AID TO THE CONTRAS: DEALING WITH THE MISCONCEPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001904450084-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 84
• Publication Date: June 4, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2011/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01904450084-0
'SUBJECT: Aid to the Contras: Dealing with the Misconceptions
There are in the debate on the aid to the resistance in Nicaragua, and
Angola as well, vast misperceptions on the role and effectiveness of armed
opposition to oppressive regimes. We hear that there is no way the United
States could ever match the money and weapons the Soviets have provided the
governments installed in Nicaragua and Angola--no way the resistance could
"defeat" them militarily.
This argument totally misses the point. It is not necessary to "match"
Soviet military support to a government. Resistance forces rarely defeat a
government army. Indeed, it is usually foolish to attempt that.
The purpose of an insurgent force is first to prevent an oppressive
regime from achieving irreversible consolidation, and secondary to peel off
popular support.
A relatively small force can initiate this process, as we have seen in
Nicaragua with both the Sandinistas in 1979 and the Contras currently, as well
as in Angola with Savimbi. The fundamental thing is that it costs much more to
counter an insurgency than to support one. Recruiting, training and equipping
an adequate security force is a monumental task for a regime facing an insurgent
force. Today we see the Angolan regime, with 150,000 Angolan and Cuban troops
and massive aid from the Soviets, beleaguered by the insurgency which started
with a few thousand men and has now grown to about one-third the size of the
defending government force. Because the government cannot choose the battlefield,
it must provide security throughout the country. Because extensive fortification
networks--maintained by troops that patrol the countryside--are needed to provide
such protection, large numbers of troops are tied down to protect defense
installations and economic facilities in all parts of the country to counter
insurgent forces capable of moving quickly and silently. This requires very
expensive to carry the heavy expense of maintaining helicopter gun-
ships, other heavy weapons, and communications and transport. Large quantities
of ammunitions are needed when fighting an "invisible" enemy.
Far fewer people are required to destabilize a government than are needed
to protect it. Insurgent forces do not really need sophisticated and expensive
weapons except to defend against air and tank attacks. They can pick their
opportunities to strike at vulnerable strategic targets. This can inflict
physical and psychological damage on the regime at a low cost.
Their purpose is not to defeat a superior military force, but to take
popular support away from the regime. Much of the insurgents' appeal to the
populace comes from their efforts to improve living conditions within the
country. Programs to provide education and improve sanitation and health
facilities are cheaper to fund than programs to upgrade the military
capabilities of the government.
Approved For Release 2011/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01904450084-0
 Approved For Release 2011/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01904450084-0
To argue that the insurgents will never have the military power to defeat
the government's superior military might ignores history and misrepresents
the way revolutions work. Because insurgency is a protracted conflict,
involves a number of stages and is pursued through a variety of tactics,
progress is made through small, numerous achievements. A full-blown offensive
is not required to gain momentum in the insurgency. Small-scale tactics can
gradually erode the stability of the government. Most insurgent conflicts
are not decided on the battlefield. Insurgencies force the collapse of regimes
that, either through an erosion of popular support or international pressure,
are already weakened. A decisive insurgent military victory is not required.
In Uganda, for example, the recent success of Musaveni--who led a small
resistance movement against a government force six times its size and succeeded
without fighting a major engagement--shows the vulnerability of brutal, corrupt
governments.
In Algeria in the late 1950s, in South Yemen in the 1960s, and in Vietnam
in the 1970s, neither Paris nor London nor Washington had the perseverence
or domestic support to continue their counterinsurgency efforts and a stalemated
situation ensued, resulting in eventual withdrawal by the foreign forces and
victory for the insurgents.
We also hear that the Nicaraguan resistance should be totally self-reliant;
that external support somehow will undermine the legitimacy of the moment
and its long-term chance of success. The truth is that external material
support and international recognition of a shadow government are key factors
in most successful insurgencies.
-- External support played a key role in the successful rise to
power of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Without massive
support from the Cubans and Soviets, the Popular Movement would not have
been able to defeat the other groups vying for power.
-- The Sandinistas' victory was achieved in large measure through
Cuban assistance in the form of advice, training, arms and funds.
-- The same can be said of Soviet support for the Vietcong in the
1970s and French support for George Washington in the 1770s.
-- International pressure and external support were key factors in
bringing about the negotiations between the white regime and the insurgents
in Rhodesia which ultimately led to a peaceful insurgent victory. To succeed,
an insurgency must gain international support and recognition.
Withdrawal of external support can destroy or greatly diminish an
insurgency's capabilities, at least initially. This occurred in:
-- The Philippines, where the communist Chinese withdrew support
from the Huks during 1946-1954.
-- Venezuela, where Cuba, after becoming disillusioned with the
insurgents in the mid-1960s, withdrew support.
Approved For Release 2011/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01904450084-0
 Approved For Release 2011/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01904450084-0
-- Greece, where Tito terminated support for the Greek insurgents
and closed the Yugoslav borders in the late 1940s.
-- Angola, where the US stopped its support of the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola following the Clark Amendment in in 1975 and
the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola gained power.
We also hear that there is no significant popular support for the
resistance inside Nicaragua and that, by contrast, the Sandinista regime
enjoys broad international backing. Simply not so.
History shows that progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the
government and gradual erosion of international support for the government
is what brings down or alters oppressive governments. This process is
under way in Nicaragua. The insurgents have made gains among rural peasants
who resent agricultural collectivization and resettlement programs as well
as the government's mandatory military draft and anti-church policies. The
heavy financial burden of the counterinsurgency effort--about half of the
Nicaraguan budget last year--combined with poor economic management has
created mounting discontent with the Sandinista regime.
Marxist regimes try to move quickly to consolidate power to thwart
internal opposition and to develop close ties with the Soviet bloc to
discourage external intervention.
-- Castro was able to eliminate virtually all internal opposition
in Cuba within the first two years.
-- Within two and one-half years of Selassie's overthrow in Ethiopia,
Mengistu had consolidated power, severed relations with the United States,
and begun receiving Soviet military support.
On the other hand, where the West has provided at least a degree of
support to opposition forces--such as in Nicaragua--consolidation of the
Marxist regime has been much slower. After almost seven years in power,
the Sandinistas--faced with a continuing insurgency that enjoys only very
modest US support--have not been able to complete the consolidation process
and eliminate the internal political opposition. In addition, both the
Soviets and Cubans are cautious about provoking a confrontation with the
United States over Nicaragua. Unlike the Angola and Ethiopia cases, the
USSR has not signed a friendship treaty or made other formal commitments to
Nicaragua, and the Cubans have refrained from sending in large numbers of
combat troops.
Finally, skeptics question whether US support for the Nicaraguan
resistance makes sense in a geopolitical sense. The answer is that US support
of insurgent movements fighting Marxist-Leninist regimes has to be seen in
the context of countering greater Soviet subversive involvement in the Third
World. Moscow and Havana currently support high cost, long-term efforts to
the regimes they installed in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and
Nicaragua. In each case, the Soviets now find themselves supporting a
Marxist-Leninist government that is combatting an insurgency--a clear reversal
of the roles experienced by the United States and the Communists in Vietnam.
3
Approved For Release 2011/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01904450084-0
 Approved For Release 2011/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01904450084-0
Given the nature of insurgent conflicts, the cost to Moscow and its
allies of countering an insurgency is considerably greater than the cost to
the West of aiding the insurgents. Yet, at present Moscow appears committed
to holding these gains and is likely to exploit any low cost opportunities
to further consolidate power. Part of this resolve may reflect Soviet belief
that America's post-Vietnam reluctance to become embroiled in Third World
conflicts will eventually force the United States to withdraw because the
results of any US commitment are not immediate enough to sustain public
support. The United States can block this form of Soviet aggression even
while maintaining relatively low levels of support to insurgent groups. In
El Salvador, for example, a low-level US commitment in support of the government
has been a major factor in reversing the fortunes of Nicaraguan and Cuban-backed
insurgents. By requiring Moscow to counter multiple insurgencies, the risks
and costs to Moscow are increased substantially, alternatives to Soviet
domination are kept alive, and Marxist-Leninist regimes in countries such
as Nicaragua are prevented from quickly and irreversibly fixing their
totalitarian grip on the people.
n
Approved For Release 2011/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01904450084-0