MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: ADD-ON TO GOL DESPAIR
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 15, 2011
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 3, 1983
Content Type:
CABLE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 119.62 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 9728
SIT833 AN009123
D T G : 031551Z 5 E-P 83 PSN:053918
TOR: 246/1555Z
DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF KIMM JP VP KEMP SIT E08 DUR /012
WHSR COMMENT: --RED TAG--
FLASH
D E RUEHBL X9728 2461554
Z 031551Z SEP 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2763
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC FLASH
BEIRUT 09728
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
FROM COL GATANAS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, XF, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: ADD-ON TO
GOL DESPAIR
1 SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
2. COL QASSIS (G-2) JUST CALLED COL GATANAS REQUESTING
RESULTS OF WPENS-LEVY/FAIRBANKS-STINER MEETING AND ANY
OTHER INFORMATION. GATANAS WILL GET BACK TO HIM BUT
ASKED ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TH INCIDENT WHERE
BIQA AREA COMMANDER GENERAL MAKKARUM AND 400 MEN WERE
CAPTURED (REPORTED SEPTEL). OASSIS THINKS THIS IS SYRIAN
RESPONSE BY ACTION TO YESTERDAY'S GOL LETTER TO SARG.
HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS ACTION 15 SIGNIFICANT ALSO
BECAUSE IN THE PAST ONLY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND SMALLER
NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE CAPTURED.
SG
G RE!
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 9728 DTG: 031551Z SEP 83 PSN:O53918
3. COL OASSIS ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE
"COMING DOWN THE HILL" AND DIDN'T GO INTO DETAILS ON THE
OPE ) 8, 3. DILL0N.
BT
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL TO
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
Menachem, I have just concluded a meeting with my
national security advisers to review the crisis in
Lebanon.
Bud McFarlane has returned from the area and personally
reported on the results of his diplomatic efforts.
We have concluded that the fundamental and immediate
problem is the Syrian determination to undermine the
internal reconciliation process which we think has a
chance.
The Syrian willingness to do this has been amply
demonstrated during the past week and will be heightened
as the IDF withdrawals. Indeed, the spectre of further
bloodshed and massacres will have extremely damaging
implications for both our countries and we must do
everything in our power to prevent it.
The Government of Israel's agreement to delay its
withdrawal has contributed to significantly to our
mutual efforts to forge internal political reconciliation,
especially between the Druze and the GOL. I am aware
of your government's skepticism toward this process,
but no stone must be left unturned.
In the past day, a GOL-Druze plan has been jointly
drafted and is being reviewed by Gemayel and Jumblatt.
Progress is also being made to bring the Shi'ite
leader, Nabih Berri into the government.
The success of these efforts is crucial to our strategy.
But we need five more days to conclude the process.
I know that last Monday, Ambassador McFarlane said that
the request for a delay was final. However, in view of
the violent events of the past week and the successful'
performance of the Lebanese army, I must ask you and
your government to consider an additional delay of the
IDF redeployment.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
The Army is now concluding its operations in West
Beirut, and has extended its activity into East Beirut
to demonstrate it is an army of all the Lebanese
people. However, the army will not physically be able
to move into the Shuf for several more days. It is
vital to the success of your redeployment that the LAF
move into the Shuf in an orderly, coordinated fashion.
I have concluded that this delay is crucial to the
attainment of our mutual goals in Lebanon and I must
request your personal cooperation on this matter.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8