NICARAGUA: PROSPECTS FOR THE INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000901210003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

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Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
Nicaragua: Prospects for
the Insurgency
Key Judgments
ret
SNIE 83.3-4-85W
March 1986
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD. CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 83.3-4-85W
NICARAGUA: PROSPECTS FOR
THE INSURGENCY
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum to Holders updates the Special National Intelli-
gence Estimate, Nicaragua: Prospects for the Insurgency, prepared in
July 1985. It will look first at recent trends in the conflict and the
strengths and weaknesses of both sides. It will also examine the
significance of foreign support to Managua and to the insurgents. It will
then discuss prospects for the insurgency over the next year or so,
depending primarily on alternative scenarios of US support for the
rebels and the likely Soviet-Cuban response. Finally, it discusses other
key variables likely to affect the outcome, and the prospects for a
negotiated solution to the conflict.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Whether the Nicaraguan insurgents are able to obtain substantial
military aid and training assistance from the United States over the next
few months is likely to have a significant impact not only on their own
prospects, but also for Sandinista consolidation as well. The Managua
regime remains intent on ultimately consolidating a Marxist-Leninist,
totalitarian state in Nicaragua, and the insurgency has remained a major
obstacle to its success. We believe that, should the insurgency be greatly
reduced or defeated, the generally weak and divided internal opposi-
tion would present little challenge to the Sandinistas.
Although the insurgents reopened and expanded a second front in
central Nicaragua during the latter part of 1985, they have continued to
suffer from serious logistic problems made more acute by inconsistent
Honduran cooperation and the insurgents own inadequate management
and delivery capabilities. This has precluded force expansion, forced
them to keep large units in Honduras awaiting resupply, and made it
difficult to support forces deep inside Nicaragua. Furthermore, al-
though the insurgents have received some popular support in rural
areas, their inability to maintain a dominant presence anywhere in
Nicaragua has limited their ability to attract more active support, and
they remain unable to operate in urban areas. Finally, insurgent units
now find themselves confronting experienced and aggressive Sandinista
counterinsurgency forces supported by artillery and helicopter
gunships.
Insurgent success in obtaining US military aid would have an
immediate positive impact on their morale and would send a clear
message to Nicaragua's neighbors about Washington's commitment to
the struggle. Many Latin countries will fear that the result will be an in-
tensified conflict, but specific reactions within the region are likely to
vary considerably. The Honduran Government, in particular, would
feel reassured by approval of military aid, providing it remains in
covert channels. But it would expect compensation for its support,
would remain nervous about the US commitment to Honduran security
and the prospect of an indefinitely prolonged guerrilla presence in
Honduras. Costa Rica, for its part, is unlikely to change past policy and
allow the insurgents more extensive activities inside Costa Rica.
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With increased US support, the armed conflict inside Nicaragua
is likely to intensify, and, with better management and delivery
capability, the insurgents would likely be able to sustain a large force
presence inside Nicaragua. It also may enable the insurgents to expand
their operations and add to their strength-now estimated at about
20,000. Although the insurgents are unlikely to achieve military victory
within the next year, the Sandinistas will increasingly face the prospect
of a long and costly conflict that they may ultimately lose. Much will
depend on the type and size of the aid, however, and the degree to
which the insurgents respond to US training and guidance. The rebels
still have serious administrative, leadership, tactical, and training
weaknesses that are not susceptible to quick fixes.
A key variable for insurgent prospects will be the ability of the po-
litical leadership to achieve greater unity, develop a more effective
political strategy, and establish better links with the internal opposition
in order to mobilize greater popular support. This has been a major
weakness so far, despite growing popular dissatisfaction with the
Sandinista regime. Increased military success, coupled with a viable
political program, probably would begin to shift the strategic balance in
the insurgents' favor. We believe, however, this is unlikely to happen
within the next year.
Managua probably will use increased US support for the insurgents
to justify even greater sacrifices from its population and tighter controls
on the internal opposition. The Sandinistas are also likely to step up dip-
lomatic pressure and, whenever necessary, use military pressure on
Honduras and Costa Rica to deny sanctuary to the rebels. Finally,
Managua is likely to continue its support for radical and subversive
groups in neighboring countries and encourage bombings and sabotage
in an effort to raise the cost of support to the Nicaraguan insurgents.
A major factor in Managua's capability to contain the insurgency
will be how much additional military support the Soviet Bloc and Cuba
are willing-and able-to provide. We believe the Soviet Union will
continue to provide substantial military and economic support to
buttress the Sandinista regime. In particular, they or their surrogates are
likely to provide additional helicopters and other material to support
the counterinsurgency effort. The Soviets may provide new air defense
weapon systems, and they may test the levels of US tolerance by
supplying L-39s or comparable aircraft. They 'will still feel constrained
about providing advanced jet fighter aircraft for fear of provoking a US
response.
Cuba would probably be willing to commit additional military
advisers and trainers. But we do not believe that Castro would be
willing to send ground combat units to Nicaragua for fear of a US
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response. And, although he may step up support for neighboring radical
groups, he will be wary of being openly linked to terrorist acts on their
part.
We believe that, should the insurgents fail to obtain military aid
from the United States but continue to receive nonlethal support at
current levels, they are likely to be discouraged, and the incentives for
cooperation among the various factions of the external opposition would
be reduced. The insurgents probably would be unable to obtain
sufficient funds from other sources to purchase necessary transport
aircraft or meet other critical military needs. Furthermore, Nicaragua's
neighbors are likely to have greater doubts about the ultimate viability
of the insurgency and the US commitment to oppose Sandinista
consolidation. Honduran military support for the insurgency would
become increasingly problematic. We doubt that the insurgency would
precipitously disintegrate, but, over time, the strategic balance is likely
to shift gradually in Managua's favor as its own capabilities continue to
improve and the rebels fail to keep pace.
Although increased US military aid to the insurgency probably
would not change the Sandinista negotiating posture in the near term, a
stronger and more viable insurgency would tempt Managua to accept a
less advantageous Contadora Treaty and undertake nominal talks with
the internal opposition on national reconciliation. On the other hand,
there is some possibility that no amount of insurgent or other pressure
will induce the Sandinistas to make fundamental concessions.
Nevertheless, without a viable insurgency, Sandinista incentives to
make negotiating concessions would be greatly reduced, and the
remaining domestic opposition would rapidly become irrelevant. Al-
though Managua argues publicly that it cannot make concessions while
subject to external aggression, we do not believe it would be significant-
ly more conciliatory were the insurgency weakened. Instead, this would
improve Nicaragua's chances of obtaining advantageous bilateral agree-
ments with Costa Rica and Honduras, thereby undermining the Conta-
dora process.
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