US SENDS NEW ARMS TO REBELS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070041-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: February 13, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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III
U.S. Sends -
,WANION3 OSF
New Arms
To Rebels
Afghans, Angolans
Get Stinger Missiles
In Change of Policy
By David B. Ottaway
and Patrick E. Tyler
Wastungtaa Past Staff Writers
hesitatm
tic
for
be I ? nit_ several
Unger miss rtIT to ail*
communist rebe in Angola and Af-
ghanistan, informed sources said
yesterday.
The decision, which has been
closely held among the president's
national security affairs advisers
since it was made earlier this
month, marks a major shift in U.S.
policy. Shipments of top-of-the-line
American arms to such insurgents
had been barred in favor of furnish-
ing largely Soviet- and Chinese-
made weapons bought on the inter-
national arms market or from U.S.
allies.
The change in policy is certain to
broaden involvement of the Central
Intelligence Agency in Third World
conflicts and appears likely to es-
calate the fighting in Afghanistan
and Angola, where Soviet helicop-
ter gunships have inflicted heavy
casualties on rebels forces in the
past year.
The shift occurred after activists
in the Pentagon and the CIA,
backed by conservatives in the Sen-
ate and elsewhere, overcame op-
position by officials in the State De-
partment, as well as some in the
CIA. Opponents of the change long
have argued that introduction of
U.S.-made weapons into Third
World conflicts escalates those
struggles into U.S.-Soviet confron-
tations. Those situations pose
touchy problems for neighboring
states attempting to maintain a neu-
tral diplomatic posture while pro-
viding a route for U.S.-backed arms
shipments.
See STINGER, A16, Col. I
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1O16 Si NI).%). NIA114.11:m. IInth
U.S. Sending
Missiles to
Third World
STINGER, From Al
Introduction of such weapons
also makes it more difficult for the
U.S. government to maintain a pos-
ture of "plausible deniability" of its
involvement in such conflicts.
A White House spokesman said
the administration had no comment
on whether Stinger heat-seeking
antiaircraft missiles have been pro-
vided to rebels in the two countries.
Nor would he comment on reports
that Stingers might also be sent to
the U.S.-backed contras, or coun-
terrevolutionaries, fighting the San-
dinista government in Nicaragua.
The_Stinaer decisioiLfollowed_the
Feb. 25 recommendation 91 an in-
tera,ency committee made up of
senior representatives from the
State oartmenL Clf, Defense
Department aad the National Se-
curity council gad Tile commit-
\
tee_ which meets neriodicaily in the
White Housei ?tuatiel room. Of 111
Roorp./011 of he Old-Execy ve Of-
fice Building. is chars -i. i DIM-
= and-coo ii iE
parami itaa ODOratinnl
Over the past year, the inter-
agency review of U.S. covert para-
military operations concluded that
, Soviet-backed forces were employ-
ing more lethal weaponry and more
? aggressive tactics against muja-
? hadeen rebels in Afghanistan and
? against the guerrilla army of Jonas
Savimbi in Angola.
One intelligence estimate indi-
cates that roughly one-third of So-
viet special forces units, trained for
counterinsurgency and night com-
bat roles, have been deployed to
Afghanistan where they have in-
flicted heavy casualties.
In Angola, a large column of So-
viet-made tanks and armored ve-
hicles backed by helicopter gun-
ships and MiG21 and MiG23 jet
fighters are poised for an offensive
expected in the next 60 days to rid
the Marxist central government of
Savinibi's 10-year-old insurgency.
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Rebels in both countries have
been opposing the increased air
threat with Soviet-made, shoulder-
fired SA7 missiles and have com-
plained that their range?less than
two miles?is not sufficient to
thwart "stand-off" attacks by heavi-
ly armored Soviet gunships. The
rebels also have complained about
the reliability of Soviet SA7s, whose
battery-driven electronics appar-
ently are subject to frequent failure.
The Stinger, a state-of-the-art
antiaircraft missile made by Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp. and supplied to
only a few U.S. allies, is a far more
lethal weapon than the SA7 the
United States has been supplying to
the Afghan rebels. The Stinger has
a range of up to five miles and em-
ploys a supercooled sensor to lock
on to aircraft heat emissions and is
not easily fooled by decoy flares
fired by Soviet helicopters.
In a letter to Reagan last month,
a group of conservative senators
estimated that Stingers could im-
prove the "kill" capabilities of rebel
forces facing Soviet military aircraft
by three to ten times.
The CIA's clandestine service
chief, Clair George, was described
by sources as a strong proponent of
the Stinger decision. George, who
has been credited by CIA Director
William J. Casey with rebuilding the
agency's paramilitary arm, repre-
sented the CIA in the interagency
deliberations. Casey visited Africa
this month to meet with Savimbi
and assure him that "effective" an-
tiaircraft weapons were on the way,
sources said.
The administration has been un-
der pressure for months from con-
servative senators Ind political ac-
tion groups to provide U.S. weap-
ons to the anticommunist insur-
gents. The CIA and State Depart-
ment have been criticized by these
groups for dragging their feet.
A key event in the Stinger deci-
sion, according to sources, was a
meeting on March 5 between Sec-
retary of State George P. Shultz
and a group of mostly conservative.
senators led by Senate Majority
Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.).
During the 70-minute meeting in
Dole's office, Shultz was pressed
four different times to move quickly
to provide Stingers to Angolan reb-
el leader Savimbi and to the Afghan
mujahadeen resistance. Each time,
according to sources, Shultz asked
the senators: "Are you sure you
want me to go back to Bill Casey
and tell him you want Stingersr
All nodded and said, "Yes," the
sources said.
In the week following piis
ing. toe-secret
author-
ity waj given to shin several hu-
dred Stingers tk Angola and Ai-
ds:list= amordin* to source-a.
These shipments arnved during the
past week, a source said.
Some conservatives have voiced
private criticism of the Stinger de-
cision, saying that the original pro-
posal to help "freedom fighters"
with American weapons called for
thousands of U.S. antiair and anti-
tank missiles to be provided to
U.S.-backed insurgents in Nicara-
gua and Cambodia as well as Af-
ghanistan and Angola.
An administration official said the
House and Senate intelligence over-
sight committees were notified of
the Stinger decision late last week.
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