AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405790001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP85T01058R000405790001-1
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Afghanistan Situation Report
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29 January 1985
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TOP SECRET
Islamabad has tightened restrictions on Pakistan Air Force
attacks against airspace violators to avoid provokinn
escalation of Soviet-Afghan cross-border attacks.
The Jamiat commander in Balkh Province may have been the
victim of fighting among insurgent groups.
WESTERN AFGHANISTAN?
Herat's Jamiat leader, Ismail Khan, has built one.of the
most effective insurgent organizations in western
Afghanistan, and his efforts may prove important to the
long-term survival of the insurgency in the west.
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29 Ja.nuary 1985
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TOP SECRET
This document is prepared weekly by the Office..of Near
Eastern and cniith Aci ~n Anal ,c; a one +h., nrr;, ,, ,.t c,...,.a.
Analysis.
29 January 1985
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not necelarilyrauhgritA[Y
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PAKISTANI CAUTION ALONG BORDER
Islamabad before it could shoot down Soviet or Afghan aircraft
the Pakistan Air
Force must now receive authorization trom a highest levels in..
over Pakistani territory.
Pakistani border troops may have shot down as many as
two aircraft since last June--both crashed in Afghanistan--and
fired on t at bombed the Arandu area on 23
January.
Comment: Previously, the Pakistan Air Force could shoot at any
aircraft from Afghanistan that were more than 10 miles in
Pakistani airspace as long as the aircraft would crash in
Pakistan. The tightening restrictions indicate that Islamabad
does not want to cause an incident that might provoke an
escalation of Soviet and Afghan cross-border attacks.
Islamabad is trying to strengthen its control over
timely informatin on air incursions. In any event, the border
posts are likely to continue firing at intruding aircraft.
rontier Corps forces in the border regions, as well as to receive
By limiting its own military activity
escalating military pressure on Pakistan.
along the border, Islamabad probably is trying to keep Moscow from
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29 January 1985
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TOP SECRET
heavy snowfall has
increased the prospects for good crops in southwestern
Afghanistan this year. Resistance and tribal leaders are
urging farmers in refugee camps in Pakist n to to
Afghanistan for planting and harvesting.
East Germany's ambassador to Kabul told US officials that
Afghan Politburo member Nur Ahmad Nur was being groomed for
"a very high post" and would remain in Moscow another year.
The official also said it would require 20 or 30 years for a
Marxist system like East Germany's to begin to take hold in
Afghanistan-.
29 January 1985
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TOP SFCRFT
.ISMAIL KHAN: AA UNIFYING.FORCE FOR RESISTANCE IN WESTERN
AFGHANISTAN?
Since 1979 Jamiat-i-Islami leader Ismail Khan has built one of the
largest and most effective insurgent organizations in western
Afghanistan. Soviet and Afghan forces, despite repeated efforts
to clear the Herat area, have failed to suppress Ismail's fighters
and have suffered high casualties. Ismail's efforts to provide
civilians with essential services through an insurgent
administration have increased his popular support and may prove
important to the long-term survival of resistance in the west.
The Leader
Ismail earned his ran o captain in the Afghan
Army in the pre-Communist rule of Daoud. He was strongly
influenced by Iran's military, economic, and cultural ties to the
West under the Shah and he has tried to follow a rational and
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pragmatic approach to problems.
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Ismail joined the resistance in the
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Herat uprising in 1978 when he led some of his troops from the
Afghan 17th Division against government forces loyal to the
Communist regime. After the unsuccessful uprising, he spent four
months in Golran and contacted the Jamiat-i-Islami in Mashhad,
Iran, before returning to Herat, Badghisat, and Ghowr Provinces of
Afghanistan to build the resistance. He then went to Peshawar,
Pakistan, and received retion from the Jamiat-i-Islami. He was
elected head of the Herat Jamiat-i-Islami. in 1980.
Unlike many other regional insurgent leaders, Ismail is respected
for his political as well as military acumen. He offers an
alternative to those Afghans who find the Babrak regime and the
feudalism of some insurgent leaders unacceptable.
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Civilian Support
for a single leader.
Ismail's followers claim he is a unifying force in the resistance
in the Wes Civilians in
Herat, who have been among the strongest supporters of the
insurgents, respect Ismail's organizational skills and his
successes against Soviet and Afghan forces. Moreover, the
civilians are predominantly Sufi, and Sufism emphasizes support
Civilians view Ismail as friendly, low key, and approachableL
He has taken care in his
military planning to-protect the lives of civilians and has
established schools and hospitals in the Herat area. Ismail has
also redistributed some land, and because Soviet reprisals would
damage fields and insurgents are needed for a ricult r work.
seldom orders attacks when harvests are due.
Islami groups in western Afghanistan.
Growing Insurgent Organization
Ismail's insurgent organization has grown substantially since
1979. It now is the most powerful and influential of Jamiat-i-
Ismail has expanded his base,'and his guerrillas now
more in the rest of the province.
operate throughout Herat Province, and in Badghisat, northern.
Farah, and parts of Ghowr Provinces. Insurgent groups in western
Afghanistan directly controlled by Ismail or loosely affiliated
with him numhpr at lpagt ;_ 00 and possibly as many as 35,000.
Ismail claims to have at least 5,000
insurgents under is direct command in Herat City and about 10,000
Herat Province is divided into
addressed by the Provincial Council.
subdivisions for administrative purposes, each with its own Shura
(council)--authorized to tax civilians, run the schools,
adjudicate, and build food stockpiles for emergencies--and a
mobile force-to Prisure that ra's orders are carried out.
the organization also includes
four councils at-the provincial level: Executive, Military,
Provincial, and Urban. Ismail and his deputy Alawuddin Khan serve
as the highest ranking members on each council. Most of the other
representatives on the councils are former army officers who are
loyal to Ismail and command groups at the local level. The
Executive Council is the central governing body, and the Military
Council serves as the focal point for strategy at the provincial
level. Financial, religious, agricultural, and medical issues are
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Ismail has increased his efforts to foster cooperation with other
insurgent organizations--especially other Jamiat groups--in the
western provinces and maintains contact with resistance leaders in
other parts of the country. he has
formed military alliances with groups in Badghisat, Farah, and
Ghowr, and occasionally assists insurgents in operations in Faryab
Province. Moreover, Panjsher Valley commander Masood and Ismail
have exchanged some personnel. Ismail's organization has
tolerated smaller non-Jamiat groups in the area,
Insurgent Operations
Ismail's insurgents--divided into small, comparatively well
trained mobile groups--have become increasingly aggressive since
1979. In response, the Soviets have launched frequent
multibattalion-size sweep operations. We estimate that:the
Soviets and Afghans have conducted at least 15 large sweeps during
the past year to relieve insurgent pressure on the city and major
. The insurgents repeatedly cut the roads leading to the Iranian and
Soviet borders, and ambushes of Soviet convoys between the border
city of Towraghondi and Herat and Shindand to the south
is
along the road to provide additional safety and have increased the
size of supply columns. Nonetheless, the guerrillas continue to
strike convoys moving through the area and now also attack the
small military posts, especially between Herat and Eslam Qal'eh on
The Jamiat insurgents in Herat have successfully denied the
Soviets control over the city for the past five years and most
likely will continue to prevent the Soviets and their Afghan
allies from establishing more than temporary ascendancy in the
provincial capital. Repeated sweeps through the-bazaar have
The Soviets have constructed a series of military pos
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failed to prevent insurgent groups from reestablishing positions
or maintaining constant pressure on Afghan posts in the city. A
Soviet and Afghan sweep through the city in June resulted in
intense fighting and high civilian casualties but-failed to
dislodge the insurgents. A cordon-and-sweep operation southwest
of Herat in September apparently was only of limited
effectiveness, and the Soviets and Afghans launched a new
operation against the resistance in December.
The absence of Soviet positions in Herat City has facilitated the
high level of guerrilla operations. US Embassy sources report
that Afghan troops usually are reluctant to leave their posts in
the city. At night, the guerrillas move frequently through regime
The resistance conducts frequent assassinations and arrests of
government sympathizers in the city,
US Embassy sources report that in mid-December,
the guerrillas killed over a dozen KHAD (Afghan intelligence)
officials.
Outlook and Implications
Resistance in the western provinces--fired to a large extent by
religious fervor--is likely to grow. Ismail's insurgent
organization probably will continue to deny the Soviets long-term
control of the Herat area despite resupply problems; occasional
tensions with smaller, rival organizations; and the lack of
substantial support from Iran.
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Area insurgent groups probably will continue to cooperate under
Ismail's leadership. Because of his Tajik heritage, however, he
is unlikely to become more than a regional resistance commander.
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