UNITA ABILITY TO SABOTAGE ANGOLAN OIL PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000501760013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501760013-4
SE(RET 25X1
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Ccntral Intdligaxe Ag ncy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 May 1987
UNITA Ability to Sabotage Angolan Oil Production
Summary
Western presence.
Y
UNITA has developed a limited but improving military
capability in Angola's oil producing northwest over the last two
years despite logistic problems and a lack of ethnic support in
the area. The insurgents appear unlikely to attack the Cuban-
and Angolan-defended oil facilities, however, due to the risk of
losing highly trained troops and concern over possible negative
repercussions in the event of Western, particularly US,
casualties. In the near term, the intensity of insurgent
activity in the northwest is likely to remain relatively low,
consisting mainly of small-scale attacks against infrastructure
targets, including lightly defended oil assets with little or no
This typescript was prepared byl Africa 25X1
Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis with
contributions from the Office of Imagery 25X1
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA 25X1
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Improving UNITA Capabilities in the North
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In the last two years, UNITA has intensified its efforts to
disrupt the Angolan economy and has improved its operational
capabilities in the northwestern oil producing areas. We
estimate that UNITA maintains a force of 6,000 men in the
northwest provinces, while 25X1
in Cabinda Province, there currently are three gftups or-
commandos totalling 235 men. In early,,-19 ,,aced
200 of its most experienced and best trained commandos into
Cabinda Province to establish a permanent Dresence in the area,
The commandos,' 25X1
armed with light weapons and explosives, were tasked with
conducting small unit raids against lightly defended targets,
conducting reconnaissance operations, and political proselytizing
to establish a base of support with the local population.
members of this unit destroyed the power 25X1
transtormer at a ongo, ambushed government convoys, and were
probably responsible for the bombing of the Cabinda airport
terminal building and the mortar attack on an oil facility last
year. 25X1
Senior UNITA officials approved a new strategy in late.1986
designed to reorient the-insurgents away from conventional
en a ements aaainp ' t government forces
The plan emphasized expanaing guerre a
activity in t e north, targeting oil, mining, and coffee
producing areas and their lines of transportation. UNITA
intelligence officials stated last February that the insurgents
were 'reorganizing and strengthening their Northern Front Command
--operating about 100 miles north of Luanda--to about 2,600 men
including two battalions and four subordinate commands
Savimbi as pic a experienced commanders from his
southeastern units and personally trained them to lead guerrilla
detachments in the northern theater. Savimbi commented on 18 May
that recent guerrilla operations by the new northern units had
surpassed his expectations and that there were a larger number of
that
Savim i as authorized is local commander to mount attacks at
his discretion throughout Cabinda with the sole restriction that
he not-target the oil facilities.
The implementation of UNITA's strate in the north depends
in part on the use of Zairian territory.
UNITA has about 2,000 suppor-cers among go an
expatriates living in Zaire's Shaba Province. UNITA activity in
Shaba consists of organizing political backing, fund raising, and
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logistic and intelligence support for insurgents operating near
the border. A South African military aircraft transported
approximately 45 UNITA soldiers as well as small arms, ammunition
and other equipment in early March to Kinshasa, 25X1
the troops and 25X1
supplies would be intiltrated by roun into Cabinda Province and
elsewhere in northwestern Angola. 25X1
suggests that the
insurgents still lack a solid base of-ethnic support in Cabinda
andL_,no t4Uj"ta-r,a* . Savimbi is aware of the problem and
has tasked UNITA Party Leader Puna, a native Cabindan, with
cultivating popular support for the insurgents in the exclave,
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UNITA does not appear to have 25X1
close ties to the small Front or the Liberation of Cabinda
(FLEC) that opposes Luanda's rule, and demands independence for
UNITA operations in the northwest also are hampered by
supply difficulties. In addition to moving some troops by way of
Zaire, the insurgents have moved men and materiel on the ground
from UNITA's southeastern stronghold, but the distance and threat-
of government interdiction makes the route unreliable. 25X1
hat Angolan forces have recently e ec a 25X1
several resupply flights to UNITA--probably South African--in the
northern provinces -and that the 25X1
South African Defense Force supplied UNITA-by sea in late 1986.
UNITA's ability to sustain or increase operations in the
northwest Iogistics.
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Strengthened Government Defenses
Luanda has responded to increased UNITA activity by
strengthening defenses at various oil facilities. Cuban troops
have increased security around the Chevron Gulf oil terminal at
Malongo and elsewhere in Cabinda
~UNITA leader avi i 25X1
stated in mid-1986, that the insurgents will not target oil
installations in Cabinda because of improved defenses around the
facilities. Improvements since January 1986 include:
- Additional site security at Malongo, including an outer
perimeter fence, free fire zone, and mine field as well as
the augmentation of the Cuban security unit responsible for
* UNITA is backed by the largest of Angola's ethnolinguistic
groups, the Ovimbundu, who are located in the central and
southern part of the country. Cabinda and the rest of the
northwest are dominated by the Bakongo.
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defending the terminal from company to battalion size since
Auaust 1986.F-
s e a additional
security improvements have occurred.:
Doubling the size of the Cuban military installation located
near Cabinda City, indicating the addition of a second
battalion there by March 1987.
- Installation of the first SA-3 site in Cabinda to augment
air defenses over the oil terminal, Cabinda Air .....-,
Cabinda Port by January 1987. The site repre-se
significant improvement over hand-held SA-7 SAMs and anti-
aircraft artillery in the area.
Prospects for Insurgent Attacks
Despite improved UNITA capabilities in the oil producing
areas, several factors work against UNITA attempting large-scale
insurgent attacks on many of the oil facilities. Although UNITA
has warned foreigners to leave, Savimbi -appears reluctant to risk-
adverse political reaction to Western casualties. He probably
realizes that UNITA's effort to win increased Western recognition
and aid would be damaged by operations that could be portrayed as
terrorist attacks against Western civilians. Nevertheless, if
Savimbi became convinced that the West was-abandoning UNITA in
favor of Luanda, the likelihood of insurgent attacks against
Western assets would greatly increase
Savimbi recently publicly castigated the French oil fi-rm
Elf-Aquitaine for-taking political actions against UNITA and
threatened the safety of French technicians, according to press
reports. In the same speech, Savimbi stated that=the Portuguese
and American presence in Angola was exempted from attack for
historical and political reasons. Should UNITA decide to strike-
the oil facilities, the insurgents probably would target
facilities with little or no US presence and take Qreat carp to
A m e r i c a n
the UNIT om ing o the Cabinda airport
was care u y planned to destroy the terminal building without
harming the property of Chevron-Gulf.
Even if the political dimension was removed, UNITA probably
would refrain from spectacular attacks against oil assets because
of its reluctance to risk heavy casualties against such hard
targets. UNITA's current strategy calls for wide-scale small
unit operations directed at lightly defended targets and the
insurgents have spent several years establishing a permanent base
of operations in the oil producing areas. The loss of highly
trained commandos would be a blow to UNITA's capabilities and
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captured insurgents could compromise information on the carefully
developed infrastructure. As a result, UNITA military operations
near the oil facilities are likely to continue to focus primarily
on disrupting supply lines and ambushing; government patrols
rather than attacking the oil facilities themselves.
Should the current military situation or level of support
for Savimbi change dramatically and UNITA decide to attack oil
assets, the insurgent's would presumably focus their efforts
against onshore facilities. With the exception of an estimated
30,000 barrels ,per a t11a X94, from various onshore wells-in-
the northwest, ngola s 3b0,000 b/p/d oil production comes from
offshore wells. UNITA has no known maritime operating capability
and no established control of the coastline, thus the vast bulk
of Angolan production appears to be beyond the reach of UNITA
attack for the near term. UNITA probably would target lightly
defended support facilities outside of Cabinda, such as those
located in Soyo and Ambriz, rather than risk an assault on more
heavily defended targets such as the Malongo terminal in Cabinda.
Even if UNITA were able to strike key ail facilities, the impact
on Luanda probably would be limited. The Iran-Iraq conflict
illustrates the extreme difficulty entailed in crippling oil -
production, even when oil facilities are attacked on a regular
basis. UNITA and South Africa have made limited attempts to
disrupt Angolan oil facilities in the past, none of which have
resplted in a significant drop in production.
Angolan oil facilities will remain vulnerable to attack by
South Africa. The South African military, through-the use of
amphibious units infiltrated by submarines or other craft, are
capable of striking Angola's offshore and onshore facilities.,
Pretoria is aware of Luanda's critical dependency upon oil
production and could undertake operations against the facilities
in an effort to bolster UNITA's campaign against economic
targets. In May 1985, Angola announced that it had foiled a
South African commando raid against the tank farm at the Malongo
facility. Pretoria later admitted publicly that it had lost
contact with a reconnaissance group operating in northern Angola,
Senior South African military advisers view UNITA attacks on oil
facilities in Cabinda as essential to guerrilla operations in
northern Angola. Pretoria, however, probably would encourage
UNITA attacks rather than risk direct involvement.
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SOVIET/WARSAW PACT MILITARY
DELIVERIES TO ANGOLA, 1982-86
1982
83
84
85
86
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Angola: Commodity Production and
Price Trends
COFFEE Production
Thousand metric tons
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
DIAMONDS Production
Thousand carats
PETROLEUM Production
Thousand b/d
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Prices
US $ per pound
Prices
US $ per carat
250-
200- A
150
100
50
0
Prices
US $ per barrel
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