SHIFT IN PAKISTANI THINKING ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOSCOW?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 16, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/10: CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3
S ET
The Director o entral Intelligence
Washington, C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 02436-86
16 May 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Shift in Pakistani Thinking on Negotiations with Moscow?
Pakistan may be in the process of reconsidering its o tions in
negotiations with Kabul and the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan
question. While we need to be keenly alert to such a strategic shift, I
do not believe Zia's regime is so naive as not to see the pitfalls. At
the same time I do not believe the objective circumstances are yet
present in Pakistan to occasion a major shift.
2.I why Zia might reconsider his Afghan
policy include e following:
-- The change of leadership in Kabul conceivably could offer new
opportunities.
-- Moscow may be "more sincere" about an intention to withdraw.
-- The Mujahidin may be doing less well and possibly beginning a
long term decline in capabilities.
-- Zia has told Mujahidin leaders that they may have to come to an
understanding with Kabul.
-- The Soviets' performance on the ground in Afghanistan may be
increasingly effective.
-- Moscow may be stepping up military pressure against Pakistan
along the border.
-- There may be dwindling support for the present Afghanistan
policy within Pakistan.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/10: CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/10: CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3
SECRET
3. I believe we must take a more careful look at the balance sheet
however. I have been convinced over the past few years and have noted in
memos that the Afghan conflict will be resolved in Pakistan, not on the
battlefields of Afghanistan. Once Pakistani support to the Mujahidin is
broken the game winds down soon thereafter. I am not certain, however,
that the serious problems--that one day will come in Pakistan causing
Zia's collapse--are here yet.
There are many different calculations involved in Pakistani
thinking which have traditionally caused them to speak out of
several different sides of their mouths on the problem.
Pakistan has never wanted to see the resistance truly united or
powerful enough to exert independent influence in Pakistani
policy formulation.
The Pakistanis are clever enough to keep the US nervous about
their intentions in order to keep maximum economic and military
support flowing.
Islamabad wants to appear reasonable and flexible to the world
on this issue.
Zia wants to avoid the direct confrontation with Moscow which
negotiating rigidity would imply.
The Paks deeply distrust Najibullah and his intentions toward
Pakistan.
It is in Zia's interest to avoid bein seen as the instrument of
the US; a certain coolness toward the insurgency issue helps him
there.
Zia probably believes that his "open-mindedness" about the
nature of a future Kabul regime is clever: once the Soviets are
gone there is no reason for confidence that the Communists can
maintain a hold on power, or that the internal resistance can't
get weapons from across porous borders.
4. There are still a number of factors which need to be balanced
against seeming Pakistani melting of resolve.
-- Pakistan cannot survive without US economic and military
support. It is largely the Afghanistan issue which has helped
keep Pakistan in the US -go od graces.
-- Zia must realize that it is only his support for the Mujahidin
which enables this Administration to try to put the best ace on
Pakistani delinquency on nuclear weapons development. When
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/10: CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/10: CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3
JtLKtI
Islamabad stops playing ball with the Mujahidin, Congress will
descend on perceived Pakistani nuclear violations like a pack of
banshees--strongly supported by the pro-Israeli lobby which has
deep anxiety about any "Islamic bomb."
I do not yet sense that Zia's Afghanistan policy in itself is an
object of criticism in Pakistan. Most Pakistanis fear Moscow
and Kabul and consolidation of Soviet power there. The real
problem is that Zia's domestic opponents perceive that ids
vulnerable to charges of doing America's bidding and to being
kept in power by e US; it Pakistani support to the Muja idi i~n
is broken, is will be much more vulnerable to the domestic
opposition.
The economy has not yet deteriorated seriously--but the longer
term outlook is not encouraging.
-- The refugee issue is not yet a serious problem for Pakistan.
5. In short, there are very many good reasons for Pakistan to avoid
any true shift of policy on Afghanistan now. Tactical maneuvering is
likely to continue, and we must continue to be extremely alert for signs
of strategic shift in Islamabad's thinking. That said, the potential
ingredients for the eventual collapse of Zia's regime are present, and
probably cannot be avoided over the long term. Over the shorter term,
however, I still believe we have some time to work with.
-- It is conceivable Zia may believe the nuclear issue will soon
bring him to grief with the US anyway. But he has no reason to
hasten that day.
-- Nonetheless, Benazir Bhutto's return is a real wild card
which--if mishandled--could greatly accelerate domestic
deterioration.
r Otl1c
Graham E. Fuller
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/10: CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/10: CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3
NIC 02436-86
16 May 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Shift in Pakistani Thinking on Negotiations with Moscow?
NIC/VC/NIC:GEFuller:jcn 16 May 86
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - D/Exec Staff
1 - ER
1 - A/C/NIC
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
1 - SRP
VC/NIC
n,,0/~ ss"'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/10: CIA-RDP88T00988R000200160001-3