TALKING POINTS FOR THE A/DDI AFTERMATH OF THE ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00874R000100010007-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 7, 2011
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 21, 1985
Content Type:
MISC
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP91B00874R000100010007-4.pdf | 150.02 KB |
Body:
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Talking Points for the A/DDI
21 October 1985
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interests--hoping to avoid further loss of internationa
-- We believe Arafat will try to resist demands to attack U
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Aftermath of the Achille Lauro Incident
Role of Abul Abbas
The evidence is particularly strong that Palestine
Liberation Front leader, Abul Abbas was involved in the plannin
of this terrorist incident and that the original plan was an
attack against the Israeli port at Ashdod, the ship's next
scheduled stop.
-- The plan apparently miscarried because the terrorists were
discovered on board with their weapons.
1.
We still have no definite word on the location of Abul
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Abu bbas
interests worldwide over the next several months.
held in Baghdad soon.
attend the PLO Executive Committee meeting expected to be
Status of the PLO
PLO Chairman Arafat is facing increasing pressure from PLO
hardliners to retaliate for the 1 October Israeli raid on PLO
headquarters in Tunis and the US interception of the Achille
Lauro hijackers.
-- PLO hardliners, who have long advocated a more militant
posture, almost certainly are in a stronger position in
the wake of the US and Israeli operations.
-- We judge that Arafat--in the interest of preserving Fatah
unity--will yield to the hardliners' pressure and
authorize more frequent and spectacular attacks on Israeli
its viability as a national liberation movement is to
stage attacks not only against Israel, but Israel's prime
benefactor--the United States.
United States interests--particularly in the Middle East and
Europe--also are likely to become a primary target for various
PLO factions seeking revenge for the US operation.
-- The PLO may soon conclude that the only way to draw
attention to its grievances with Israel and to demonstrate
Terrorist Attacks Against US Interests
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SECRET
credibility--but he may not be able to head off freelance
operations by PLO splinter groups.
-- Arafat's Fatah organization has not attacked US interests
since 1973, when the Black September organization
kidnapped and killed the US Ambassador and Deputy Chief of
Fallout in Egypt from Hijacking Episode
President Mubarak needs US aid too badly to break relations
with Washington. The tough anti-US line he has been taking is
primarily intended to forestall domestic criticism of his
leadership and his role in the crisis.
-- Mubarak will soon want to put bilateral relations back on
track. We believe his private anger at the United States
may already have peaked.
Mubarak does not enloy a strong power base.
-- Fundamentalists, as well as leftists, have led student
demonstrators calling Mubarak a "coward" and demanding
Egypt break with Israel and the US. Police crackdowns
have contained the protesters, but harsh treatment of
detainees risks touching off a cycle of demonstrations
directed against the government.
Key groups have rallied behind Mubarak to give the
appearance of national unity, but protracted demonstrations and
police repression could prompt them to abandon him.
CIA Actions in Response to Achille Lauro Incident
Various DDI offices have provided papers on the Achille
Lauro incident and its implications to senior government
officials in the last two weeks.
-- NESA did a typescript for Secretary of Defense Weinberger
on Prospects for and Consequences of Increasing PLO
Terrorism and Israeli Retaliation.
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-- The OGI, NESA and EURA offices are currently coordinating
a typescript on the Achille Lauro incident for the
National Security Council.
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Talking Points for the ADDI
Foreign Policy Implications for Italy of the Hijackin
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The hijacking of the Achille Lauro has been one of the most se us 25X1
international challenges that any Italian government has faced in the
postwar period. It brought down a stable governments whose foreign po
was characterized by strong support for both NATO and the US. 25X1
The crisis has driven home to Italian leaders and public that Itali
interests and American interests will not always coincide. Ital 's tie
with US and NATO have been keystone of postwar Italian policy.
Prime Minister Craxi, Foreign Minister Andreotti, and Defense Minist
Spadolini are all determined to maintain Italy's ties to NATO and
US, but Craxi and Andreotti are more ready to break with the US o
specific issues, especially the Middle East.
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