USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000600690002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 23, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP88G01116R000600690002-9
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP88G01116R000600690002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000600690002-9
23 November 1986
USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
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Process
- Better use of intelligence than any Administration since the war.
-- First time all NSC principals have read PDB. Same base
of current intelligence. Dialogue with briefs has given
us best feedback ever.
-- First time all NSC principals get National Estimates
directly and in brief form.
-- First time principals have had (and used) opportunity to
get long range CIA research papers directly, based on list
each week in PDB.
-- Better access, use of intelligence and dialogue at lower
levels too (Assistant Secretaries, etc.).
-- Greater participation and opportunity to express their
views for chiefs of all intelligence components (military,
State, NSA, FBI, Treasury, etc.) in formulation and
finalization of intelligence estimates.
-- More intelligence sanitized for use with public than ever
before: Soviet strategic forces, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Libya, terrorism, etc.
-- Almost no principals give us regular feedback on NIEs, good
or bad, or other products or reporting either.
-- Few senior policymakers give us any time or energy on
requirements, current or long range.
-- If policy agency has different view, intelligence is frequently
ignored or discounted.
-- Few have come to us to complain intelligence not objective
- only example, Shultz to me on Angola.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000600690002-9
 STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000600690002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000600690002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000600690002-9
Observations
-- CPPG has been a useful policy vehicle and opportunity for second
level officials to integrate intelligence information - same
set of officials as core built mutual confidence and familiarity
(and trust) at sub-NSC level. Few, if any, leaks in six years.
-- State has become more shrill in attacking intelligence in last
year or two State disassociates
self from some NIEs, footnotes most, questions value of many.
-- In trying to get Presidential decisions by by-passing NSC
meetings, Secretary of State shuts him off from views other than
State's (Angola, sometimes Middle East and Central America, Reykjavik).
Consequences on those occasions frequently bad.
-- Absence of written summary of NSC meetings circulated to principals
leaves them uncertain or disagreed about what National Security
Adviser or President took away from the meeting. Not an orderly
process that gives people confidence that President has seen and
understood all points of view, including the intelligence.
3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000600690002-9