US POLICY OBJECTIVES RE NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000802750002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 17, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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I % L. I SYSTEM II
36 Add-On
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASI* GTON. D.C. 20506
March 12, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
25X1
SUBJECT: PRG Meeting on Nicaragua, February 27, 1987 n 25X1
The February 27, 1987 PRG on Nicaragua reviewed the existing U.S.
goals and objectives for Nicaragua and decided that a draft paper
should be prepared outlining a clearer and more sharply focused
goal emphasizing the need for full democratization in Nicaragua.
The draft paper also would discuss the relative advantages of the
goal of democracyin Pr the alternative policy of containment of
the Sandinistas.
The attached draft responds to that PRG decision. Please provide
comments and suggestions by March 18, 1987. 0 25X1
Attachment
Tab A - PRG Draft Paper
cc: Donald Gregg
Office of The Vice President
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SYSTEM II
90236
U.S. Objectives in Nicaragua
American objectives in Nicaragua should meet the following
criteria:
(1) Advance U.S. security and political interests.
(2) Be compatible with the security and political interests
of our regional allies.
(3) Be easily understood by the American people and
congruent with our traditional values and principles.
(4) Receive bipartisan Congressional support.
(5) Foster the well-being of the Nicaraguan people.
(6) Place U.S. adversaries at a disadvantage in public and
diplomatic discourse.
The only objective that fully meets the preceding criteria
is the establishment of democracy in Nicaragua.
The promotion of democracy in Nicaragua is obviously
compatible with traditional American values. Indeed, recent U.S.
foreign policy initiatives (Philippines, Haiti), together with
the welcome return of democracy in three out of four Central
American countries and elsewhere in Latin America, suggests that
support for democratic institutions is becoming a new basis for
bipartisan foreign policy. A policy that promotes democracy
generally and in Nicaragua specifically is, in principle, capable
of attracting strong public and Congressional support. We have
already moved in this direction. In fact, one of the objectives
of Public Law 99-500 ($100 million for contras) is precisely the
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promotion of ". . . regularly scheduled, free and fair elections
and the establishment of democratic institutions" in Nicaragua.
The goal of democracy in Nicaragua is also supported by
Contadora; by the neighboring democratic presidents; by the Arias
peace initiative; and even.by the Sandinistas themselves. In
1979 the Sandinistas pledged to the OAS to "call Nicaraguans to
the first free elections" that Nicaragua would have in this
century. They subsequently accepted rortadorm.'s twenty-one
objectives, one of which stipulates the adoption of
. . . measures conducive to the establishment and, where
appropriate, improvement of democratic, representative and
pluralistic systems that will guarantee effective popular
participation in the decision-making process. . ." Because
democracy is in the mutual interest of our hemisphere, in this
respect our effort is no more than to insist upon what the
Sandinistas themselves have proclaimed to be their ideal.
President Arias has recently focused his own initiative on
the need for Nicaraguan democratization and called for "free,
pluralistic and honest elections" in Nicaragua. Finally, in a
variety of public statements the leaders of the neighboring
democracies have unambiguously called for democracy in Nicaragua.
These Central American leaders know that in the absence of
democracy throughout the region their own democratic gains are at
risk and the security of their respective countries becomes
highly vulnerable. Without democracy in Nicaragua, they see
subversion and war in Central America for the foreseeable future.
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Recent public opinion polls show that the people of Central
America overwhelmingly share these fears.
There is, therefore, a strong basis -- political,
diplomatic, international and in the public opinion of
neighboring nations -- for sharply defining U.S. goals in
Nicaragua as the establishment of full, and popularly elected,
legitimate democratic rule of the same genus that now happily
prevails in neighboring countries. What the U.S. seeks in
Nicaragua is the simple principle of self-determination for the
Nicaraguan people, i.e. their ability to select their own leaders
in free, fair, contested and periodic elections.
If democracy does not win out, the alternative to this
objective would be the consolidation of the anti-democratic
Sandinista regime and the inevitable acceptance of the establishment
of yet another totalitarian Soviet surrogate in the Western
Hemisphere. Such a devastating setback would ultimately demand
the development of some type of containment policy to isolate the
Sandinistas and minimize their potential for destabilizing
neighboring countries including Panama and Mexico.
As a policy alternative, however, containment would be
extremely costly in political, economic and military resources
while being unable to meet U.S. political and security requirements.
Moreover, containment would be extremely difficult to
effectively implement since it will have to overcome the close
cultural and historical links between the peoples of Central
America as well as the porosity of the area's national borders.
American military assistance and presence in the region would
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sharply increase. The local military forces would regain their
preeminence in national politics displacing the newly emerging
civilian leadership. Even Costa Rica would be hard-pressed to
maintain its tradition of doing without armed forces. Resurgent
local guerrillas covertly supported by the Sandinistas will
destabilize the neighboring governments and contribute to further
economic deterioration. Perhaps most tellingly, by their very
nature, containment is a policy dcxnocracicc find difficult to
sustain over the long haul. The cycle of subversion, violence,
disruption, polarization and economic decline will accelerate as
soon as our immediate interest wanes. But inevitably the U.S.
would be faced once again with the necessity to decide how to
respond to Soviet encroachment on our southern border, except
this time the magnitude of the problem and the seriousness of the
threat will be incomparably greater.
To summarize, the choice before the U.S. today is either
democracy or containment in Nicaragua. Only the former is
compatible with American traditions and the most effective U.S.
foreign policy while simultaneously securing our political and
security interests in the region. Containment, on the other
hand, only postpones the day of reckoning and ensures that
conditions will be more unfavorable when -- inevitably -- the
problem surfaces again as it surely will if only because the
United States simply cannot acquiesce in the Soviet Union
becoming the dominant power in Central America.
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