INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL USSR: OBLAST MILITARY COMMISSARIAT ACTIVITY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP05S00365R000200280002-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 6, 2012
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 12, 1982
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP05S00365R000200280002-2.pdf261.33 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05500365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05500365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 c W, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence Appraisal USSR: Oblast Military Commissariat Activity (U) 12 AUGUST 1982 NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON WNINTEL SECRET = Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 ~:_ uti oe~ r~ r\ yethods,. C.-z-;,ttonr-cr=iu'arv jr. I:rr1 i.5,,;.; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Intelligence Appraisal USSR: Oblast Military Commissariat Activity (U) PREPARED BY DB-1F This Is ^ Department of Defense Publication Produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency Classified by Multiple Sources Declassify on OADR 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Street Addresses of Key Commissariats in the Baltic: r"-'% SECRET ,_.....~ . y..-;a t` T? - - ,^~..raj,- ~: - _.,~?~??v-gym ~yi-.~._ Deiorussian, ana Carpathian Military Distric Republic Voye nkomat - Narvskoye Shosse 18, Tallin Republic Voyenkomat - Bul'var Raynysa, 4 Riga City Voyenkomat, Vilyanu 14 Latvian SSR N.B. Sborniy punkt (Mil. assembly point) - 3 Vilyanu 14, Riga Lithuanian SSR Republic Voyenkomat - Totoryu 25/3, Vil'nyus Kaunas Rayon Voyenkomat - 233000 Salomay Neris, 14'. Brest Oblast Voyenkomat - Kuybysheva, 58 Gomel Oblast Voyenkomat - Sadovaya 20 Minsk Oblast Voyenkomat - 220001 Fabristsiusa, 34 BELORUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT L'vov Oblast Voyenkomat - Ivana Franko, 25 Ternopol Oblast Voyenkomat - Vatutina, 4. Zakarpatskoy Oblast Voyenkomat - Oktyabr'skaya, 37 DIA Intelligence Appraisal SECRET (U) r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 SE ET USSR: OBLAST MILITARY COMMISSARIAT ACTIVITY (U) Summary (C) Soviet military commissariats, or vo nkomat play a crucial role in the process of force generation. Of their many unctions, the most important are conscription, training of youths and reservists, and mobilization of reservists and civilian transport vehicles when so ordered by the Soviet Armed Forces. Current- ly, the voyenkomaty provide the active ranks approximately 2.1 million conscripts annually, train several more million Soviet youths for eventual induction, and manage a manpower base of well over 50 million reservists. Within the hierarchy of commissariats, the role of the oblast voyenkomaty is pivotal. Consequently, activities associated with mobilization at this level would be a key indicator of increased Soviet military readiness. Discussion (C) Commissariats are widely dispersed throughout the Soviet Union and are a part of the military chain of command. They are under the direct control of the local military district (MD) commander through the organization and mobilization department of the MD staff. Ultimately, the command links of the voyenkomaty lead up to the Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. For purposes of administration, however, the commissariats are organized hierarchically and parallel the territorial subdivisions of the USSR. Generally, administrative control descends from republic-level commissariats to oblast, city, and rayon voyenkomaty, in that order. There are an estimated 4,200 commis- sariats throughout the Soviet Union. (See chart opposite for a list of key commissariats in the three westernmost military districts.) (S) Within the hierarchy of commissariats, the oblast voyenkomat, or its counterpart, may be considered the linchpin of the system. The term counterpart is used to indicate that not all Soviet republics have oblast subdivisions. In such instances, a city voyenkomat or the republic voyenkomat itself may perform the functions of the oblast commissariat. The following characteristics distinguish the oblast voyenkomat from those at higher and lower echelons: -- It is generally at this level that commissariat capabilities are the most extensive. For example, permanent medical staffs are first encounter- ed at oblast level as well as expanded communications facilities. -- The oblast commissariat often serves as the induction center for the region and plays an influential role in determining branch assignments of conscripts and the cross-training of reservists. -- The oblast voyenkomat supervises the activities of all lower echelon commissariats. 12 Aug 82 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 1 ET -- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 SECRET It is at this level that mobilization manpower quotas levied by higher echelons for the oblast are consolidated and implemented. In addition, it is also probably only at this level that records of oblast reserve personnel are duplicated. -- In the event of mobilization, the oblast commissariat would serve as a main collection and dispatch point for reservists. -- In the event of general war, it is believed that only oblast-level commissariats would be collocated with civil defense staffs at exurban command posts. (C) From the foregoing, it is clear that in the event of general mobilization -- or a substantial partial mobilization -- there would be a marked increase of activity at the oblast voyenkomaty. Initially, commissariat staffs might be augmented to work around the clock. Mobilized reservists would be arriving from subordinate voyenkomaty in mobilized civilian transport vehicles, processed at a collection point or points, and dispatched. to deploying or activating units. Oblast collection points could be the commissariat itself or an open area or public building located near the voyenkomat. The actions taken by all commissariats during various stages of combat readiness are depicted on the chart opposite.-. (C) Besides increased physical activity, another indicator of general or partial mobilization would be the expanded use of communications facilities. Such communications are via radio, teletype, and secure landlines. Communications equipment reportedly in use by the voyenkomaty include R-105 transceivers, STA- 35 teletypes, and ZAS on-line secure systems. The growing use of computers by the commissariats provides yet another and more modern means for exchanging and processing information. Outlook (S) Among. the major concerns of indications and warning analysts over recent years have been the detection of military mobilization activity in the three western MDs of the USSR: the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MDs. Forces drawn from these MDs would' form part of the Western Theater of Military Operations designated for operations against the NATO Central Region. (5) The mobilization of assets within these MDs would be a key indicator of increased Soviet military readiness oriented against NATO, or measures under- taken in response to an internal Warsaw Pact crisis such as the ongoing Polish problem. (Classified by multiple sources; declassify on OADR) Contributions by: Mr. Frank Reilly, FRD 12 Aug 82 DIA Intelligence Appraisal Page 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05S00365R000200280002-2 Z> L ( - ; L r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000200280002-2 SECRET