US IS REPORTED TO HAVE GIVEN INTELLIGENCE ON GUERRILLA GROUP TO PRETORIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 24, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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NEW YORK TIMES
July 23, 1986
Al
U.S. Is Reported to Have Given Intelligence
on Guerrilla Group to Pretoria
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
? Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 22 ? The
United States, working closely with
British intelligence, has provided
South Africa with intelligence about
the banned and exiled African National
Congress, according to current and for-
mer Government officials.
The congress is the principal guer-
rilla group seeking the overthrow of the
South African Government and the end
of apartheid.
Warnings of Planned Attacks
A senior Administration official, who
did not wish to be named, categorically
denied today that any intelligence on
the African National Congress had
been exchanged between the United
States and South Africa.
But the present and former officials
interviewed for this article said that
the information, including political in-
telligence as well as specific warnings
of planned attacks by the group, was
given to South Africa by the Reagan
Administration at least into the mid-
1980's, although they could not be spe-
cific about when during the Reagan
years it began. South Africa, in return,
has reported on Soviet and Cuban ac-
tivities in the region, the sources said.
It could not be determined whether
the United States was still providing in-
formation on the African National Con-
gress. Nor could it be learned whether
South Africa had used the information
to prevent African National Congress
attacks or to prepare for South African
raids on the congress's bases in
Mozambique and elsewhere in south-
ern Africa.
Because South Africa has no satellite
intelligence ability, the sources said, it
has been dependent on the United
States and Britain for communications
intelligence from the black nations in
Africa beyond the range of its own in-
terception ,equipment.
The sources, who include former
White House aides in the Reagan and
Carter Administrations, said the
United States and South Africa had ex-
changed sensitive intelligence under an
arrangement dating from the 1960's.
But they said the data initially con-
cerned Soviet shipping and submarine
movements in the South Atlantic and
Indian Ocean.
?
White House Won't Comment
The sharing of information about the
African National Congress with the
South African Directorate of Military
Intelligence was described as part of a
reversal of a policy established under
the Carter Administration, which had
banned any sharing of intelligence with
South Africa. It could not be learned
whether President Reagan or any of his
senior advisers specifically ordered or
acquiesced in the policy change.
Edward P. Djerejjan, a White House
spokesman, asked for comment about
, the sources' account, said, "We simply
do not discuss or comment on intelli-
gence operations or alleged intelli-
gence ?operations."
Senior officials of the State Depart-
ment, the Defense Department and the
South African Embassy in Washington,
informed last week of the former and
current Administration officials' ac-
counts, also said they would have no
comment.
. American intelligence officials said a
special focus of the intelligence shared
with the South African Directorate of
-Military Intelligence originated from
the interception of communications be-
tween the African National Congress
? ileadquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, its
guerrilla training camps in Angola and
its offices in Africa and Western Eu-
- tope.
Most of the conversations are con-
;ducted "in the clear" ? that is, un-
? eoded ? and the electronic "take" has
:included specific advance information
I?on planned bombings and disruptions
:by the congress, officials said.
:Administration Debate
:Over Group's Ideology
Many of Mr. Reagan's senior na-
, tional security officials, the sources as-
serted in interviews, took office con-
vinced that the leadership of the Af-
rican National Congress was domi-
nated by pro-Soviet Communists, and
. that providing South Africa with infor-
? &ration on the group was in the Amer-
ican national interest.
? Other officials, including current ,
, members of the Administration, dis-
? agree with this view, arguing that the
congress is primarily a nationalist
? group whose views must be taken into
' consideration.
Last yeai, the State Department pub-
licly urged South Africa to take part in
talks with the African National Con-
gress and to release its imprisoned
leader, Nelson Mandela. A senior off
cial was quoted as saying that United
States policy called for South Africa to
be "reaching as broadly and widely as
it can," including contacts with the Af-
rican National Congress.
The-Airicaii-Natress has
been recognized by the United Nations
General Assembly and the Organiza-
tion of African Unity as a national lib-
eration movement. It has offices in
more than 30 countries.
"It all comes down to what you be-
lieve about the A.N.C.," one former
senior Reagan Administration official
said in acknowledging tnat communi-
cations intelligence on the organization
had been relayed to South Africa. He
described the congress as a dangerous
revolutionary organization controlled
by Communists and said, "Our inter-
ests require helping the South Af-
ricans."
b An intelligence officer now serving in
the Reagan Administration, acknowl-
edging that the African National Con-
? gress had been a major target of Amer-
. ican intelligence-gathering, said: "I've
known about it for a long time, that we
target the A.N.C. We've always consid-
ered them to be the bad guys, to be
, Soviet pawns, stalking horses for the
Soviets:"
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south Africa, in a Government book-
let published early last month, as,
serted that 23 of the 30 members of thg
congress's executive committee "are
known to have 'membership with" the
South African Communist Party,
which was outlawed in 1950.
Oliver Tambo, the group's president
in exile, acknowledged in a newspaper
Interview last year that there was "an
overlapping of membership" between
the two groups, but said: "It is often
suggested that the A.N.C. is controlled
by the Communist Party, by Commu-
nists. Well, I have been long enough in
the A.N.C. to know that that has never
been true." '
Some Reagan Administration offi-
cials acknowledged that disclosure of
United States-South African intelli-
gence-sharing would heighten the rebel
group's suspicions about the Adminis-
tration's intentions and policies on
South Africa:
Despite Restrictions,
A Continued Flow
Shortly after taking office in 1977, the
Carter Administration ordered a ban
on the sharing of any intelligence with
South Africa, the sources said. But they
said intelligence on Soviet and Cuban
activities in southern Africa nonethe-
less continued to flow to South Africa,
apparently because elements in United
States intelligence agencies chose to
evade the ban.
The sources said no intelligence on
the African National Congress was for-
warded to South Africa before 1981,
when President Reagan took office.
The sources for the account included
a former member of the National Se-
curity Agency who said he disagreed
with the policy of sharing intelligence
with South Africa.
Senior American intelligence offi-
cials acknowledged that there is a gen-
eral understanding among United
States intelligence agencies prohibit.
Ing the passing of intelligence about a
second country to a third. '
"If you're asked by a third country
what you saw in a second country," a
senior Reagan Administration intelli-
gence official said, "you're not to it-
spond." Exceptions are made for Brit-
ain, some other selected Atlantic allies
and Israel, the officials said, but all
other contacts are to be authorized in
advance.
What the U.S. Gets ?
From South Africa
1p?fib Former officials of the National Se-
curity Agency, describing the nature of
the intelligence-sharing relationship,
said the agency had traditionally relied
on the South African Directorate of
Military Intelligence for data on Soviet
shipping and submarine activities
around the Cape of Good Hope and in
the Indian Ocean. ?
American representatives of the Na.
tional Security Agency were posted at
Silvermine, a South African intelli-
gence installation near Cape Town, by
the early 1970's, and reports on Soviet
shipping were routinely flowing from
South Africa to the National Security
Agency's headquarters at Fort Meade,
Md., according to former officials of
the agency.
Most of those reports, they said, were
relayed through installations of the
Government Communications Head-
quarters, the British counterpart of the
National Security Agency and the
United States' closest ally in the collec-
tion and distribution of communica-
tions intelligence worldwide.
Officials said South Africa's intelli-
gence installations were vastly ex-
panded in the mid-1970's, as the Soviet
Union and Cuba became directly in-
volved, along with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and South Africa, in the
civil war that broke out in Angola after
the Portuguese withdrew in 1975.
Former National Security Agency of-
ficials said vast quantities of electronic
equipment, including antennas and so-
phisticated interception receivers,
were secretly shipped from Britain and
West Germany to South Africa to en-
able the South Africans to build more
listening sites.
American-made computer chips and
other electronic components were in-
volved In the shipments, according to
former White House aides, although
under Presidential directives against
such shipments to South Africa the
components could have been barred.
The shipment of such materials was
initially barred by President Kennedy,
and later Administrations continued
the ban, at least publicly.
But national security officials of the
Ford Administration chpse to look to
look the other way, the sources said, in
a successful effort to avoid any public
debate over the American and British
role in aiding South Africa's intelli-
gence abilities.
In the Carter Administration, Rich-
ard M. Moose, the Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs, ordered an
end to all collaboration on communica-
tions intelligence between the United
States and South Afriba. Former offi-
cials of the National Security Agency
said the liaison nonetheless continued,
with South Africa continuing to report
on Soviet submarine and shipping ac-
tivity.
"Moose thought he had stopped it," a
senior Carter Administration official
recalled, "but the Navy really went
bonkers on this and it wasn't stopped."
There was no reason to believe that
the National Security Agency was then
sharing with the South Africans any of
its separately collected intelligence on
the black countries south of the Sahara,
including Angola, Zambia and Mozam-
bique, the official added.
Shopping Lists
Exchanged in Britain
A former National Security Agency
officer, discussing the British role in
the sharing of intelligence with South
Africa, recalled attending a high-level
meeting in the mid-1980's at the head-
quarters of the Government Communi-
cations Headquarters at Cheltenham,
90 miles northwest of London. At the
meeting, he said, senior American and
British officials reviewed previous in-
telligence assignments and future tar-
gets ? a process known in intelligence
jargon as "tasking."
After long discussions of American
and British interception programs in-
volving the Soviet Union and the Mid-
dle East, the officials turned to Africa.
The meeting was led by a British repre-
sentative of the Government Com-
munications Headquarters with a
small group of American intelligence
officials, including two senior officials
from National Security Agency head-
quarters, actively taking part.
At this point, the former National Se-
curity Agency officer said, three South
African military intelligence officers
were ushered into the room. The South
Africans and the British exchanged
tasking requirements ? sophisticated
documents outlining previous com-
munications intelligence targets, such
as a third-world embassy, and the fre-
quencies on which they relayed intelli-
gence and other communications.
According to the former official, the
delegations from the American and
British agencies asked South Africa to
continue its efforts to monitor Soviet
and Cuban activity in Angola and
Mozambique, as well as Soviet ship-
ping and submarine activity around the
Cape of Good Hope.
The South Africans were asked to
pro?vie-1e their reports on Soviet and ,
Cuban activity on a weekly basis, in-
stead of reporting monthly, as they had
in the past. Other targets were to in-
clude Soviet commercial and economic
activity south of the Sahara, with spe-
cial emphasis on support for the rebels
in South-West Africa, or Namibia,
where South Africa has been engaged
in a guerrilla war with the South-West
Africa People's Organization.
In return, a participant said, the
South African delegation had its own
requirements for American and British
intelligence. Two copies of a South Af-
rican document were turned over, out-
lining previous targets for the United
States and Britain and new targets to
be added to the day-to-day intelligence
'collection.
These included a South African re-
quest that an extensive array of politi-
cal, military, diplomatic and economic
activity south of the Sahara be col-
lected and relayed to Pretoria, includ-
ing intercepted ? information dealing
with the Governments of Angola,
Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana,
the former National Security Agency
official 'recalled. .
"I saw the list," the former official
said, "and they also wanted any and all
tasking related to the A.N.C., Including
the movements of Oliver Tambo, We
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I got a list of 10 people of Tambo's staff]
I ? the A.N.C. high command ? and
they wanted information from us."
The South African request "ap-
peared routine" and "nobody seemed
surprised about it," the officer said, al-
though he recalled his personal sur-
prise at how "extensive" the coopera-
-tion was between the South Africans
and the United States and Britain.
One specific request for the United
States was to monitor the international
travel of Mr. Tambo and report when
he was taking flights aboard Soviet and
Cuban airlines. There was also specific
;mention of the frequencies on which the
Governments of Zambia, Mozambique,
Angola and Tanzania transmitted intel-
ligence and diplomatic information;
the National Security Agency and.the
Government Communications Head-
quarters were asked to monitor those
frequencies for items of interest to
South Africa, the former official said.
A 'Special Emphasis' .
On Guerrila Group ?
Most important, the former official
said, the South Africans made what:
was known among intelligence officials
as a" "special emphasis' request from
the South Africans for th
tional Congress's communications. .
The South Africans listed the fre-
quencies used by the rebel group and
the pattern of when they talked, the of-
ficial said. It was clear, the official
added, that the South African Director-
ate of Military Intelligence was unable.
to independently intercept all of the
communications it deemed essential.
The African National Congress's
communication system was arranged
much like a normal military com-
mand, the South Africans explained,
with military communications domi-
nating the traffic by day and political
and covert activities discussed at
night. The former National Security
Agency official said most of the inter-
ceptions of African National Congress
communications in Zambia were the
responsibility of the Government Com-
munications Headquarters, the British
agency, which has far more extensive
communications intelligence coverage
in Africa than the National Security
Agency. ?
. By the early 1980's, the former cal;
cial said. the African National Con-
gress was considered by the National
Security Agency to have the status of
an international organization, such as
the Palestine Liberation Organization,
and assigned surveillance to what was
then ? known in the agency as the.
G-Group, which is responsible for the.
monitoring of all non-Communist coun-,
Ple!ft. ?
_ -
Fornier National Security Agency of-
ficials described tasking conferences,
such as the one in Cheltenham, as de-
signed to carry out previously estab-
lished policy. Inevitably, the number of
targets whose signals are to be inter-
cepted expands with each conference.
-1 The conferences are normally held
more than once a year.
It could not be learned which of the
South African requests were new or
simply reiterations of previously
agreed-upon targets. Senior Carter Ad-
ministration intelligence officials said,
however, that no such tasking confer-
ences took place before 1981.
Many of the targets included in the
South African tasking document, the
participant "said, were designated by
what is known in the National Security
Agency as "case notation," letter and
number designators that enable the ?
collected data to be properly routed by
computer in the vast information re-
trieval systems used by the agency and
by British intelligence.
Former National Security Agency of-
ficials said the fact that African Na-
tional Congress targets were installed ,
in the case notation system was evi-
dence that the information-sharing ar- I
? rangement was permanent, not ad hoc. I
"To put it in case notation," an offi-
cial said, "means that it's an institu:
tional and organized effort. It allows
you to technically manage the issue."
Such exchanges have taken place in
. the past, other officials of the agency
noted, especially with countries In
those areas of the world where ? the
I agency end its British counterpart
have little intelligence coverage,. sech
as in South Africa.
"In some cases," a former genier
National Security Agency .official' ex-
plained, the liaison "ran counter to di-
plomacy or larger moral issues.". ?
"What the Fort does is considered
technical and not diplomatic," the -for-
mer official added, referring to -the
agency's headquarters at Fert
and it is rarely if ever shared with the
State Department. The National -Se-
curity Agency's attitude toward clues.
tions of diplomacy or morality, the for-
mer official added, is: "So what? On a
worldwide basis we need the cover-
age." - ?
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