BRIEFING PAPERS ON THE SANDINISTA MILITARY BUILD-UP AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000901450024-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: January 23, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTINCSLIP
Chm/NIC
Compt
VC/NIC
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20
D/A A,101
22
STAT
29 Jan 86
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
January 23, 1986
SUBJECT: Briefing papers on the Sandinista Military Build-up
and the International Court of Justice: Nicaragua v.
United States
A great deal has been written about the expansion of the
Sandinista military, and about the suit brought by Nicaragua
against the United States at the World Court (ICJ). The
enclosed briefing papers focus on key facts and arguments
essential to understanding these issues--for example when the
Sandinistas began building up their military forces, relative
to the formation of the armed opposition, and how the
Sandinistas' support for the Salvadoran guerrillas affects
Nicaragua's claims in the World Court.
A more detailed paper, also called The Sandinista Military
Build-up, is available from S/LPD, Room 5917, U.S. Department
o State, Washington, DC 20520.
-Sincerely,
-john D. Blacken
Acting Coord'ixator of Public Diplomacy for
Latin//America and the Caribbean
- ,e) L/ jo- 4
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International Court of Justice:
Nicaragua v. United States
On October 7, 1985, the United States terminated its acceptance of the "compulsory
jurisdiction" of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Review of the U.S. acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction was prompted by the case brought by Nicaragua alleging illegal
military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua.
Two separate issues, (1) the ICJ's jurisdiction, and (2) evidence of Nicaragua's support for
the Salvadoran guerrillas, dominate the ICJ case.
ICJ, or World Court: The ICJ is the judicial organ of the United Nations. The ICJ's
jurisdiction derives from the consent of the states involved. States consent (1) by agreeing to
limited jurisdiction over particular cases, or (2) by submitting a declaration accepting the
Court's "compulsory jurisdiction" over cases concerning itself and other states that also accept
compulsory jurisdiction.
? The U.S. accepted compulsory jurisdiction in 1946.
? Apart from the U.S., only 46 of 159 UN member states now accept compulsory jurisdiction.
States may make reservations to their declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction,
specifying any-cases, or types of cases, they will not submit to ICJ adjudication.
? Among other things, the U.S. reserved from the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction " disputes
arising under a multilateral treaty unless ... all parties to the treaty affected by the
decision are also parties to the case before the court."
? ICJ jurisdiction under treaties and agreements is not affected by termination of the 1946
declaration.
Nicaragua v. United States: The U.S. contends that the ICJ has no jurisdiction to decide
Nicaragua's claims because:
1. Nicaragua never validly accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and therefore
cannot sue or be sued in the ICJ on that basis.
2. Before Nicaragua brought suit, the U.S. modified its acceptance to exclude for a period of 2
years matters related to Central America.
3. Nicaragua's claims affect treaty rights of its neighbors and fall under the " multilateral
treaty reservation" in the U.S. declaration of 1946.
4. Nicaragua's claims concern collective security and self-defense matters which the UN
Charter assigns to UN political bodies for resolution.
Despite strong evidence in support of these arguments, the ICJ held that it has jurisdiction and
that Nicaragua's claims are appropriately settled in the Court.
Sandinista Intervention in El Salvador: The second key issue in the ICJ case is Nicaragua's
claim that it "is not engaged, and has not been engaged in" support for the Salvadoran
guerrillas. Nicaragua alleges that U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance is illegal, and
unprovoked because Nicaragua has never acted against its neighbors in any way that would
give them or the United States the right to act against Nicaragua in individual or collective
self-defense.
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Congress, intelligence* agencies, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America and
critics of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua have found that, "contrary to the repeated denials of
Nicaraguan officials, that country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran
insurgency." (Press release, March 4,1982, Congressman Edward P. Boland, Democrat of
Massachusetts) The Sandinistas have:
? Smuggled Soviet-bloc arms and transferred weapons in their own inventory to the
Salvadoran insurgents.
? Trained Salvadoran guerrillas in military tactics, weapons, communications and
explosives, and served as a transit point to guerrilla training camps in Cuba and the
Soviet bloc.
? Harbored and advised Salvadoran rebel military leadership.
? Enabled guerrilla radio stations to broadcast from Nicaragua.
? Supported terrorist and subversive activities against neighboring states.
Nicaragua's claim that it does not support the Salvadoran insurgents has been undermined, for
example, by:
? Miguel D'Escoto's admission of Nicaragua's support at a July 1983 meeting of the
Contadora group.
? Testimony at the ICJ by a witness for Nicaragua that "it could be taken as a fact that at
least in late 1980/early 1981, the Nicaraguan Government was involved in the supply of
arms to the Salvadoran insurgency," and that the Sandinistas allow guerrilla
communications, and command and control activities, to operate from inside Nicaragua.
? Extensive evidence of Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras
compiled in 'Revolution Beyond Our Borders': Sandinista Intervention in Central
America, " September 1985, U.S. Department of State.
? The apprehension by Honduran authorities on December 7, 1985 of a Soviet-made car en
route from Nicaragua to El Salvador carrying 450 pounds of military supplies to the
Salvadoran guerrillas. The car was driven by two members of a Costa Rican Marxist
party, some of whose members have been trained by the Sandinistas in guerrilla warfare.
Inside concealed compartments made for the car in Nicaragua were ammunition,
grenades, bomb fuses, medical supplies, $27,400 in cash, and radios labeled for specific
Salvadoran guerrilla commanders, all wrapped in pages of Barricada, the Sandinista
party newspaper.
Current Position of the U.S.: On January 18,1985, the U.S. withdrew from further
participation in Nicaragua v. U.S., but will continue to participate in ICJ proceedings that are
consistent with ICJ functions as defined by the UN Charter, and based on specific agreement of
the parties.
1/2/86
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean
Room 6253 N.S.
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
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Sandinista Military Build-up
Immediately after the fall of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the Sandinistas (FSLN) began
building the largest armed forces in the history of Central America. The build-up:
? is unprovoked and far exceeds defensive needs.
? threatens Nicaragua's neighbors, who have been objects of Sandinista aggression
since 1979.
? provides unprecedented instrument of force for suppression of domestic opposition.
Origins of Build-up: The "72-Hour Document," presenting the conclusions of a 3-day FSLN
strategy session in September 1979, shows the Sandinistas intended to create a large military
force loyal to the FSLN party and the "revolution" as defined by the Marxist leadership
"vanguard."
? The Sandinistas signed economic assistance and party-to-party agreements with the
Soviet Union in March 1980, and, probably, a secret military agreement, as Soviet
military supplies began arriving within months of Somoza's fall.
? Thus, the military build-up started a full 2 years before any armed resistance to the
Sandinistas existed and at a time when the United States and other countries were
providing significant amounts of economic assistance. U.S. alone provided $118 million in
the first 18 months of Sandinista regime.
Dimensions of the Build-up: FSLN troops number 119,000, with 65,000 on active duty, and
54,000 in the reserves and militias.
? 3% of Nicaragua's 2.7 million people are under arms, a ratio of troops to population almost
3 times as high as El Salvador, 4 times as high as Guatemala, and 5 times as high as
Honduras. Costa Rica has no army.
? Somoza's National Guard numbered 14,000 men at its height.
? The Sandinistas instituted the first systematic draft in Nicaragua's history for men 18-40
in 1983. In efforts to enforce the draft, the government raids schools and movie theaters,
and conscripts seminarians.
External Support: Nicaragua receives personnel and sophisticated equipment from a
number of Soviet-bloc and radical governments and groups:
? Cuba sent the first of approximately 3,000 military/security advisers a week after Somoza
fell, helped build Punta Huete Airport, capable of accommodating any aircraft in the
Soviet arsenal, and advises and trains Salvadoran rebels in Nicaragua.
? The USSR has sent over $500 million in military aid since 1981, including 300 SA-7
surface-to-air missiles, 5-8 Mi24 and a dozen Mi8 attack helicopters, 100mm Howitzers,
military and civilian advisers, communications, and transport equipment.
? Libya supplies SF-260 aircraft and helicopters, pilots, and mechanics.
? Bulgaria began training Sandinistas to fly MiGs in 1980.
? East Germany, PLO, Libya, North Korea, Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia provide
equipment, training, and personnel.
1/2/86
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean
Room 6253 N.S.
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20520
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central IntelligencE
Washington, D.C. 20505
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