much public con-
cern about Cuba. If the word apathetic
is going to be used it was even more so
then than it is now. The public hadn't
been stirred up by the administration."
"If there is an historical lesson in
the $ay of Pigs it is that we are in
danger of putting ourselves in the same
situation in Central America, not only
with countries bu[ with individuals,"
says Phillips, the implication being that
it should be all or nothing with no half
measures. Otherwise we leave our
friends hanging.
It's the same concern ex ressed by
n r r n m ormer o ~cia
this one directly involved in t e
planning and execution of the Bay of
Pigs.
"We seem to have a history of
getting our friends involved in things
up to the point of na return when
we're not prepared to back them up,"
says the former official, speaking
specifically of Honduras' role in pro-
viding a base for the U.S.-backed
Nicaraguan rebei contras.
"Either that system in Honduras is
going to fall or the one in Nicaragua is
going to fall and I don't see the
Hondurans getting the level of aid,
training, etc., from us that (Nicaraguan
President Daniel] Ortega seems to be
getting from the Soviet bloc."
As for the parallels between Cuba
and Nicaragua, he says "one of the
similarities then and now which both-
ers me is the depth of division within
the Congress and the administration
over how to proceed on an operation of
this sort. That was certainly the case
with Cuba, although it was not as
much in the open.
"I don't really see how any -thing of
this sort has the chance of attaining its
ultimate goal when you have these
tremendous divisions ...."
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100260018-7