U.S. POLICY TO CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R002400110025-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: October 4, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

5598X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/05: CIA-RDP83M00914R002400110025-1
(Revised 10/16/79)
WASHINGTON
October 4, 1979
Presidential Directive/NSC - 52
TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and
Budget
United States Representative to the
United Nations
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
-Director, International Communication Agency
Administrator, International Development
Cooperation Administration
U.S. Policy to Cuba (U)
The Presiden: has directed the United States Government to
continue to seek to contain Cuba as a source of violent
revolutionary change. In addition, U.S. policy should be
directed at accomplishing the following four specific objectives:
-- To reduce-and eventually remove Cuban military
forces stationed abroad. (S)
To undercut Cuba's drive for Third World leadership. (S)
To obtain Cuban restraint on the Puerto Rican issue. (S)
To inhibit the Soviet build-up of Cuba's armed forces.(S)
In pursuit of these objectives, the President has directed
implementation of the following measures:
-- with respect to the Caribbean and.Central American
region, the State Department should direct a strategy to
engage =_a-minded Latin American governments in an ef^fort
to compe_e with the Cubans. and increase the prospects for
S= ;...;TINE
Review 10/.:` 99
Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/05 CIA-RDP83M00914R002400110025-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/05: CIA-RDP83M00914R002400110025-1
(Revised 10/16/79)
peaceful and democratic change. The Department of State
should explore with governments in the region the possibility
of increasing our presence in the area. On the military
side, the Department of Defense should increase port visits
and training in order to demonstrate our concern for the
region and enhance the security of the region. Also, the
Department '-f State, in conjunction with the International
Development Cooperation Administration, should develop
budgetary programs to provide greater amounts of economic
and military assistance to governments in the region that
respect human rights and democratic values, and also resist
Cuban influence. The Department of State, in conjunction
with the Department of Defense, should reverse the decline
of FMS credits allocated to Latin America. The FMS budget
allocated to Latin America should be increased in ^Y 81,
perhaps to -4-5 percent of the total FMS budget. (S)
(With Latin
American governments, we should seek to raise their consciousness
of the Cuban problem as their problem -- not just ours -- in
order that they begin to seriously consider actions to curb
Cuban adventurism.) We should also hold periodic consultations
with these Governments about measures that might be taken
individually or collectively to counter expansionist actions
by Cuba. The Department of State, in close coordination
with the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council,
Department of the Treasury and Department of Co-amerce,
should encourage these governments to-adopt an approach,
which denies the Cubans the recognition they seek and raises
the costs to the Cubans of continued intervention abroad,
including, but not limited to the denial of credit. (S)
-- The Department of State should consult with moderate
members o the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and urge attention
to issues like human rights, arms restraint, non-intervention
and foreign aid which could lead to criticism of Cuban and
Soviet activities. We should continue tb encourage the
moderates in the NAM to resist strongly and publicly efforts
by the C:-ha s to use their 3-year NAM chairmanship to impose
pro-So>>ie= positions, of the kind reflected in the Cuban
dra=t de . - =a tion for the NAM Summit. (S)
State should continue to press
-- Tie Department O.L.
vigorctI__1-- :c preclude Cuba from gaining a seat on the UN
Security C~~ncil or from hosting the next UNCTAD Su__rnmit. (S)
SECRET/SENS: IVE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/05: CIA-RDP83M00914R002400110025-1