OLD ENEMIES UNITE AGAINST KREMLIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170110-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 11, 2012
Sequence Number: 
110
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 12, 1980
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170110-4.pdf113.06 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170110-4 RTIGLE A _Fr ON PAGE JACX ANDERSON THE WASHINGTON POST 12 April 1980 Old Enemies Unite ainst Kre The Kremlin's decision to invade Af- these often clumsy diplomatic moves, as may not have realized that what' ice, ghanistan was not reached without some CIA reports illustrate. down well in Kabul is likely to raise the- serious misgivings, U.S intelligence, Afghan= Prime Minister ; Mohammad roof in Islamabad," a CIA topseCret: analysW report. One of the-Soviet strate- Daoud was ousted by his cousin and umbra report observes. gists' principal concerns was the possibil- brother-in-law, King Zahir Shah, in 1963 The Soviets' clumsy attempts to bring ity that the aggression might unite.the because of -his "authoritarian methods their Moslem neighbors together- in, the adverse economic effects of his Sovietdominated "collective security' tile Moslems of Pakistan and Af and 1on ho . g s ghanistan - and. this is precisely what tough policies toward Pakistan," the CIA failed. But their military aggression sde has happened. review notes. ceeded, ironically., in uniting the tradi= . "Only such a military action could fi- But when Daoud was recalled in 1973, tional enemies - against the Soviet. nally have pushed those diverse factions 1{ the situation "began to worsen sharply," Union. together," said one State Department ex- according to the CLA. "He began at once Hello, Central One of the GTe'q pert who has monitored the situation for to increase sharply agitation on the molt jealously guarded secrets is the tut- years. Thiel may turn the possibility of a Pushtunistan question." listed "panic number" it maintains fot'se= Vietnam-style quagmire for the Russians Shortly after his return, the CIA began lected personnel to call in an emergency.. into a reality, he added. picking up reports that he "has trained Unfortunately for the dignity of the There has been bitter emnity between and equipped Pakistani dissidents to / agency, practical jokers often give out Afghanistan and" Pakistan? for example, carry out sabotage on the Pakistani side the supersecret number for laughs or. over Pushtimistan, the two Pakistani " of the border." Though he denied this personal convenience. Women employes, provinces that border on Afghanistan. publicly, Daoud admitted to CIA sources for instance, have been known to We it As a secret CIA historical overview that he would give "sanctuary and finan- out to unwanted, over-amorous dates as noted, theAfhans had "long claimed that cial assistance" to Pakistani dissidents in their home. telephone number. ,'Tile these provinces, whose people are ethni- the two disputed provinces. eager swain. winds up talking to a CLk closer to Afghanistan's dominant Daotud's overtures to India further exa- case officer,,' who answers "Security tall y Pushtun tribal than to most Pakistanis, `_ cerbated this country's relations with Pa- Force,." and is coldly unsympathette.to should -be granted autonomy or; self-de- kistan. So strong was the antipathy to- the caller's complaint of, passion be- termination." ward Pakistan that Daoud, and even the trayed. The Pushtunistan dispute was visceral, according to one source, and erected an emotional barrier that no Afghan or Pa- kistani leader could safely breach.. The hostility between the two nations might have continued indefinitely if the Soviets hadn't marched into Afghanistan. "Russia's . aggression has cemented them in a way that nothing else could have done," a CIA analyst told my associ- ate Dale Van Atta. The Soviets' o military aggression marked the failure of longstanding, heavy-handed attempts by the Kremlin to gain dominance over Afghanistan by indirect means, and the Pushtunistan issue was usually the sticking point in - two Soviet puppets who succeeded him Annoying drunks nave also had it after he was assassinated in 1978, held . totted off on them as a "hot number," back from they Russians' "pet concept," and are told bluntly that not only is'Lulu an Asian collective security system in not back in town, she was never there at which the Soviet Union was to be. the all. Occasionally, ordinary fumble-fin- dominant partner. gered citizens dial the number by'acc A bumbling Soviet diplomat, Alexan- dent: der Pusanov, contributed to the Afghan- - They ' even. answered when nij ' "M Pakistani differences when he suggested porter James Grady called at I1?.30 one to the Pakistani ambassador in Kabul night. Grady assured the case officer and "that Pakistan make territorial conces- the CIA spokesman who called the-next sions to Afghanistan in the interests of day that we had no intention of publish- mutual harmony." ing "the number. Obviously, the agency Word of this got back to Islamabad, can't have the number changed:-'It and the Pakistanis were not impressed wouldn't do for some poor spook out in by Pusanov's attempt to blame the gaffe ' the field to dial it in desperation.'.. a and on aninterpreter's mistake. ..`Pusanov get a recording. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170110-4