HANGING ON IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100120012-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 30, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/22 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100120012-8
." a r:~..-
_E~l- -
WASHINGTON POST
30 November 1985
JACK ANDERSON and JOSEPH SPEAR
the U.S. Embassy m Kabul, the embattled
capital of Afghanistan. It's not a pretty picture.
Far from protecting the Americans stationed
there, the Soviet puppet government of
Afghanistan inspires and encourages a constant
campaign of denunciation in the press,
"spontaneous" mass demonstrations, ha{assment
and threats of physical violence against our
diplomats.
With a professional diplomat's understatement,
charge d'affaires Ed Hurwitz noted in one cable to
Washington: "Our relations with the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan are probably colder and
more limited than with any other country in which
we maintain an embassy." The United States has
never sent a replacement for Ambassador Adolph
Dubs, who was kidnaped, then killed in a botched
rescue attempt in February 1979, months before
Soviet invasion.
"The regime claims that the United States is its
primary enemy and threatens us accordingly,"
Hurwitz continued. "Frequently labeled as a nest of
spies, the embassy has had four officers declared
persona non grata within the last 2~/x years. Most
embassy staff members are regularly followed by
secret police agents, and all but a few of our FSNs
have been arrested on espionage charges." FSNs,
or "foreign service nationals," are Afghan citizens
employed in nonsensitive positions by the embassy.
According to U.S. cables obtained by our
reporter Jenny Cunningham, the Afghan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs delivered anone-too-subtle threat
Hanging On in Afghanistan
C onfidential State Department cables provide a to the embassy in September 1983, claiming that it
glimpse of the life of American diplomats at would be unable to prevent "angry Afghans from
taking action against our buildings and staff
members." And in fact, the regime has apparently
done nothing to stop frequent anti-American
demonstrations in front of the embassy. As in other
communist countries, such demonstrations cannot
take place without the government's collusion.
"This highly restrictive environment necessarily
puts severe limits on the goals and objectives of the
embassy," Hurwitz cabled Washington. "We have
little hope of influencing [Afghan government)
policy decisions, nor can we perform those
commercial or informational functions which are '
normally part of an embassy's portfolio."
Why stay, then? Hurwitz disagrees with critics
who complain that the embassy's continued
presence in Kabul gives tacit recognition to the
Soviet puppet regime. He also points out that, for
all the restrictions, the embassy is able to collect
some information on the fluctuating situation in
Afghanistan that is valuable to Washington
policy-makers.
The embassy staff is also able to keep the Soviet
aggression in Afghanistan from becoming "the
forgotten war" by sending out information that can
be used by the press, which is barred from
Afghanistan. Continued world attention will exert
pressure on the Kremlin to negotiate a settlement,
Hurwitz believes.
Remarkably, Hurwitz reported that "employe
morale has generally been high in Kabul, since mos!
people have volunteered for the job and know what
they are getting into." ~..
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/22 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100120012-8