THE DEFECTION OF ARKADY SHEVCHENKO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 7, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160009-6
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ARTICLE LPPzLB
On PAG
WOeLD
The Defection
Of Arkady
Shevchenko
BREAKING WITH MOSCOW
By Arkady N. Shevchenko
Knopf. 378 pp. $18.95
T HE SOVIET OBSESSION with se-
crecy limits outsiders to frustrat-
ing speculation about the Krem-
lin's real foreign policy intent,
where answers are contingent at least as
much upon the individual biases of the ana-
lysts involved as on the glimpses of Soviet
reality available to them.
Hence the hunger for definitive answers
from someone ostensibly in a real position to
know. And who is better qualified to address
Soviet foreign policy intentions and policy-
making procedures than a highly-place defec-
tor? Enter Arkady Shevchenko, the highest
ranking Soviet diplomat ever to defect to the
West since World War II. In 1978, before he
asked for political asylum in the United
States, Shevchenko served as a United Na-
Lions undersecretary general. Even more in-
teresting, from the standpoint of access to
the Kremlin, was his prior service as an ad-
viser to Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andrei A. Gromyko, who has recently
emerged as the principal architect-of Soviet
foreign policy.
There is no question that Shevchenko was
privy to significant information and his ac-
count makes an important contribution to the
West's understanding of Soviet foreign policy
aims. Yet several early reviews of his book
Breaking With Moscow have raised doubts
about Shevchenko's credibility. The issue is
not whether he is loyal to his new country
the United States. That much anyone except
those stricken with paranoiac suspicion
should consider established. For three years
until his defection, Shevchenko spied for
America at an enormous personal risk. His
changing of camps was a great embarrass-
ment to the Politburo. And U.S. officials inti-
mately familiar with Shevchenko's file vouch
for his bona fides.
7 April 1985
What triggered much . unfavorable com-
mentary was not Shevchenko's political in-
tegrity but rather his personal character.
And the book provides ample grounds for
concern on this score. To start with, Shev-
chenko fails to explain credibly why he de-
fected. He was disillusioned with the system.
But so are most Soviet citizens. Very few de-
fect. Shevchenko admits that his U.N. col-
leagues regarded him "as an orthodox Soviet
functionary, obedient, loyal, a hard-line Com- i
munist." And the image was not entirely
wrong. In Shevchenko's own words, "I had
never fought my government the way dissi-
dents did. On the contrary, I served it loyally
as well as I could for many years." So what
did finally convince him to break with Mos-
cow? The book sheds little light. Was be, in
addition to feeling alienated from the regime,
also dissatisfied with his family life? Did he
feel that his career had gone sour? After all,
Shevchenko states that the Soviet govern-
ment does not regard the U.N. secretariat
hghlY? So an appointment to move there
could be viewed by Gromyko's ambitious ad-
viser as a kick upstairs? Finally, could he
have been entrapped by U.S. intelligence?
According to Shevchenko, he was asked to
spy for America only after inquiring privately
about the possibility of receiving political
asylum. There is almost certainly more to
the story.
say, it was the.Soviet regime that had driven
her to suicide. But Shevchenko, who opted to
escape to his CIA
alone in the couple's New York apartment,
asleep and ignoran t of his plans. does not
look like a knight on a white horse either.
Similarly, Shevchenko expresses little or
no remorse for the many political and moral
compromises he presumably had to ;make tin
order td rise-through-the ranks of the gov-
ernment he increasingly despised. Shev-
chenko is openly proud of his impressive ca-
reer in the Soviet foreign policy establish-
ment. The trouble is that merit alone rarely
assures success in the Soviet bureaucracy.
"If Machiavelli were alive and living in Mos-
cow today, he would be a student, not a pro-
fessor," Shevchenko writes. Yet, there is no-
thing in the book to indicate that the author
had to engage in anything distasteful before
his decision to defect. Should the reader as-
sume that the former diplomat managed the
remarkable feat of entering the ruling class
with clean hands?
Breaking With Moscow is anything but a
confession. These are not the memoirs of a
man eager to explain his inner transforma-
tion. One key to understanding the Shev-
chenko book is realizing that it is written by
an ambitious person anxious to establish him-
self as a major voice in American public de-
bates on relations with the Soviet Union.
Ambition is, after all, one reason he agreed
to become a U.S. spy. He "thought, to work
THERE ARE also problems with
Shevchenko's account of the cir-
cumstances which led to the death
of his wife. He suspects that the
KGB may have murdered her because upon
her return to Russia she probably "made
herself a threat to several careers." Per-
haps. Yet Shevchenko offers no supporting
evidence. And why would the KGB, with the
Gulag and mental health institutions at its
disposal, need to create an unnecessary con-
troversy by killing a woman already back in
Moscow and thus firmly under control? The
official Soviet version of Lina Shevchenko's
death-suicide-does not sound completely
implausible. The poor woman woke up one
morning in her New York apartment only to
discover a note from her husband informing
her that he "intended to ask for political asy-
lum in the United States." Her shock is easy
to imagine. It probably was soon followed by
a nightmare of KGB interrogations, fearful
emotions andarealization that her whole life
had been suddenly destroyed. Needless to
for the Americans-for a while would be the
most effective way of dissipating any doubts
they might have about my honesty and sin-
cerity." Otherwise, if he did not prove to be
sufficiently cooperative, Shevchenko was
afraid that the U.S. authorities might throw
him away, "like a squeezed lemon." He cer-
tainly "hoped for more than that" in terms of
his careerprospects_in America.
To some moral purists such frank pragma-
tism may sound offensive. But before con-
demning Shevchenko, one should be aware
of a possible double standard. Should the
same demanding criteria, be applied to the
memoirs of recent presidents, secretaries of
state and national security advisers? If so,
Shevchenko's selective memory and self-
serving attitude -wo ld not -look -too bad Per-
sonally, I wish he had skipped the details of
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his illustrious life and his final defection and
concentrated entirely on what is really inter-
esting in his book-the Soviet foreign policy
process. But then, of course, his book would
not have become a best seller. And in all fair-
ness, any publisher would pressure a celeb-
rity defector to tell his personal tale even at
the price of serious distortions.
I T IS UNFORTUNATE that the con-
troversy over Shevchenko's own story
distracted somewhat from the atten-
tion of his real substantive message.
And that message is both important and basi-
cally credible. Breaking with Moscow offers
new insight into how Soviet foreign policy
decisions are made, who makes them and
with what purpose in mind. Shevchenko ex-
plains that the Soviet leadership views the
East-West relationship and the international
political process in general "in terms of the
continuing struggle between two opposing
social and political systems." And they be-
lieve that eventually "their system is going
to prevail." In this respect they are not very
different from Ronald Reagan. And like Rea-
gan, "they do not intend to achieve this vic-
tory by resorting to nuclear war."
How do the Soviets expect to triumph
without resorting to nuclear war? According
to Shevchenko, they are not quite sure them-
selves. He reveals, for instance, that "while
short-term global political goals are obvious
to the top echelon of the Foreign ? Ministry,
long-term policy planning is almost nonexist-
ent." Instead, Soviet policy makers have
their hands full in dealing with immediate
challenges to their empire and exploiting im-
mediate opportunities available to it. Both
are in abundance. As Shevchenko sees it,
Russia's rulers are extremely cynical and
heavy-handed. They would stop at nothing-
including assassination-as long as they are
sure that they can get away with it. But risk-
taking is not one of their qualities. When the
Politburo engaged in a dangerous adventure
it was not the result of some sinister master
plan-but the outcome of escalation and mis-
calculation.
He reveals, for example, that the 1973
Yom Kippur war took the Soviet government
by surprise. And the U.S.S.R. simply had no
choice but to fulfill its obligations to the
Arabs. Otherwise, he explains, "Moscow
might have substantially undermined its posi-
tion in the Arab world." Likewise in the case
of Angola, "the idea for the large-scale mili-
tary operation had originated in Havana, not
And almost everywhere the Soviet leader-
ship's primary concern was avoiding a direct
confrontation with the United States. It was
America's lack of resolve that contributed to
the Soviet expansionist drive in the mid-'70s.
The Soviets were most surprised that the
United States-a superpower-accepted de-
feat in Vietnam. And the American humilia-
ton was perceived as an "argument for a
much tougher line with the capitalist world,
especially with the United States." Similarly,
Soviet activism in Africa was encouraged by
an image of America "as a diminished rival in
the Third World."
THE IMPLICATION Shevchenko
draws for U.S. foreign policy is
both clear and sound: Soviet global
ambitions can be constrained only
by credible deterrence and by the Western
will to defend its important interests. Still,
Shevchenko is not a Cold War ideologue. He
is for a constructive relationship with Mos-
cow from a position of strength. His advice is
"to seek a reasonable and pragmatic accom-
modation, even cooperation, where . our in-
terests are in alignment." And his-book con-
tains a number of ;instances whew the Soviets
-were genuinely,
interested in mutually beneficial arrangements, pri-
marily in the area of arms control.
Shevchenko's portraits of senior Soviet diplomats
such as his former boss Gromyko, Ambassador to the
United States Anatoly Dobrynin, and U.N. ambassador
Oleg Troyanovsky are colorful and realistic. They are
described as highly competent, pragmatic servants of
the Soviet regime. Incidentally, Shevchenko deserves
credit for dissuading the Reagan administration of the
notion that Gromyko has strong anti-American instincts
and was a major obstacle to improving the U.S.-Soviet
relationship. In fact, because of his long association with
diplomacy toward the United States and his Realpolitik
mindset, Gromyko seems to be committed to dialogue
with America-in order, of course, to advance the
Kremlin's interests. But what counts is that Gromyko
understands that it is in Moscow's interest to establish
normal relations, no matter who is President and
whether Mos,:ow likes him or not." Shevchenko con-
firms the opinion of Western Sovietologists that a con-
siderable fragmentation of power occurred during the
Brezhnev rule. From his standpoint, the foreign ministry
under Gromyko was transformed from an implementor
into an architect of Soviet power toward the West. Shev-
chenko "cannot remember a single case when the Polit-
buro failed to adopt a ministry proposal." Whether
Gromyko and his ministry will enjoy similar power under
the vigorous leadership that can be anticipated from
Mikhail S. Gorbachev will be interesting to watch.
a.
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3,
SOME OF Shevchenko's judgments appear to me
less persuasive. His suggestions that an air
crash which killed U.S. Secretary General Dag
Hammarskjold was a Soviet-directed assassina-
tion and that the Soviets attempted to assassinate Egyp-
tian President Anwar -Sadat, are not based on firsthand
information-he claims no access to the KGB's most in-
timate secrets-but rather on vague banter in Moscow
corridors of power. The talk is disturbing, but as anyone
familiar with the gossip that pervades the Soviet capital
knows, it is clearly insufficient for drawing conclusions.
Also, one can question Shevchenko's dismissal of
Georgy Arbatov-director of the U.S. and Canada Insti-
tute and a frequent guest on American talk shows-as
an irrelevant propagandist. That has been Ambassador
Dobrynin's position all along and may reflect resentment
at the foreign ministry of Arbatov's enterprising per-
sonal diplomacy.
Breaking With Moscow tells a lot about Soviet foreign
policy and its architects. It also tells a lot about Arkady
Shevchenko, an ambitious hard-nosed man with common
sense and a good gasp of international issues. If Gorba-
chev will surround himself ' with people of such caliber,
the conduct of Soviet foreign policy will become muck
more effective. But whether that will work to benefit or
harm the United States is anyone's guess. ^
Dimitri K. Simes, a-research associate at the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences from 1967 to
1972, is a senior associate at the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace.
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