RESTRUCTURING THE IC STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R001001800003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 22, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Remarks To 5: Please provide your comments,
as requested.
E five Secretary
3 Aep 86
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22 September 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Restructuring the IC Staff
I like the idea of restructuring the IC Staff along these lines with
an analytic/requirements group and a broader and more effective committee
structure for SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT. What do you think?
William J. Casey
Attachment:
Non-htemorandum from General Odom, subj. A Radical Approach
to a Conservative Intelligence
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SECRET
NON-MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: A Radical Approach to a Conservative Intelligence
Strategy
1. I promised you that I would offer an "off-line" approach
to meeting your requirement for a comprehensive intelligence
strategy. It is "conservative" in the sense of being rather
straight forward, simple, and related to U.S. commitments and user
intelligence needs. It is radical in that to implement it you
would have to make dramatic changes in program manager
responsibilities, to include creating fundamentally new program
managers for IMINT and HUMINT.
2. The logic of the memo is:
-- define the "threat' to U.S. interests;
-- state briefly U.S. military and political commitments
regionally and functionally;
-- clarify intelligence requirements in light of the
threat and commitments;
-- describe our intelligence structure and capabilities
to meet requirements;
-- set forth the functions required of each collection
discipline (HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and analysis);
and,
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-- then add to each discipline a brief statement of its
strategy for meeting the future requirements of the
coming decade.
3. We do not operate this way today because you do not have
program managers aligned to be responsible for individual
disciplines. As a result, when the IC Staff tries to structure
alternatives for resource increases or decreases, the results are
not logical ties between 'inputs" (money and manpower) and
"outputs" (intelligence product) in the context of threats and
policy/operational commitments. For example, in the recent
program drills, IC Staff guidance to PMs affects SIGINT in the
the GDIP, the CIAP, and the NRP as well as the CCP. I have
no way of knowing if this makes sense. Nor does the IC Staff. If
you had three collection program managers and an analysis program
manager, then each could give you a coherent program with regard
to outputs of intelligence. You and the IC Staff could then deal
with cross-discipline trade offs (e.g., can we drop some SIGINT
because HUMINT or IMINT can do the job?) and questions of quality
and quantity of intelligence (e.g., do we really need to know
about some things on the national intelligence requirements lists;
and do we want to know more or less about a target, can we get by
with less?).
4. The DIRNSA is the logical manager for SIGINT and is more
nearly in that position than is the case for any of the other
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S ~C R ET
disciplines. The CIA/DDO could take a DIRNSA-like role for HUMINT
and deal with the military services and the foreign service
(State) like I deal with the military services (SCEs working under
my OPCON and tasking). You have no imagery manager; COMIREX is
somewhat in that posture, but it has no program control. Anew
position with an institutional base needs to be created for this
role. Your DDI could be the analysis program manager; or you
split this function between military and non-military (DIA and
DDI). In any event, the Director of DIA would be the major
military producer.
5. I have left out two functions: counterintelligence and
covert action. Each needs a tsar, in my view, and I have some
ideas on structure, but for this purpose here, I believe you can
see how my proposal for a "strategy" would necessitate a different
management for both CI (crossing FBI, Treasury, DoD, CIA, and
others) and covert action (where we need a review of who supplies
the paramilitary forces, who does the non-military covert action,
and who commands and controls both kinds of operations -- big
issues between you and DOD, but I believe you could acquire
virtual "OPCON" over all Special Operations Forces in DoD in
exchange for abandoning CIA paramilitary and retaining all CIA
non-paramilitary covert action. In the meanwhile, if you don't
take some measure like this, Congressman Daniels will take it for
you and the SECDEF by creating an independent agency and a C2
nightmare.
SECRET
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6. I realize these are fairly sweeping proposals for change,
but as I suggest in the title of this memo, they are radical
organizationally but conservative fiscally and with regard to
intelligence capabilities.
7. If you find the concept more serious than amusing, then I
would like to talk with you about it.
Lieutenant General, USA
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