SIERRA LEONE: DIM PROSPECTS FOR THE MOMOH REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 23, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
S F 6R T ~
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 April 1986
DATE
DOC NO ALA M o19
OCR
3
P &PD I
Sierra Leone: Dim Prospects for the Mortah Regime
months to one year.
Summa
President Mowh's six-month old pro-Western government
faces increasingly serious political and economic problems
which we believe will probably threaten his grip on power in
the next six months to one year. Sierra Leone's economic
outlook is bleak, and Momoh's inability to stem acute shortages
of consumer goods, spiraling inflation, and endemic corruption
is likely to lead to outbreaks ou urban violence. who
his reluctance to challenge powerful control the economy has eroded most popular support for his
rule. The US Embassy reports that the military is increasingly
unhappy with Momoh's performance, Although US interests in
Sierra Leone are limited, Iran and Libya may seek to cultivate
the country's large Muslim community--about 40 to 60 percent of
the population--to ex lp oit likely instability over the next six
ALA M 86-20019
25X6
25X6
of African Attains, natiwna. ^----
-A 1 ~ 4-in ?Marican Anal vsis. This
f ice
This memorandum was requested by Phillip R i ng da hl , nD i recedr, Of F
Nest Branco, uii wC ws ffsaw --__--
paper was coordinated. with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and
comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, on
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
S E C R E T
Ineffectual Leadership
Joseph Momoh, who last November succeeded as Siaka Stevens'
handpicked successor, was welcomed by most Sierra Leoneans, according to
US Embassy reports, in the hope that he would clean up the corruption and
mismanagement of the the former president's regime. We agree with the
Embassy that Momoh squandered his "honeymoon" period--the first 100 days
in: office--by not imposing stiff austerity measures and arresting corrupt
businessmen. The US Embassy reports that most Sierra Leoneans are now
disillusioned, and the semi-independent press has become increasingly
critical of Momoh's inertia.
US Embassy reporting indicates Momoh's failure to distance himself
from the Old Guard--the cronies of the corrupt and despised Stevens 25X6
regime--has undermined his "reformist" image. Momoh reportedly believes
that the Old Guard are temporarily indispensible for the management of
government, but that eventually they can be replaced with more reformist- 25X6
Vice
oriented officials. However, the Embassy report
President Minah-
remains influential, and Momoh appears to lack the political will to fire
him. many senior cabinet officials
believe that Minah so far has made rtast key decisions and that Momoh is a
indecisive leader.
'
Parliamentary elections scheduled for May are likely to test Momohs
leadership skills. According to the US Embassy, Mooch believes that he
can use the election to form his own political base and to rid himself of
the Old Guard, including First Vice President Minah. The Embassy notes,
however, that although Momoh serves as secretary general of the ruling
party, the All People's Congress, he has not attempted to increase his so
far marginal influence. Former President Stevens, who remains party
chairman, and his longtime cronies, are working behind the scenes to
protect their power by controlling the selection and nomination of
candidates. Moreover, public confidence in Momoh's rule will further
erode, in our view, if--as seems likely--he fails to ensure reasonably
1 -1
free elections by deploying troops to polling stations.
Economic Disintegration
In his inaugural speech in January. Momoh vowed to revive the ailing
economy, but so far has not introduced any major initiatives. US Embassy
reporting indicates that last year inflation was nearly 70 percent, the
foreign debt totaled over $500 million, and the debt service ratio was
nearly 50 percent. Sierra
Leone's foreign reserves totaled only $279,000 in November. Production of
key cash crops--cocoa, coffee, and palm kernels--continues to decline
because of low producer prices and large-scale smuggling into neighboring
25XF25X6
25X6
25X1
2525X1
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
S E C R E T
Liberia and Guinea. Despite his pledge to streamline the bureaucracy,
Momoh has resisted a freeze on government hiring, probably fearing that
unemployed school graduates would take to the streets in protest. We also
note that Momoh has yet to appoint a competent economic team and nost
finance ministry officials are holdovers from the Stevens era.
Sierra Leone also faces growing food shortages, according to US
Embassy reporting. A net exporter of rice in the 1970s, last year Sierra
Leone imported about one-third of its consumption, and the Embassy
predicts even greater deficits for at least the next two years. According
to the US Embassy, substantial quantities of rice are smuggled abroad
because of low producer prices at home. International economists report
that some 65 percent of the population lives in absolute-.poverty, and that
limited resources will be further strained by a rapidly growing
population--about 2.3 percent a year.
Momoh has told US officials that he will seek an IMF accord, but we
think it unlikely that he will implement long overdue austerity
measures. According to press reports, Momoh has not moved on his pledge
last month to float the currency, and reduce petroleum and rice subsidies,
liberalize trade, and increase agricultural producer prices. According to
Embassy sources, Momoh claimed last year that the lifting of rice
subsidies would be "political suicide," and we note that urban riots
erupted in 1984 when the Stevens administration attempted to do so.
For the near term. Freetown will probably look to the West for
increased financial assistance. The US Embassy reports that West
Germany--Freetown's largest donor--provided some $10 million last year,
but that Bonn may tie future aid commitments to Sierra Leone's adherence
to IMF criteria. A variety of open source reporting indicates that
although Sierra Leone is interested in attracting foreign investment, only
a few Western companies have begun operations in recent years, partly
because Freetown has no foreign investment code. According to Embassy
figures, Sierra Leone's main trading partners are the Netherlands, West
Germany, United Kingdom and the United States. 0
Pressures Building in the Military
The US Embassy reports that the generally pro-Western, 3,200-man
military, which initially welcomed Momoh's presidency in the hopes that he
would improve their poor living conditions, is now demoralized. Embassy
reporting also indicates that Momoh has ignored the military's
longstanding unhappiness with outdated weapons, and he has not provided
25X1
25X1
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
S E C R E T
funding for the conttr tion of new-,barracks at Wilberforce, the key
garrison in Freetown.
In the coming months, Momoh is likely to come under mounting pressure
from both senior and junior Army officers to introduce reforms. In
particular, we believe that two key officers--Force Commander Tarawal l i
r
ith
e
and Lt. Col. L.M.S. Turay--may demand that the president e
who participated in Army
revolts in 1967 and 1968. is rus a e he Lebanese expatriot
stranglehold on the economy and opposes Minah's presence in the
administration. Turay, a close friend of Tarawalli, commands the 700-man
First Battalion--the key garrison in Freetown--and believes that martial
law is necessary to halt smuggling. Should they decide - to launch a coup,
we believe they would have the support of other key garrisons and unit
commanders around the capital and could easily disarm the ill-equipped and
poorly trained 1,200-man Special Security Detachment, which shares
responsibility for the president's security with a small Army unit.
Mounting Public Discontent
US Embassy reporting indicates that civil unrest may occur soon as a
result of public frustration with the high inflation, delayed salary
demonstrate against government policies at any time, while the police are
ill-equipped to control any sustained rioting. We note that students
demonstrated in March 1985 to protest the previous regime's mismanagement
and they looted Freetown shops in January 1984 over shortages of cooking
oil and gasoline.
Sierra Leone's trade unions also are increasingly frustrated with
Momoh's ineffectual leadership and are likely to challenge government
policies. police, university
lecturers and some civil servants in Freetown have threatened to strike
Sierra Leone. We believe that should the government fail to pay its
employees on a fairly regular basis, the 50,000-strong trade union
confederation--the Sierra Leone Labor Congress--may call a strike.
According to academic studies and press reports, the Congress paralyzed
'
s
the country for two months in 1981 following then President Steven
refusal to cut food prices and improve housing and transportation.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
c F C R E T
The Lebanese Community and Middle Eastern Influences
Momoh has pledged to reduce the illicit activities of the Lebanese
business community that have crippled the economy, but so far he has
failed to introduce any major reforms. The US Embassy reports that most
of the 35,000 Lebanese who live in Sierra Leone are small traders and
merchants, but a handful dominate key economic sectors and have illegally
acquired vast fortunes. Freetown almost certainly is afraid to challenge
Lebanese businessmen who provide the government with funds to purchase
rice imports, while most of the government's domestic debt of $1 billion--
h
ese
in the form of treasury bills and stock certificates--is owed to t
expropriation of property has yet surfaced, US Embassy. reporting indicates 25X1
that some Sierra Leoneans hold the Lebanese responsible for the country's
grinding poverty.
US Embassy reporting indicates that Jamil Muhammed, Sierra leone's
wealthiest and most powerful Lebanese businessman, maintains a
stranglehold on the economy. According to the Embassy, Jamil controls
Sierra Leone's sale of diamonds and gold through the state enterprises he
manages and funds, and that he nets at least $25 million annually from
illegal diamond sales. Foreign observers report that Jamil is Sierra
Leone's "bank of last resort,"--the Bank of Sierra Leone's foreign
exchange reserves usually are low--and he brokers the country's oil
imports.
The US Embassy also reports that Jamil maintains close personal and
financial ties to Middle Eastern countries
According to the US Embassy,
Jamil is a close friend of Lebanese cabinet minister Nabbi Berri and
collects $50,000 in contributions a month for Berri's Amal faction from
Sierra Leone's*Lebanese. Jamil also has business interests in Morocco and
Jordan, some 150 PLO
members serve as his bodyguards and that Jamill 's-dynamite factory in
Sierra Leone provides the PLO with explosives.
Although Momoh probably would like to reduce Jamil's pre-eminent
position, he lacks the political skills necessary to do so. According to
US Embassy reporting, Momoh--somewhat naively in our view--believes that
Jamil can be co-opted--but has not really tried to curtail Jamil 's
influence for fear that oil imports would be cut off. Even if Momoh seeks
to distance himself from Jamil , we believe corrupt government officials--
would work behind the scenes to assist ami s various sc eme .
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
S E C R E T
Iranian Presence and Influence. Since the establishment of relations
in 19 ehran has forged fairy close ties with Freetown and, largely as
a result of Jamil 's influence, provides at least half of Sierra Leone's
oil supplies. According to the Embassy, in 1984 Freetown sponsored, Iran
funded, and local clerics helped to organize an Islamic Unity Conference
of the Hajj, attended by delegates from some 90 countries. The Embassy
also reports that in May 1985 then Sierra Leone Foreign Minister Kanu
cdndemned Iraqi "aggression" during his five-day official visit to
Tehran. Although Momoh has sought to diversify oil suppliers--in March
Algeria agreed to provide 60,000 tons of oil--Sierra Leone lacks the hard
currency necessary to secure long-term supply from most petroleum
producers, and for the near term will have to depend on Jamil's financial
"largesse" to pay for its imports from Tehran.
Iran is likely to increase its propaganda efforts in Sierra Leone and
provide financial support to the Muslim community in an attempt to
increase its influence. Embassy and press reporting indicates that in the
past two years Tehran has funded the construction of an Islamic school, a
mosque, has offered local clerics free trips to Iran, and has placed
full-page ads in newspapers explaining the Islamic revolution. The
Iranians are likely to proselytize through the Sierra Leone-Iran
Friendship Society, established in 1984, and through the local Lebanese
Shitte leader, Sheikh Chadade, who receives an unknown amount of financial
assistance from Tehran, according to the US Embassy.
Libya's Role. We believe Tripoli may to attempt to exploit
Freetown's economic decline to recruit disenchanted students unable to
find employment. Embassy reporting indicates that so far Libya has
cultivated only a small number of supporters and sympathizers--probably
under 100--but that last January radical students demonstrated against US
policies in front of the US Embassy. Although Freetown has refused to
allow Tripoli to open a People's Bureau, Libya maintains a "caretaker"
presence. In our view, Tripoli will probably recruit sympathizers through
the Sierra Leone-Libya Brotherhood Society and the "Green Book" study
group, both of which operate at Fourah Bay College in Freetown. The
Embassy also reports that a small number of university lecturers are pro-
Libyan and have traveled to Tripoli in recent years.
The Communist Presence
China. The US Embassy reports that the Chinese, who maintain a low
profile, are well regarded by the Freetown government and the local
population. China had forged close ties with the former Stevens
administration as well as with Monoh regime, and the US Embassy in Beijing
reports that Sierra Leone is regarded as one of China's closest allies in
Africa, due in part to Freetown s relatively early--1971--recognition of
the Peoples Republic. China is one of Sierra Leone's largest economic aid
donors, and since the early 1980s has provided some $30-35 million in
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
loans, as well as technical assistance for various agricultural
projects. In March, Monoh visited China and secured a $16 million loan,
but, failed to gain long-sought funding
for the rehabilitation of Sierra Leone's near-defunct railroad system.
Since the delivery of some small arms in the early 1970s, China has
provided no military aid to Freetown, according to the US Embassy. C
Cuba. Havana and Freetown have maintained fairly warm relations
since diplomatic ties were established in 1972.
Momo h admires Castro and Cuban military
Momoh may send politically ambitious officers
to Havana if training is unavailable in Western countries. However, Momoh
is unlikely to pursue closer ties with Cuba for fear of jeopardizing badly
needed Western economic aid. Although Cuba presently provides no military
or paramilitary training, US Embassy and press reporting indicates that
from the early 1970s until 1982 Cubans trained the presidential guard.
Havana provides neither economic nor technical assistance, according to
the Embassy, but it has formed several joint ventures with Lebanese
businessmen in Sierra Leone. The US Embassy reports that some 60 Sierra
Leoneans presently study in Cuba.
The Soviet Union. According to t US Embassy, the Soviet Union has
negligible in uence in Sierra Leone. _
detects no pro-Soviet orientation among most Sierra Leoneans. Moscow
provides no economic or military aid, but the Soviets claim that some 500
Sierra Leoneans have been educated in Moscow, and that 20 are presently
enrolled there. Nevertheless, the Embassy reports that most students--
including Momoh's daughter--return disillusioned and embittered by Soviet
racism. The Soviet presence is limited to a small Embassy staff and a
10-man trade mission.
Outlook and Implications for the US
US Embassy reporting indicates that relations between Washington and
Freetown are good, and Sierra Leone often has supported US positions on
key issues, such as Afghanistan. The United States provided $6.4 million
in economic aid in 1984--the latest year for which figures are available--
including PL-480 food aid, and US private investment in Sierra Leone
totals some $70 million, mainly in the rutile (titanium ore) mining
industry. Moreover,
would like further expanded training
programs. In addition to preserving the moderate pro-Western orientation
of the current regime, US interests also include preventing the country
from being used as a base for destabilizing other noderate regimes in the
prowess,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
region--particularly neighboring Liberia where the US has substantial
F_ I
strategic and financial interests.
If, as we expect, Momoh fails to address Sierra Leone's political and
economic, problems we believe that growing civilian and military unrest is
all but certain. Momoh may attempt to placate disgruntled military
officers.by arresting a few corrupt businessmen and pleading that more
time is necessary to implement reform. Public patience is likely to
evaporate within the next three to six months, however--and possibly
sooner-if Momoh continues his relationship with the Old Guard and the
Lebanese elite. As a result, we believe strikes, student denonstrations,
and potentially violent work stoppages may erupt. Moreover, although the
Lebanese and Sierra Leonean communities have lived in relative harmony
since independence, we believe anti-Lebanese riots are.. possible if the
economic decline continues and Momoh is seen as unwilling to stem the
corrupt Lebanese business practices.
1 We
believe the military would not hesitate to arrest ami an o upt
businessmen, repudiate government debts to them, and seal the borders to
reduce smuggling. However, we also believe that a new government would
face the same intractable economic problems, particularly shortages of
foreign reserves, making it unable to finance fuel and food imports. In
our view, any new government would have difficulty meeting public
expectations for change and would probably have to contend with outbreaks
of public unrest. A new government, particularly if headed by Tarawalli
or Turay, probably would maintain Sierra Leone's generally pro-Western
orientation and traditional distance from the Soviet Union. Moreover, we
judge that Moscow will not make a serious effort to cultivate Sierra Leone
unless it loses its foothold in neighboring Guinea.
We believe, however, that Sierra Leone is 1 ikely to become an
increasingly attractive target for Iranian and Libyan influence
peddling. Tehran and Tripoli are likely to exploit economic and political
instability by increasing their ties in the Muslim and Lebanese
communities. Moreover, in our view, Sierra Leone's small and ill-trained
security service cannot effectively monitor foreign activities, and we
suspect that both Iran and Libya--assisted by some Lebanese radicals--nay
use Sierra Leone as a transit point for arms smuggling and regional
subversion.
25X6
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
SUBJECT: Sierra Leone: Dim Prospects for the Momoh Regime
Distribution:
Original -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Ambassador Howard K. Walker, Director, Office of West
African Affairs, Department of State
1 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department of State
1 -- Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
1 -- William Thom, Acting Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 -- Kathleen Davis, Sierra Leone Desk Officer, Office of West
African Affairs, Department of State
1--DDI
1 - NIO for Africa
1 -- N IC
1 -- DDO/Africa
1 -- PDB Staff
1 -- C/DDI/PES
1 -- D/ALA
1 -- ALA Research Director
2 -- ALA/PS (one source copy; one clean)
4 -- CPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF
4 -- ALA/W
4 -- ALA/W files
ALA/AF/W/ I (23 April 1986)
S E C R E T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7
TURTLE
ISLANDS
She~
Island
Sierra Leone
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
O Province capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 Kilometers
0 50 Miles
1ti
BANANA
ISLANDS
WO RTHE
,,,Pend?mbu
Makeni
1- Qumbuna
NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
- - :~(em?ren
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707180001-7