(SANITIZED) PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 6, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SU6JECT: (Op~ionoq
Conventional Net Assessment
FROM:
exren~s~oN
no.
Brig den Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, NIC
oA1E
7 November 1986 2
TO: (ORieor dosiynotion, room number, and
buiyiny)
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NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ...- This Information has been Authorized for
Release to .. .
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TOP SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #05114-86
6 November 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Brig Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman
Paper
1. Attached is the paper I mentioned--written in May but
still relevant to the ongoing pos - eykjavik analysis. on loan to
s the manager of the team putting together N -3/8-87.
is quite high on him--and the more I see of him and his work,
the more I am impressed. One might not always agree with his analyses, but
what I have seen thus far is well-researched, well-thought-out, and
well-written.
2. The post-Reykjavik relevance of this particular piece is its
projection of Soviet doctrinal options, and its arguments in particular for
a middle ground in which arms control could create a context for maintaining
Soviet nuclear power while reducing the risk of nuclear escalation and
enhancing the utility of conventional forces es ecially if modernized and
in accord with the Ogarkov initiatives.~hesis could be extended and
elaborated along the following lines apropos post-Reykjavik. The Soviets,
good chess players that they are, in an overly simplistic way could be
argued to have come to Reykjavik with a two-track approach in mind, and were
and still are prepared to pursue either of these tracks as unfolding events
and their interests dictate.
Track I would be generally along the lines suggested by
in his recent paper forwarded to you.
The US, as expected, isn't prepared to give up SDI, and the
Soviets, while refusing to agree without this concession, appear to
be extraordinarily forthcoming otherwise.
o As a result, the US generally and the SDI program particularly get
the blame for failure to agree. Domestic and allied opposition to
SDI is generated.
1
Tr1P CF('RFT
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o Further, new life is breathed into the liberal opposition in the
US, and the left opposition in Europe.
o As a result, nuclear and conventional defense initiatives are
damaged in the US and NATO. The alliance becomes more frayed,
perhaps irreversibly.
o The Soviets in the meantime retain and modernize their ballistic
missile forces, a key to their superpower status.
o Under this familiar nuclear umbrella, the Soviet continue to take
risks, with the possibility of escalation, exacerabated by
ballistic missiles, serving to deter U.S. responses.
o Problem--that exacerbated possibility of escalation also tends to
be self-deterring for the Soviets. And in any event, SDI may
ultimately reduce the utility of ballistic missiles.
4. Track II would not necessarily preferred by the Soviets, but could
be an option for them. This formu on would not necessarily be a
competitor but a complement to thesis, although Omight not see
it that way.
o At least by the time of a new Administration, the U.S. shows
willingness to slow or stop part or all of the SDI program in an
arms control agreement. The Soviets get at least some credit for
having brought the US around.
o Most importantly, the SDI is in fact slowed or stopped in part of
whole, a good trade for ballistic missiles if that is to be the
price.
o Why? Because while ballistic missiles are being eliminated, the
Soviets may be able to build anew strategic umbrella in which they
could be predominant, based on bombers, bomber and submarine
carried cruise missiles, and most importantly, defenses against air
breathers.
o Also, with the elimination of strategic and tactical ballistic
missiles--as well as tactical cruise missiles (unclear why the
latter need be included given the NSDD's thrust), the U.S.
deterrent linkage to Europe would be greatly eroded, and the US and
its allies would be unlikely to bridge the gap with qualitative and
quantitative improvements to conventional forces, especially if
lulled by the elusive prospects of conventional arms control.
o In the meantime, the Soviets would likely pursue their own
conventional qualitative improvements along the lines of the
Ogarkov proposals, to provide another layer of assured
predominance, in this case at the theater level.
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o Under this new albeit unfamiliar strategic umbrella, reinforced by
its improved conventional forces, the Soviets might be better able
to take risks--with at worst no increase in the likelihood of US
responses, but less likelihood of escalation if the US does
respond, and less damage to Soviet interests whether or not
escalation occurs.
o Problem--the known benefits of predominent ballistic missiles would
be exchanged for the less certain prospects of a different and more
diffuse sort of balance; plus, the US and its allies might be able
after all to overcome political and economic obstacles to take
advantage of their technological potential to regain predominance
at the strategic and conventional levels.
5. I don't think we have done enough work yet to say for certain that
the above formulation is correct, but I believe it has enough merit to be
worthy of further exploration as we develop our response to the NSDD. I
would hate to see us develop a strategy based on a perceived one-track
Soviet game plan, if in fact there is a good possibility they may have in
mind at least two, with the flexibility to pursue either as events and their
interests dictate.
Very respectfully
Dist:
Copy 1 - DCI
2-DDCI
3 - DDI
4 - D/ACIS
5 - NIO/SP
6 - NIO/USSR
7 - NIO/GPF
8 - NIO/EUR
9 - C/NIC
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TAP SECRET
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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consu Itants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ...- This Information has been Authorized for
Release to .. .
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iur ~t~Kti
TAe Director of Central Intelligence
Wurigtae, D.C. 20505
coerl 6
Copy
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Brig Gen Frank B. Horton, USAF
Chairman
a rman, - -87
SUBJECT: Follow-Up to SOVA Strategy Conference (29-30 September 1986)
1. The SOVA conference, in my view, reached a prudent bottom line on the
issue of where Soviet military strategy is heading. Namely, most of the
invitees concluded that the evidence in hand is sufficient to indicate that we
must seriously evaluate potential new directions in Soviet strategy. But they
also concluded that it is premature for us at present to advance firm
judgments on exactly what strategy the Soviets have endorsed or will
endorse. (S NF)
2. A few months ado, in order to lay some groundwork for dealing with
this issue in this year s 11-3/8, I prepared the attached draft to establish
an overall frame of reference for evaluating how the Soviets might now be
weighing their strategic choices. The paper focuses on drawing out the
implications from a wide variety of community assessments dealing with
Gorbachev's political situation, the Soviet economic scene, Soviet arms
control proposals, and pertinent conventional and nuclear force
developments. In particular, the paper features a matrix laying out
hypothetical alternative strategies--including the kinds of forces, employment
options and the like that would appear to fit an "Ogarkov-type" strategy best
and those that would be more compatible with alternatives to Ogarkov's
apparent approach. Given its purposes, the paper reflects all the available
reporting that enables us to assess Ogarkov's likely views on these matters,
but does not specifically reference or discuss the pertinent sensitive
reporting. (S NF)
3. On the second day of the conference, I gave the matrix in this paper
to the invitees to solicit their comments on the utility of such an
approach. Howard Stoertz and General Edward Meyer, in particular, thought it
was a good way to tackle the problem. I invite your comments as well. (U)
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TOP SECRET
SUBJECT: Follow-Up to SOVA Strategy Conference (29-30 September 1986)
Distribution:
Cy 1 - Addressee
?_ - Gordon Negus, D/DIA
3 - NIO/SP
NIO/SPA (60ct86)
2
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