USSR: AN AGENDA FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000401060002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88G01117R000401060002-8
--sPECIAL AtU-LY8I6--
~~...~-~ -~~-y4R @OINSlf?I~Y1- ARMA ODNTAO IN E` ~pi`
?he Mataav pact elaboration of Gorbachev' ? ?J-tlantic to the
Urals' proposal i? a bid to make conventional ara~ control the
centerpiece of infra-turopean dialogue tos years to coos. Al_
-though the plan includes unattractive eleeenta--nuclear weapons
and aircraft--it appears to have been so constructed to avoid
gi vinq grounds for i~nediate reject ion. 2t calla Eor relatively
?odest cuts in IU-TO and pact lorces in a staged approach that
appears a~bitiou? but not grandiose. The thrust of the plan
appears directed at CDs phase TI, put the pact avoided closing
the door on any possible Lormi, including NBlR.
when Gorbachev announced his ?1-tlantic to the Urals' pro-
posai oa April ls, it appeared sot to have been thought through.
Oetaila were ?issing ~Gorb.~cbev described the entire plan in
only two paragraphs) sad darter otticiala subsequently offered
a variety of contradictory laterpretations. The aio of the
proposal is the first iasta4ce appeared to be ?i~ply to answr
suropean concerns that in a eon-auclear world they would be at
a convent-tonal disadvantage.
Yesterday's elaboration of the proposal !a clearly the re-
sult of latensive ooordieation on the
touter olticials and their last Outopeanra111ea~rkSo~i~sp/cta
o! the proposal are still unclear, but this ~aay be del iberace,
to give as appearance of fleacibility.
Tie reduction elan. The telativel ?odest soo
proposal--it did not call for total Oisir~a^ient as oeoeitht
have espected given Gorbacbevs record--,and its three-staged
approach to reductions soggesta the doviets hope it will be
~segarded a? ? serious otter.
--The Brat step would be a one-tis~ MArv/warsaw pact cut
of 100,000-150,000 troops witbia a Year or two. Although
the statesent indicated that tactical air forces should
also be cut, the wotdi~tg of t-e etate~ent su
the soviets would cot iesis~t oa including aiigtocceahin
this stage.
--J- second step ~rould ic.elude 2S-percent reduction of
~U-T'0/Marsaw pact ~ lapd and ~taotioal air forces by the early
1!lOs. A,11 otter intc~'taa COyatriea would be included in
the process duripq ? oabsequent stage.
To buttress the proposal's aeriouaneas, the
that there are ?a~ ptecooditioas' !or beginning dlscussionssised
that the plan is iedepeod.at? e! tee .taauary 1S initiative, and
that it wlooswd alto aativa ideas. As ? further effort to put
a gloss oa the pica, ~he pact stressed that the coney saved
iron s?duatiasa world : go c? eooe~eiio awd social dev.iop?eat .
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88G01117R000401060002-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88G01117R000401060002-8
' ~ CON! ZDlNT111L
In addition to the bloc-to-bloc character of the initial
phases, fro ?a for eles~nts in the plan are likely to be unat-
tcactive to Mest tutopean goirern~enta: inclusion of operation-
al-tactial ?issiles and tactical aircraft. Pere discussions to
get oti the ground, the soviets would probably co~proeise on
both issues.
--Qorbachw on J1pri1 10 vas aseiguous on the question o!
including operational-tactical missiles ~rangea up to
1,000 k~)t nor the pact tic~ly states that such missiles
should be reduced siaultaneously rlth cuts in conventional
forces.
The soviets have long been interested in including tac-
tical aiscratt in the Milt negotiations and, before they
swv?A to their sere-sere IMl proposal, had insisted that
aircraft be cwere0 in an iN? agrees~ent. Their use of the
test ?tactical? leaves obscure chat type of aircraft they
Rope to include.
da rith other soviet pronouncements over the
last s x ?ont s, the prarisions !ot verification at least give
the appeasanoe of being lortboo~ing: reductions would be ?oni-
tored by M?M and on-site inspection, and military activity by
the cesxining troops would also be "observed.'
in addition, the plan earls for the establish~enc of an in-
ternational consultative eos~a~ittee--possibly including non-bloc
t~e~bers--that would, as-on9 other duties, span 'posts of control'
at ?a~or tailray centers, aisports, and harbors. tThis is a
throrback to ? concept discussed at the 1!S? surprise l-ttack
Confereace.) The plan alp., calls for an exchange o! data, not
as a basis toc reductions but for the purpose of v?rili cation.
. Mo doubt hoping to avo10 criticism chile
lnvit n9 scourse, the pact rat open-ended on the question of
There its aw plan should be taken up. It cleat ly prelers using
.the plan as the basis ios CDi phase II. The stateaent refers
spec! ti oa 11Y to the wooed stage of CDt, anb the war saw pact
co~uunique underscored the iaportanae of the Movesb?r CSCE
meeting in Vienna.
?arever, the pact oltess alternatives, such as a 'special
lotus` or as espanded MiI7t aan0ate. slthough the pact sea!-
tirse0 its interest in ongoing MiIA discussions in Vienna, the
elteet of -the statesw~t vas to deelate that these talks as aoti
structured. are going eorhere.
~t`=D~IiL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88G01117R000401060002-8