CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S MEETINGS WITH JULIO RAMOS AND SERGIO RAMIREZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000700930040-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: April 5, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP90BO139OR000700930040-7
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0 052035Z APR 86 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9276
INFO PUEADWW~WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
BT
-&-4 ` MANAGUA 02197
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL US. NU
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S MEETINGS WITH JULIO
RAMOS AND SERGIO RAMIREZ
2. SUMMARY: CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED SEEP,,'ICES COMMITTEE
LES 4S'IN MET SEPARLTEL, M'ITH COMAfrL1.TE JULIO PAMOS
AN:' VICE PRESIDENT RAMIREZ ON APRIL 4. IN A PELATI`:E
CANDID CONVERSATION. RAMOS DISCUSSES GON MILIT4P
CAPABILITIES AND THE GONE REASONS FOP IMPLEMENTING
A STATE OF EM---PG--NC,. RAN:REZ. It, A LESS CANDID
PRESENTATION, DISCUSSED THE CONTADORL PROCESS. THE
UPCOMING CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS' SUM?IT MEETING
AND THE GON ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION
AND DIALOGUE WITH THE EXTERNAL OPPOSITION. END SUMM4=
JULIO RAMOS
3. ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 4, CONGRESSMAN ASPIN WAS
INVITED TC A MEETING WITH COMMANDER OF MANAGUA'S THIRE
MILITAR1 REGION JULIC RAMOS. PER GON REQUEST. OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WERE NOT INCLUDED.
4. IN A FRANK DISCUSSION OF CONTRA ABILITIES. RAMOS
SAID THAT SINE 1982, THE CONTRAS HAL- SEEN BASED IN
HONDURAS AND ACTIVE IN THE NICARAGUAN DEPARTMENTS Or
MATAG4LPA. JINOTEGA AND 1,1JEVA SEGCt'IA. HE SAID THL'
IN 1923 84 THE CONTRAS EYrA1,f)EL' THEIR OrERATIONE BUT
II N 19P5 THE EP S HAL EEG'J!. TE PEPEL THEL^ HE 541[ TH'
GPOJ~' IN THE SOJTH WAS SF1--LL AIJC SINE MAC iP?I- PC-,
VIR'LIA_LI BEEN PUSHED OUT OF NICAPA?3'J1.. ARDE. HE
SAIC'. WAS t,YJ LONGER A THREAT AIPL THE GON OBJECTIVE
FOP 1986 WAS TO PUSH OUT REMAINING FDN FORCES. SOME
OF WHOM ARE STILL ACTIVE IN NICARAG'JL'S CENTRAL
REGION (CHONTALES).
5. HE SAID MOST RECENTL'. CONTRA ACTIVITY HAD MOVES
EAST FROM THE NJEVA SEGOVIA,'HONDURAS BORDER AREA TO THE
JINOTEGA/HONDJRAS BORDER AREA. THOUr.oi THERE
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WAS STILL SOME ACTIVITY IN NUEVA SEGOVIA, MAORIZ AND
NORTHERN CHINANDEGA. TWO MONTHS AGO, HE SAID, THE
CONTRA HAD KILLED A SWISS CITIZEN IN NORTHERN CHINANDEGA.
HE SAID THE CONTRAS HAD NOT HAD POLITICAL SUCCESS. THAT
ONLY IN THE CHONTALES AREA WAS THERE STILL SUPPORT FOR
THE CONTRA. HE SAID THE FUN STILL ACTIVE IN CHONTALES
AREA WOULD SOON BE CONTAINED. THE GON OBJECTIVE, HE
SAID, WAS TO STOP THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES TO THE CONTRA
FORCES.
6. KISAN, HE SAID, WAS NO LONGER CAPABLE OF MAJOR
MILITARY ACTIVITY EVEN THOUGH IT WAS CURRENTLY TRYING
TO STRENGTHEN ITS TIES WITH THE FDN. HE SAID THE
INTERNAL DIVISONS IN THAT ORGANIZATION, WHICH HAD
RESULTED IN KISAN'S HAVING HAD SIX DIFFERENT LEADERS
IN THE PAST COUPLE OF YEARS. MEANT THAT IT WOULD
EVENTUALLY DISAPPEAR.
7. IN WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN A SLIP OF THE TONGUE, RAMOS
SAID THAT WITH U.S. AID, WHICH THE CONTRAS WERE GOING
TO RECEIVE, THEY WOULD HIT ECONOMIC TARGETS. HE SAID
THEY WOULD CHOOSE ECONOMIC TARGETS BECAUSE SUCH TARGETS
DO NOT REQUIRE A POLITICAL OR SOCIAL BASE. BUT ADMITTED
THE DESTRUCTION OF THOSE TARGETS WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT
IMPACT.
8. RAMOS SAID THAT THIS YEAR GON FORCES HAD STABILIZED.
BOTH ELITE AND CAMPESINO TROOPS, HE SAID, HAD BEEN
STRENGTHENED. EVEN THOUGH OUR ECONOMY WAS SUFFERING,
HE SAID, THE GOVERNMENT COULD HOLD ON.
9. RAMOS SAID THE FSLN WOULD NEVER ALLOW "FOREIGN
MILITARY BASES," IN NICARAGUA. HE SAID THERE WERE
SOME 600-700 CUBAN MILITARY ADVISORS IN THE COUNTRY.
WHAT WE ASK, HE SAID, WAS A CESSATION OF AGGRESSION.
HE SAID THE GON HAD TOLD AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN THAT
IT COULD SHOW THAT IT WAS NOT SUPPORTING INSURGENT
GROUPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. HE SAID THE ONLY
STICKING POINT DURING THE MANZANILLO TALKS, HAD BEEN
THE GON REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE CONTRA. HE SAID
THE FSLN WOULD NEVER NEGOTIATE WITH THE CONTRA BECAUSE
TO DO SO WOULD BE TO DOOM THE REVOLUTION. "WE PREFER
TO HAVE A U.S. INTERVENTION TO NEGOTIATING WITH THE
CONTRA."
10. ON RECRUITMENT, HE SAID THAT SANDINISTA FORCES
HAD DRAFTED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN SINCE
OCTOBER 1983. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE GON HAD LIVED
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 MANAGUA 02197
H PASS TO CONGRESSMAN ASPIN
WHITE HOUSE FOR WILLIAM BALL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL US, NU
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S MEETINGS WITH JULIO
UP TO ITS COMMITMENT TO RELEASE DRAFTEES FROM SERVICE
AFTER TWO YEARS OF DUTi'. HE SAID DRAFTEES RECEIVED
21 DAYS OF BASIC TRAINING. IN THAT. HE SAID, WE COPIED
THE U.S. MODEL, NOT THE CUBAN MODEL, WHICH REQUIRED
SIX MONTHS BASIC TRAINING. AFTER BASIC TRAINING, HE
SAID, SOLDIERS WERE SENT TO UNITS WHERE THEY SPECIALIZED
IN SPECIFIC DUTIES. HE SAID SOLDIERS RECEIVED ONLY A
SMALL SUBSIDY WHICH ENABLED THEM TO BUY DRINKS AND
CIGARETTES. HE SAID DRAFT AGE WAS 18-25 YEARS FOR
ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE AND 25-40 YEARS OF AGE FOR RESERVE
UNITS. HE SAID THAT UNDER THE LAW RESERVES COULD BE
CALLED UP FOR ONE MONTH'S TRAINING EACH YEAR BUT THEY
WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE CALLED THAT OFTEN. HE SAID
THAT SHOULD A MAJOR CALL UP BE NECESSARY, RESERVES
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WOULD BE FUNNELLED INTO THE EXISTING ARM" STRUCTURE
IN THE FOLLOWING WAY. HE SAID PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER
CADRES OF 60 OFFICERS AND 60 ENLISTED HAD BEEN
ESTABLISHED. EACH GROUP OF 3.000 RESERVES WOULD BE
CHANNELLED INTO THAT TYPE OF CADRE. RAMOS SAID THAT
WITH THOSE ON ACTIVE DUTY. THE RESERVES AND THE
MILITIA. THE GON HAD AN ESTIMATED 300.000 MEN PREPARED
TO BEAR ARMS. BUT WITH RESERVES AND MILITIA, HE
SAID. NICARAGUA COULDN'T INVADE ANOTHER COUNTRY. HE
SAID THE ACTIVE DUTY FORCE WAS 70.000 BUT IT WOULD BE
REDUCED TO STANDING FORCE OF 50.000 IF THERE WERE NO
THREAT FROM THE CONTRAS.
11. RESPONDING TO CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S REQUEST TO
DESCRIBE THE GON'S POLICY OF HOT PURSUIT. RAMOS SAID
THE CONTRAS FIRE FROM HONDURAS ALL THE TIME. OFTEN.
HE SAID. WE SENT IN MEN TO TAKE OUT A CONTRA FIRING
SITE. BUT THE GON HAD NO INTEREST IN HOLDING POSITIONS
IN HONDURAS. HE SAID WHEN HIS TROOPS HAD KNOWLEDGE
OF CONTRA MOVEMENTS THEY COULD NOT WAIT UNTIL THE
CONTRA WERE 50 METERS AWAY BEFORE ACTING: THEY HAD TO
TAKE DEFENSIVE ACTIONS EVEN IF THAT MEANT CROSSING
THE BORDER. RAMOS SAID THAT A BATALLION COMMANDER
IN THE BORDER AREA COULD ON HIS OWN AUTHORIT) MOVE
NICARAGUAN TROOPS ONE KM INTO HONDURAS IN HOT PURSUIT.
TO GO FARTHER. COMMANDERS MUST SEEK GUIDANCE FROM
SUPERIOR OFFICERS.
12. IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S QUESTION AS
TO WHY GON FORCES MOVED INTO HONDURAS IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE HOUSE VOTE ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL
FOR USDOLS 100 MILLION IN AID TO THE CONTRA. RAMOS
SAID THAT JUST BEFORE THE VOTE THE CONTRA INFILTRATED
SOME 800 TROOPS UNDER THE COMMAND OF OMAR INTO NORTH
SEGOVIA. HE SAID THE EPS HIT OMAR AND HIS FORCES HARD
CAUSING SOME 200 CASUALTIES. AN ATTEMPT TO MOVE A
SECOND CONTRA UNIT INTO NORTH SEGOVIA WAS NOT SUCCESS-
FUL. SO ENRIOUE BERMUDEZ. FEARFUL THAT OMAP'S GROUP
WOULD BE WIPED OUT. ORDERED A FORCE OF 800-1.000
TROOPS UNDER THE COMMAND OF ARELLAIJD TO ENTER NICARAGUUL
THROU3'-+ THE DEPARTMENT OF JINOTEGL. RAMOS SAID THE
EPS WAS AWARE OF EERMUDEZ'S PLANS TO ENTER NICARAGUA
IN THAT AREA BUT IT HAD NOT UNDERTAKEN A PRE-EMPTIVE
STRIKE. HE SAID THAT THE EPS HAD CHASED THE CONTRAS
SOME FOUR OR FIVE KMS INTO HONDURAS. OUR GENERAL
GUIDELINE, HE SAID. WAS THAT THE EFS TROOPS SHOULD
NOT GO BEYOND ITS ARTILLERY RAN3E. HE SAID THAT
DISTANCE WAS FOUR OR FIVE KMS. RAMOS SAID THE EPS
HAS A STRONG FORCE OF 8.000 TROOPS ALONG THE JINOTEGA
BORDER AREA WITH HONDURAS. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE
HOW MAN, OF THOSE TROOPS WERE IN THE FRONT LINES AND
IN HONDURAN TERRITORY DURING LAST WEEK'S ENCOUNTER.
HE SAID IT WAS NOT A STRIKE BUT A MAJOR ENCOUNTER.
EPS SMALL UNITS HAD ATTACKED THE REARGUARD OF THE
CONTRA.
13. CONGRESSMAN ASPIN ASKED IF RAMOS BELIEVED CONGRESS
WOULD APPROVE THE PRESIDENT'S CONTRA AID PROPOSAL. RAMD'
SAID THAT'S WHAT THE GOt,' WAS WAITING TO HEAP BUT THE
C0I43PESSM4N SHOULD KN3 THAT V:DC_S 1Cr^ MILLION "WO'ULE'
0'J, , PP.OLOtJ; THE A GOtJ . THE -"''.N ' HIGH PROVIDE THE
CO!NTRI W71 E(,:J PME1 T PUT THE WOULD NOT EPI N G MOPE
MEN DP GIVE THE CONTRA A POLlTT-LL EASE. HE SAID THE
CONTRA HAD POPULAR, SUr'OP7 ON_ IN CHONTALES. HE
ADMITTED THAT IN 1983 THEY HAD SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT
IN JINOTEGA AND NUEVA SEGOVIA. BUT. HE SAID. SUCCESS-
FUL EPS MILITIR ACTIONS AND FOLLOWUP POLITICAL WORK
HAD RESULTED IN SERIOUS DETERIORATION CF SUPPORT. HE
SAID THE CONTRA COULD HIT URBA'.' AND ECONOMIC TARGETS
S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 MANAGUA 02197,
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREP US, NU
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S MEETINGS WITH JULIO
BUT THAT WOULDN'T GAIN THEM POLITICAL SUPPORT. WE
HAVE COMMITTED POLITICAL ERRORS, SAID RAMOS, BUT NOW
WE'RE BEGINNING TO DO THINGS RIGHT AND THE DRAFT IS
SUCCESSFUL. FOR THE CONTRAS PART, THEY HAVE NO
POLITICAL BASE AND THEIR MILITARY DEFEATS HAVE DEMORAL-
IZED THEIR SUPPORTERS.
14. IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S QUESTION OF
WHY THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS NECESSAR'r IN OCTOBER
1985 IF THE CONTRA WERE LOSING, RAMOS SAID THE STATE
OF EMERGENCY WAS DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THE INTERNAL
FRONT, NOT WITH THE CONTRAS. HE SAID THE GON HAD
MADE AN ERROR IN LIFTING RESTRICTIONS DURING THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THAT THE'LACK OF RESTRICTIONS
HAD PERMITTED THE CONTRA TO DEVELOP INTERNAL SUPPORT.
NICARAGUA MUST BE ONE OF THE FEW COUNTRIES NOT TO HAVE
IMPOSED MORE SERIOUS RESTRICTIONS AT A TIME WHEN IT
WAS LOSING MEN. HE SAID THE EPS HAD 1500 DEAD LAST
YEAR. HE SAID THE CONTRA WERE DISINTEGRATING AND THE
STATE OF EMERGENCY WOULD GUARANTEE ITS STRATEGIC DEFEAT.
HE SAID WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY WOULD
BE CONTINUED NEXT OCTOBER DEPENDED ON THE CONTRA. HE
SAID THE CONTRA WERE LOSING AND ONLY A DIRECT U.S.
INTERVENTION WOULD ACCOMPLISH THE U.S. ENDS. HE
ADMITTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A POLITICAL COST TO THE
STATE OF EMERGENCY, BUT, HE SAID, "THE REVOLUTION WAS
STRONG. WE HAVE INTERNAL SUPPORT AND A JUST POSITION."
HE SAID. "TALK TO THE JOURNALISTS WHO TRAVEL UP NORTH.
THEY WILL TELL YOU OUR TROOPS' MORALE IS HIGH EVEN
THOUGH THEIR BOOTS HAVE HOLES AND THEIR CLOTHES ARE
RAGGED; THEY STAY IN THE MOUNTAINS AND FIGHT." HE
SAID PEOPLE COMPLAIN ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF BASIC FOOD-
STUFFS, BUT IF CALLED THEY WOULD GO WILLINGLY. HE
THEN NOTED THAT MOST PEOPLE WERE NOT AFFECTED BY THE
STATE OF EMERGENCY. THERE WAS, AFTER ALL, NO CURFEW.
15. AS TO WHY THE GON HAS SO MANY TANKS, RAMOS SAID
THAT IN 1981 AND 1982 THE GON WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO
BUILD A REGULAR ARMY. WHAT WAS RECEIVED FROM THE
SOVIETS WERE RECONSTRUCTED T-55 TANKS. HE SAID THE
TANKS WERE IN SUCH POOR CONDITION THAT SOMETIMES
THEY HAD TO BE PUSHED WITH TRACTORS IN ORDER TO GET
THEM STARTED. IN NO WAY DID THE GON'S TANK FORCE
COMPARE WITH HONDURAS'S TANK FORCE OF MODERN SCORPIONS,
HE SAID. WITH THE U.S. AGGRESSION WE HAD CHANGED OUR
ARMS ACQUISITION EMPHASIS, HE SAID. NOW THE GON SOUGHT
MORTARS. ARTILLERY AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. HE
SAID 50,000 - 100,000 AUTOMATIC RIFLES WERE URGENTLY
NEEDED AND THE GON WOULD GET THEM WHEREVER THE( COULD.
EVEN ALL OF THAT WON'T HELP US, HE SAID, IF THE U.S.
INVADED. "IF LIBYA'S SAM-5'S DIDN'T WORK, OUR SAM-7'S
WON'T EITHER."
16. CONGRESSMAN ASPIN MET ON APRIL 4 WITH VICE PRESIDENT
SERGIO RAMIREZ. PER GON REQUEST, OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
DELEGATION DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING. A LARGE NUMBER
OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS FOLLOWED THE CONGRESSMAN
TO HIS MEETING WITH RAMIREZ BUT THE CONGRESSMAN REFUSED
TO MAKE ANY STATEMENTS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE
MEETING.
17. RAMIREZ OPENED THE MEETING Bi PROVIDING THE CONGRESS-
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MAN WITH HIS OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN
NICARAGUA. RAMIREZ SAID THE GON HAD "GOOD HOPE.'
HE NOTED THAT THE GON HAD RECENTL+ SIGNED A BORDER
AGREEMENT WITH COSTA RICA AND WAS WORKING TO REACH A
SIMILAR AGREEMENT WITH HONDURAS. THE BORDER WITH
HONDURAS. HE SAID, WAS NICARAGUA'S "HOTTEST SPOT NOW."
IT WAS TO THE GON'S ADVANTAGE. HE SAID. THAT HONDURAS
DID NOT WANT A MILITAR, CONFRONTATION. HE SAID RECENT
HONDURAN STATEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN QUOTED IN THE APRIL 4
WASHINGTON POST, LED THE GON TO BELIEVE ITS CURRENT
CRISIS WITH HONDURAS WOULD BE OVERCOME. HE SAID THE
GON UNDERSTOOD THE FACT OF LIFE THAT THE U.S. MILITAP
PRESENCE IN HONDURAS INFLUENCED HONDURAN DECISION-
MAKING. BECAUSE OF THE U.S.. HE SAID. HONDURAN
PRESIDENT AZCONA MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE AS
COMPREHENSIVELN AS HE DESIRED. BUT RAMIREZ BELIEVED
PERMANENT CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES WOULD BE MAINTAINED. (RAMIREZ AT THIS
POINT APPARENTLY WAS REFERRING TO CHANNELS WHICH DID
NOT NECESSARIL+' INVOLVE THE TWO COUNTRIES' RESPECTIVE
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. HE SPECIFICALLI MENTIONED THE
S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 MANAGUA 02197
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL US. NU
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S MEETINGS WITH JULIO
HONDURAN MINISTER OF ENERGi AS ONE OF THOSE INVOLVED
IN FACILITATING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
RAMIREZ SAID THAT AZCONA'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE HAD
SPOKEN WITH DANIEL ORTEGA WAS A DELIBERATE AND WELL
THOUGHT OUT HONDURAN ACT DESIGNED TO GAIN INTERNAL
SUPPORT FOP AZCONA. HE SAID IT WAS IN PART NECESSAP
BECAUSE OF THE DISGUST THE HONDURAN PEOPLE FELT FOP
THE CONTRAS AFTE=. THEN MURDERED A CANADIAN PRIEST.
1B PALSIRE2 DESCPIEED THE UPCOMING SUMU,IT OF CENTRAL
AMEP:CAN PRESIDENTS TO BE HELD IN ESOUI='U.AE. GUATEMALA
IN MAi AS A CULMINATION OF A REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC PROCESS.
IN PREPARATION FOR THAT SUMMIT MEETING. HE SAID.
CENTRAL AMERICAN FOREIGN: MINISTERS WOULD MEET ON APRIL 1^
AWE' 11 AND CENTRAL AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENTS WOULD MEET
IIJ GUATEMALA ON APRIL 22 AND 23. HE SAID THE TAS/. OF
THE VICE PRESIDENTS WOULD BE TO AGREE OIJ THE FINAL
DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD BE RELEASED AT THE SUMMIT MEETING.
HE SAID IN THIS CENTRAL AMERICAN EFFORT THE GON SHARED
WITH VE14IZID CEREZO THE THESIS THAT IT WAS AN IMPORTANT
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AND SEEK SOLUTIONS.
19. NICARAGUA'S GREATEST DIFFICULTY. SAID RAMIREZ.
WAS ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USG. HE SAID HE
DID NOT SEE MAN, DIPLOMATIC OR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS,
B'U THAT THE GON BELIEVED IT HAD AN OBLIGATION TO
CO:JTIN1JE TO SEAR--+-' FOR A SOLUTION. BILATERAL RELATIONS
WDJLD BE MADE MOPE DIFFICULT. HE SAID. IF THE CONTRAS
PE_EIVEI' NEW L'.S. t:r~. IT WAS THE GON'S FEAR. HE SAID.
THAT IF THE U.S. =v- ITS 3N"d HELICOPTERS ANC. ADs'ISOPP
IL I' THE BOROE-' AE=, . E,E':TJA_L, E1THES A HELICD''TEG'
WO r EE SHOT DDn''. Or A', Ari'ISDP KILLED. THL
E''ENTUtLIT,. H SAIL. CO~LC' OUICKL\ ESCALATE DUT OF
C0'fTROL AIJ'O LEG; THE U.S INTO ANOTHER VIETNAM. HE
SAID THA- DURING THE BORDER CRISIS. U.S. HELICOPTERS
HAL' FLOWN HOI'IDURAL TROOPS INTO THE BORDER AREA. RAISING
THE THRESHHOLD OF CONFLICT."
2C COtWEEIJTING Ot. THE CONTADORA FOREIGN MINISTERS'
MEETING NOW TAKING PLACE IN PANAMA. RAA'IPEZ SAID THE
GO': WOULD NOT TAL/ ABOUT SIGNING THE CONTADORL ACT.
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THE GON'S SHORT TERM AIM, HE SAID, WOULD BE TO SEEK
PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS ON CONCRETE POINTS. QEFERRING
TO ARGENTINE PRESIDENT ALFONSIN'S STATEMENTS TO
SPEAKER O'NEILL, RAMIREZ SAID THERE WAS LATIN AMERICAN
SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT A MULTI-LATIN AMERICAN FORCE
BE PUT INTO THE HONDURAS/NICARAGUA BORDER AREA. HE
SAID THE GON HAD DISCUSSED THAT PROPOSAL WITH ALFONSIN
AND HAD TOLD ALFONSIN THAT IT COULD BE A PRACTICAL MEASURE.
21. RESPONDING TO CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S QUESTION ON THE
SIX-PARTY DOCUMENT, RAMIREZ FIRST PRETENDED THAT HE WAS
NOT SURE TO PRECISELY WHICH DOCUMENT THE CONGRESSMAN
WAS REFERRING. ONCE THE DOCUMENT HAD BEEN PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED IN HIS MIND, HE SAID THE PROBLEM WITH THAT
DOCUMENT, AS WITH ITS INTERNAL OPPOSITION GROUP SIGNERS,
WAS THAT IT WAS LINKED TO THE CONTRA. "I'M NOT
PARANOID," HE SAID, "BUT THAT DOCUMENT REFLECTS THE
DEMANDS OF THE CONTRA." RAMIREZ SAID HE HAD JUST
DISCUSSED WITH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC INTERNATIONAL
VISITORS FROM SPAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNAL
DIALOGUE. HE SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT WHAT WAS
IMPORTANT NOW WAS THE PROMULGATION OF NICARAGUA'S NEW
CCNSTITUTICN-- IN THAT CONSTITUTION THE RULES WOULD BE
DEFINED. HE SUGGESTED THAT OPPOSITION PARTIES SHOULD
TURN THEIR ATTENTION TO SUPPORTING AND COMMENTING ON
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S DRAFT CONSTITUTION. HE SAID
HE KNEW THE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY HAD DRAFTED ITS OWN
CONSTITUTION BUT THAT THAT WAS A MEANINGLESS ACT. IT
WAS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S VERSION THAT COUNTED, HE
SAID, AND PARTIES SHOULD TURN THEIR ATTENTION TO
ADDRESSING THEIR POINTS OF CONCERN ON THAT DOCUMENT
DURING THE UPCOMING TOWN MEETINGS. HE POINTED OUT
THAT ALL PARTIES HAD HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK OUT
IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BEFORE THE DRAFT WAS DRAWN UP.
NONE, NOT IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, HE SAID, HAD PARTICI-
PATED IN THAT PROCESS. HE SAID KEY ISSUES IN THE CONSTI-
TUTION WERE: WHETHER NICARAGUA WOULD HAVE A ONE-PARTY
SYSTEM; SEPARATION OF POWERS; THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND
THE ROLE OF THE ARMY. APPROVING THE CONSTITUTION, HE
SAID, WAS SOMETHING THAT HAD TO BE DONE CAREFULLi, "FOR
IT WAS A CONSTITUTION THAT HAD TO LAST FOR MANY YEARS."
22. RESPONDING TO CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S QUESTION ON THE
S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 MANAGUA 02197
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL US, NU
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S MEETINGS WITH JULIO
GON ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOTIATING WITH THE ARMED OPPOSI-
TION, RAMIREZ SAID THE POINT WAS WHETHER NEGOTIATORS
HAD TIES WITH THE CIA AND THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION.
IF WE FOUND AN INDEPENDENT LEADER WHO HAD NO SUCH TIES
THEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THAT INDIVIDUAL MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE, HE SAID. HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE GON'S
WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE, ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH BROOKLYN
RIVERA. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT ANY CONTRA LEADER,
INCLUDING THOSE IN UNO, COULD, UNDER NICARAGUA'S
AMNESTY LAW, RETURN TO NICARAGUA AND REINTEGRATE INTO
THE SYSTEM.
23. ASKED ABOUT COMANDANTE BORGE'S HEALTH, RAMIREZ SAID
GORGE EACH MORNING SWAM THREE MILES IN JILOA LAGOON. IF
COMANDANTE GORGE HAD NOT BEEN VISIBLE IN THE'L71ST FEW
DAYS, HE SAID, IT WAS BECAUSE HIS WIFE WAS ABOUT TO
GIVE BIRTH. RAMIREZ SAID RUMORS SUCH AS THAT REGARDING
BORGE'S HEALTH WERE SPREAD BY THE CIA. AS CAPTURED
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86 0463674 SSO PAGE 007 NC 0463674
TOP: 052109Z APR 86 MANAGU 02197
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MINT LT. AGUADO TOLD US, HE SAID. THE CIA'S OBJECTIVE
WAS TO CREATE A SPLIT WITHIN THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE.
WE WERE VERY CONCERNED. HE SAID. THAT ONE OF OUR LEADERS
WOULD BE ASSASSINATED BY THE CIA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF
USING THAT ASSASSINATION TO CREATE A SPLIT IN THE
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE. ADMITTING THAT A SPLIT IN THE
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE WOULD BE THE ONE WAY" TO DEPOSE
THE FLSN SHORT OF INTERVENTION. RAMIREZ SAID THERE WAS
ABSOLUTELY NO CHANCE THAT A SPLIT WOULD OCCUR. HE
SAID THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE WAS SO AWARE OF THE CIA
INTENT IT WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO MAINTAIN CONSENSUS.
HE SAID PRESENT REPORTS IN HONDURAS OF DIVISIONS BETWEEN
TOMAS BORGE AND DANIEL ORTEGA WERE UNTRUE.
24. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, RAMIREZ SAID
THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. HAD DOUBTS ABOUT
NICARAGUA. THOSE DOUBTS. HE SAID. COULD NOT BE RESOLVED
WITH WORDS. HE URGED CONGRESSMAN ASPIN TO RETURN IN
FIVE. TEN OR TWENTY YEARS. THEN. HE SAID, YOU WILL SEE
OUR DEMOCRACI AND PERHAPS WE COULD HAVE A DIFFERENT
TYPE OF CONVERSATION. PERHAPS, HE SAID. NICARAGUA
WOULD BE EVEN MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN THE U.S. HE SAID
THE CHOICE B~ AMERICAN VOTERS OF AN "ULTRA-RIGHT
PRESIDENT" DID NOT STRIKE HIM AS DEMOCRATIC AND WAS
WORRISOME TO THE GON. HE SAID IT WAS NOT GOOD FOP
A SOCIETY TO HAVE A PRESIDENT "WHO LIES SO MUCH."
25. CONGRESSMAN ASPIN RESPONDED THAT EVEN IN FIVE. TEN
OR TWENTY YEARS HE AND RAMIREZ PROBABLY WOULD STILL HAVE
A DIFFERENT VIEW ON THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY. HE SAID
PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS THE CLEAR CHOICE OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE AND THAT THE GON SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT. HE
SAID THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MADE THEIR CHOICE BASED ON A
BROAD SPECTRUM OF ISSUES AND THAT NICARAGUA HAD NOT
BEEN A KE, ISSUE IN THE MINDS OF MOST VOTERS. EVEN IN
THE 198P PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, SAID THE CONGRESSMAN.
NICARAGUL WAS UNLIKELY TO BE A KE, ISSUE UNLESS AMERICAN
SEP,ICEMEN WERE INVOLVED IN THE AREA. BERGOLD
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP90BO139OR000700930040-7