SPYING AMONG FRIENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470016-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 8, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470016-6
BALTIMORE SUN
E-1 L 8 December 1985
SPYING
AMONG
By Gilbert A. Lewthwaite FRMNM
Q
"Most of the world's 400 or more intelligence and security services are targeted
to one degree or another on U.S. military, diplomatic and intelligence personnel.
facilities, and technology.... One should remember, as some Intelligence practi-
tioners put it, there may be friendly countries, but there are only other Intelli-
gence services."
- Intelligence and Policy, by Roy Godson. 1985.
"We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are
eternal and perpetual, and those Interests it is our duty to follow."
- Lord Palmerston, 1848.
Israel, in recent days, has given fresh focus to what an American intelli-
gence expert wrote just this year and a British statesman declared last
century.
Israel today, much to its own embarrassment and confusion, stands
accused of pursuing its own interests by paying an American spy to divulge
the secrets of its staunchest supporter and richest patron.
If two such closely bound and beholden friends cannot trust each other, who
can?
It is not the first time an ally has been caught spying on the United States, or
that the United States has been accused of spying on an ally.
In 1954, the Dutch Embassy in Washington admitted receiving secrets from
Joseph Sydney Petersen Jr., a research analyst at the top-secret National Securi-
ty Agency. The Dutch said they thought the information transfer was authorized.
Petersen pleaded guilty to unlawfully taking secret information and was sen-
tenced to seven years.
In 1956. the United States reportedly monitored British code messages to keep
abreast of developments during the United Kingdom's Suez Canal invasion.
Communication interception. even among allies, has become almost routine.
In recent years, U.S. dipioomats have been expelled from South Africa (1979)
and Spain (this year) for allegedly spying.
The current Israeli case is particularly disturbing because of the closeness of
the relationship. The question it provokes is: How common is the practice of ally
spying on ally?
Intelligence experts agree that it certainly goes on when circumstances con-
vince a government that the Information it needs, albeit from an ally, can be
acquired only by espionage. But they doubt that allies, particularly those formally
aligned, as In NATO, routinely finance spying operations against each other.
As the length of alliance and strength of alliance varies, you have greater and
greater probability of having human agents (spies] being run against countries,"
says Jefiiey-T. Richi l nn, an American University expert on intelligence who
auggesfs, by way of i ustation, that the United States would be less likely to spy
on the British than to spy on the traditionally more independent French.
But he adds: "Even with the strongest and closest of allies you always have a
certain amount of intelligence going on."
The Soviet Union, for example, is widely held to regard even Its closest Warsaw
Pact allies as intelligence targets. The United States, however, has generally
preferred a system of close intelligence liaison, although this has been frequently
compromised by leaks and security breakdowns in allied security services. nota-
bly the British.
Does the United States spy on Its allies these days?
Richard Helms, a former CIA director, says: "In the world of espionage, usually
allies don't spy on each other. On the other hand, there may come an occasion'
when something is going on in an allied country that it is in the national interest
to find out about.
"And maybe the only way to find out would be doing a little bit of spying. But it
would be done on a case-by-case basis."
William Colby, another former CIA director, says: "You can't answer that
question. It's too hard to answer. Who are your allies? You have to look at the
particular situation.
"You would be out of your mind if you spied on Canada. If you want to find
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something out about Canada, go up and ask
them. Other countries are more secretive
about things."
Mr. Colby and other intelligence experts
say the basic equation behind any decision
to indulge in espionage against an ally is
likely to be: Is the information to be obtained
worth the potential of the acute embarass-
ment of discovery?
"Obviously, each nation is going to have
to make its own decision about its own secu-
rity. But when you do a secret operation in
another country, you obviously have to
weigh the value of the information you hope
to get against the risk of being caught," says
Mr. Colby.
"That means in many countries the im-
pact would be so serious you wouldn't do it.
But you also have a problem here of control
of the intelligence services."
When the French secret service decided
to sink the Greenpeace yacht in New Zea-
land earlier this year to scuttle a-planned
anti-nuclear protest at France's nuclear test
ground in the Pacific, the blame was eventu-
ally laid on the defense minister and the
chief of intelligence. Both lost their jobs in
the diplomatic furor that engulfed the scan-
dal.
It was not exactly spying, but it was a
hostile intelligence action taken on friendly
territory, and It shows the lengths to which
intelligence services are prepared to go in
pursuit of their own perceived interests.
Other documented examples of hostile in-
telligence activities among allies would be
the South Korean and Filipino governments'
activities against dissident groups residing
in the United States - undertaken with
official blessing of the foreign governments
but despite U.S. protest.
In the Israeli case, the intelligence outfit
allegedly responsible for retaining the U.S.
spy was apparently operating without the
knowledge of Prime Minister Shimon Peres
and other Cabinet members. The potential
of political embarassment appears, there-
fore, to have been left out of the scales when
the espionage decision was made.
According to one NATO ambassador
based in Washington, intelligence services
frequently operate in such an autonomous'
fashion that political leaders are not always
privy to their activities.
In the United States, however, such
loose-cannon activity is less likely. The intel-
ligence services here are required by law to
inform the congressional intelligence over-
sight committees of any particularly signifi-
cant actions or developments. This puts
clear political restraints - frequently re-
sented - on them.
There is. of course, a fundamental differ-
ence between Intelligence-gathering and
spying. Every embassy, of an ally or an ad-
versary. is in the business of snooping, of
finding out as much as it legally can of what
is happening in its host country. That is why
embassies have political. economic and mW-
tary experts to glean whatever informattea
is available, to analyze trends, to dissect and
predict policies, to study personalities, to
read every available tea leaf.
"What would our [intelligence) station
chief do in Britain?" asks Richard H. Shultz,
who teaches an intelligence course at Tufts
University's Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy. "Obviously he is going to be collect-
ing a lot of open-source information. He is
going to be working with his British counter-
parts against adversaries. Would he be re-
cruiting British officials [to spy]? The answer
is: I really doubt It."
Mr. Shultz says, "Generally. what your
intelligence (operator] will do is attempt to
Identify people who can provide Information
that Is helpful in terms of the external dy-
namics of a system. Do they really recruit
them and pay them off in the ways the Israe-
lis [allegedly) did? I don't think so. Generally,
it's .a little different. It's what is called in the
trade 'having a close contact.' You don't
have this guy in tow. You are not paying
him. It's pretty deep in the background."
This is all diplomatically de rigueur. It
stops short of illegal espionage.
But when you find, finance and control
an agent who Is channeling secret docu-
ments to you, you are spying.
That is what the Justice Department al-
leges Israeli intelligence officials did in the
case of Jonathan Jay Pollard, a Navy count-
er-terrorism expert.
The Information Mr. Pollard allegedly
sold to the Israelis - largely details of Arab
military strengths, as perceived by the Unit-
ed States - has prompted some American
Jews to suggest that it was the sort of intelli-
gence the United States should have been
willing to share with Israel anyway.
The problem here is that, in peacetime,
the United States maintains close military
contacts with some Arab nations, notably
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Indeed, so
close is the current U.S. relationship with
Egypt that three U.S. officers attached to the
U.S. Embassy in Cairo accompanied the
Egyptian commandos on their mission to
Malta to try to rescue the passengers in the
hijacked EgyptAir plane last month.
That sort of cooperation would be impos-
sible if Egypt thought the United States was
routinely passing along military information
to the Israelis. Here U.S. national interests
clearly take precedence over Israeli intelli-
gence requirements - at least in peacetime.
The Israeli government has instigated its
own inquiry into the Pollard affair, and it
has promised to forward the results to the
Reagan administration, and to return any
documents illegally obtained. Despite its
original "dismay" over the espionage case,
the Reagan administration is still ready to
take Israel at Its word as a close and trusted
ally.
Roy Godson, a Georgetown University ex-
pert, says. "The point Is that in the history of
international relations, allies have spied on
each other. It would be remarkable if that
didn't exist to some extLtnt In the closin*
years of the 20th century."
Mr. Lcwthwaite Is a reporter in The Srm's Washington buream
v?.
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Israel's apology
Israel's statement after two Americans were charged with spying for Israel, issued Sunday by Prime Minister Shimon Peres:
The Government of Israel is determined to spare no effort in investigating this case thoroughly and
completely and in uncovering all the facts to the last detail no matter where the trail may lead. The full
inquiry is still incomplete and therefore the Government of Israel is not yet in possession of all the facts;
but the inquiry is progressing vigorously.
The.Govemment of Israel assures the Government of the United States that in the wake of the inqui-
ry, if the allegations are confirmed, those responsible will be brought to account, the unit involved in this
activity will be completely and permanently dismantled, and necessary organizational steps will be tak-
en to ensure that such activities are, not repeated.
Our relations with the United States are based on solid foundations of deep friendship, close affinity
and mutual trust. Spying on the United States stands in total contradiction to our policy. Such activity to
the extent that it did take place was wrong and the Government of Israel apologizes. For the time being,
we have nothing further to say on this.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470016-6