KEY ISSUES BEHIND REGAN PUSH FOR US AID TO 'CONTRAS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605760011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 19, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605760011-9
pin I KILL
ON, PAGE
19 March 1986
Key issues behind Reagan
push for US aid to `contras'
By haelotte Saikowald
Waahirgbon
President Reagan's aid package for Nicaragua
faces its first hurdle in Congress tomorrow.
To help readers understand the debate, here
are some basic questions and answers relating to
.the controversial issue:
What Is - President Reagan's goal in
Nicaragua?
The President stops short of saying he seeks
ANALYSIS
overthrow of the Marxist-
leaning Sandinista gov-
ernment.
But he has said that its
"structure" must change and that it must negoti-
ate with the insurgents with a view to holding
free elections and establishing a pluralistic po-
litical system.
Critics say they believe the President wants to
replace the Sandinista government with one
drawn from the "contras."
Is Nicaragua trying to export revolu-
tion and destabilize Central America as
Mr. Reagan asserts?
There is evidence that the -Sandinistas briefly
supplied arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador
in 1980 and '81.
They are also training leftist guerrillas from
El Salvador and other countries. Publicly the
Sandinistas trumpet the triumph of Marxist rev-
olution throughout the hemisphere.
However, the arms exports to El Salvador
appear to have slowed to a trickle since 1981. Tie .
administration, ossibl because of intelligence con-
cerns, has not provided hard evidence of Nicaraguan
subversive activities since then.
Many lawmakers in Congress, including members of
the intelligence committees, dispute the alleged serious-
ness of the Nicaraguan threat.
Does the Soviet Union seek to establish a
"second Cuba" In North America? -
The administration estimates that the Soviets have
supplied more than $500 million worth of arms, includ-
ing tanks and other heavy equipment, to Nicaragua since
the Sandinistas came to power.
Last year Moscow provided advanced Hind MI-24
helicopter gunships to help combat the rebels. There are
about 200 Soviet advisers, some 7,500 Cubans (including
teachers and construction workers), and various person-
nel from East Germany, Bulgaria, Libya, and the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Nicaragua.
Nicaragua claims that only - 200 of the Cubans are
military advisers.
Despite this Soviet-bloc presence, State Department
officials say privately they see no evidence that Moscow
is trying to establish a military base in Nicaragua.
The Soviets know that the US would never tolerate
a threat to its national security, say US specialists,
and the Soviet role in the region generally has been low
key. Much of the Soviet aid is used equipment from
Cuba.
Does Nicaragua threaten the security and
vital Interests of the US?
The President affirms that the Soviets and Cubans,
using Nicaragua as a base, could become the dominant
power in Central America, threatening the Panama Ca-
nal, interdicting Caribbean sea lanes, and ultimately
moving against Mexico. He also : raises the specter of
thousands of Nicaraguans fleeing across the border into
the US.
Critics, while not discounting a Nicaraguan threat,
charge the President with resorting to hyperbole and
scare tactics. If a clear and overt threat ever arose, it is
argued, the US would quickly resort to military force to
remove it.
Have the Sandinistas betrayed the revolu.
tion which overthrew former dictator Anas-
tasio Somoza Debayle?
The Sandinistas have gradually squeezed out the
moderate, democratic elements in the government and
imposed an increasingly oppressive regime on the Nica-
raguan people.
They have curbed the press, demobilized political
parties, harassed the Roman Catholic Church and other
religious groups, and instituted tight surveillance of
ordinary citizens.
Supporters and critics of US policy agree the
Sandinistas are organizing society along Cuban-style
totalitarian lines.
Now did the counterrevolutionaries or
contras arise and what Is their strength?
~ The contras were organized two months after Mr.
Reagan came into office. Initially they were drawn
largely from the ranks of Somoza's National =Lard nd
organized and financed by the Central Intelli enc
Agency.
As US-Nicaraguan relations deteriorated, the contras
have grown and now number up to 20,000 men. But
because of lack of weapons and training, only 6,000 are
estimated by the administration to be still in Nicaragua.
Are the contras still dominated by "Somo-
cistas"?
The administration says that of the 153 most senior
military leaders of the largest resistance group, about 53 .
percent are civilians, 27 percent served in the Somoza
National Guard, and 20 percent were comrades in arms`,
of the Sandinistas.
Eden Pastora Gomez, one of the contra leaders, based
in Costa Rica, will not coordinate with the main insur-
gent group because of its ties to the former Somoza
regime.
Edgar Chamorro, a former leader of the principal
contra force, resigned last year because he said the
contras were controlled by Somoza officers.
cera".nued
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Do the contras enjoy popular support?
Popular discontent with the Sandinista regime is
growing, but there has been no rush of support for the
contras, who are viewed by many Nicaraguans as a
throwback to the former National Guard.
The rebels have drawn most of their support from the
peasantry but failed to gain it in urban areas and among
the middle class.
The administration argues that it is harder for an
opposition to develop under a Marxist-dominated regime
than in such countries as the Philippines, where opposi-
tion forces had greater freedom of action.
What are the contras' chances against the
Sandinista government?
US military experts do not think the contras could
oust the Sandinistas or do them much damage. The
Nicaraguan regime has an army of 60,000 well-equipped
men plus a militia force of 60,000 - the largest military
force in Central America and twice the size of the
Somoza National Guard at its height. . .
Opponents of aid contend that US military support for
the contras would be met with greater Soviet and Cuban
help for the Sandinistas and escalate the conflict. More
contra aid, they argue, will drive the Sandinistas toward
increased dependence on Moscow.
The administration says the contras, if well trained
and armed, could bring enough pressure to bear on the
Sandinistas to force them to
negotiate.
How much aid would It
take for the contras to be=
come a force capable of ex-
erting such pressure?
Experts agree that $100 million
would be only a start, given the
strength and determination of the
Sandinistas.
To overthrow the Nicaraguan
regime and install a pro-US gov-
ernment would require the com-
mitment of US troops, say mili-
tary analysts.
Is the US training the
rebels?
The administration rules out
sending American advisers to help
train or fight with contras inside
Nicaragua. But it would like to use
the Army's Special Forces to train
contras in Honduras, where the
contras have bases and from
which they mount raids into Nicaragua.
Some of the requested $70 million in military aid
would be used to pay for US military trainers.
The US maintains a strong military presence in Hon-
duras and regularly conducts exercises with Honduran
forces.
Why did Congress cut off covert military aid
to the contras?
Lawmakers were angered by US mining of Nicara-
guan harbors and the disclosure of a CIA manual in
Nicaragua containing instructions on the selective use of
assassination - contrary to US law.
In October 1984 Congress cut off all funds t2tl
contras from any agency involved. in - intelligence
activities.
The administration then encouraged funding of the
contras by private groups, an action which critics say
violates US neutrality laws.
What has happened to the $27 million in so-
called humanitarian or nonmilitary aid which
Congress appropriated in 1985?
It's not clear; some of it is unaccounted for. The State
Department says $5 million still has not been spent. The
Honduran government has resisted channeling the aid to
the rebels, fearing that it might lead to a direct conflict
with Nicaragua.
Would $100 million In contra aid add to the
federal budget deficit?
The President is not asking for a new appropriation.
He seeks approval to use funds already assigned to the
Defense Department.
But congressional concern has arisen that he intend
to tai)- into a CIA contingency fund which is used to
initiate covert operations.
Are the contras a unified political force?
There are several different political groups, including
the US-sponsored United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO).
There is considerable conflict among the exiles.
Opponents of contra aid charge that the resistance
movement has no unified political leadership and no
political program that could win the support of the
people. .
Do the contras commit atrocities?
Reports by human rights organizations, including
America Watch, show that both the Sandinistas and the
contras engage in violence and brutality against the
Nicaraguan people.
Do the nations of Central and Latin America
support US aid for the contras?
Eight Latin American countries earlier this year
called. on the President to halt such aid and opt for a
diplomatic solution to the conflict.
The administration claims that several countries sup-
port US policy privately but are reluctant do so publicly
for domestic political reasons.
US special envoy Philip Habib, just back from Central
America, says that a recent poll finds that most people in
the region support the Reagan policy and favor pressure
on the Sandinistas.
Administration critics are dubi-
ous. They feel the nations of the
region should be willing to sup-
port the US if they perceive the
Sandinistas to be such a danger to
regional stability.
Instead the Latin Americans
are pressing for negotiations. And
while they do not like a Marxist
government in their midst, they
are concerned that a unilateral US
intervention would be even worse
for regional stability and the US
image.
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What Is the Contadora
process?
Four countries - Venezuela,
Colombia, Panama, and Mexico -
met on the Panamanian island of
Contadora in 1983 to begin draft-
ing a peace treaty that would cut
off all arms imports, expel all mili-
tary advisers, end support for
guerrilla movements, stop arms
smuggling, bar foreign military exercises, limit the size
of armed forces, and set up verification procedures.
What has happened to that process? Has the
US made a good-faith effort to pursue a dlplo-
matic solution?
Last September the four agreed on a Contadora
treaty, which was accepted by Nicaragua.
The US rejected the draft treaty, however, calling for
stronger verification and execution mechanisms. Nicara-
gua and Guatemala refused to sign the new version,
produced by diplomats from Central American coun-
tries.
- Where does diplomacy now stand?
In an effort to break the stalemate, the Contadora
countries and four "support" countries (Argentina, Bra-
zil, Peru, and Uruguay) in January met in Carabelleda,.
Venezuela, and signed a declaration restating many of
the Contadora objectives and calling on, the US to stop
aid to the contras and resume negotiations with Nicara-
gua. The Central American countries have backed the
appeal.
The US has turned it down, saying it would reopen
bilateral talks with Nicaragua only if Nicaragua opened
bilateral talks with the contras.
The administration blames Nicaragua for breakdown
of the diplomatic process, but it recently sent Mr. Habib
to Central America to explore the diplomatic possibili-
ties, including Salvadorean President Duarte's proposal
for talks between his government and Salvadorean reb-
els if Nicaraguan leaders hold simultaneous talks with
the contras. The results of the Habib trip are not known.
Skeptics say the Habib mission is more a political
move designed to win congressional votes than a serious
diplomatic effort.
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