COVERT AID TO ANGOLA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000303560062-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: August 14, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/07/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000303560062-8
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 August 1986
1 '
Covert aid to Angola?
By Charles McC. Mathias Jr. Annmval of this laoicia+-
C COVERT action, a handy and inoffensive term for a
dark and sometimes dangerous business, has a
proper role as an instrument of American foreign
policy. But that role is - or, at least, should be -
sharply limited.
Covert activities should pass a number of tests before
they go forward. The severity of the standards are
bound to be related to the scope of the activity and its
goals. Nevertheless, all decisions to engage in covert
action must at least satisfy several basic criteria.
The most obvious and least contestable are that they
not violate our laws and that they be undertaken in full
compliance with statutory requirements to keep Con-
gress fully and currently informed. Equally apparent,
but more arguable, is the determination that the activi-
ties form part of a coherent policy that contributes to our
foreign policy objectives and national interests. Finally,
all open, aboveboard options should have been ex-
hausted or found ineffective.
Covert aid to UNITA, a guerrilla faction in Angola, in
southern Africa, fails to meet these requirements.
The Reagan administration's argument for covert as-
sistance in Angola falls on its face from the start. Covert
aid must, at a minimum, be "covert." Yet leading mem-
bers of the administration, including President Reagan
himself, have not only publicly indicated their support
for such assistance, but also received UNITA leadership
in the White House.
The real effect of continuing to label this program
"covert" when it was never intended to remain secret
has been to exclude Congress from any direct role on this
important foreign policy decision.
Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to
declare war and appropriate funds for defense and
foreign policy. The supply of military assistance in An-
gola, which is reported to include Stinger missiles,
amounts to a major shift in American foreign policy in a
region, southern Africa. of paramount interest.
The intelligence oversight co mittees of the Con
r view v
actions. but the have very
restricted
power, which does not match the kind of congres-
sional review ands lemslatlve Dower that is essential developing a credible p icy over the long run.
On these grounds alone, proems vision o covert aid to
UNITA deserves serious consideration and discussion in
Congress, in secret session if necessary. The principal
objective of legislation that we have Introduced is to
ensure that such serious consideration occurs by requir-
ing that assistance to UNITA or other factions in Angola
be openly acknowledged through a request for funds, be
fully debated, and be put to a vote.
more urgent by the many dis u~ oreum no cy aues-
ttnna 6-- i ^ ~:
e previous ure o cove ai TA and
another faction in the mid-1970s should alert us to the
complexities of the situation. That policy turned out to
be disastrous, and it ought to remind us of the dangers of
labeling dubious, short-term programs "covert" to avoid
a cleareyed assessment of longer-term implications.
A variety of other questions deserve full examination
to make sure that our approach toward Angola is in line
with our regional policies and national interests. For
example, does material assistance for resistance forces
in Angola help or hinder our efforts to bring stability to
the region? Does it help or hurt efforts to negotiate a
settlement between the government of Angola and South
Africa over the independence of Namibia? Does such aid
enhance or erode our ability to reduce Angolan depend-
ence on Cuban and Soviet support?
Tb date, covert aid to UNITA has led the government
of Angola to refuse to continue to talk to us at all. It has
increased, not lessened, Angolan reliance on the Cubans.
Perhaps the most critical question of all is whether aid
to UNITA will strengthen or weaken our leverage with
South Africa to dismantle apartheid and take steps that
could lead to a peaceful settlement there. Our new policy
could align us with South Africa at a most inopportune
time and threaten to alienate black Africa.
One last question. Is Angola yet another trouble spot
where the US response must be military? Or are there
political and economic factors in the Angolan equation
which can be exploited by our most potent, and endur-
ing, assets - our diplomatic credibility as a democratic
superpower and our economic and social capacities?
We believe the answer to that last question is obvious.
But whatever the answer to that and the other ques-
tions, they are indeed important questions and should be
discussed widely and especially by Congress.
One of the principal objections raised by some to a full
debate on this subject is that it w,)uld undercut the
President's ability to conduct foreign policy. We believe,
however, that the administration's foreign policy can be
truly effective only when it gains broad support, includ-
ing bipartisan support in Congress.
A dramatic shift in policy toward Angola, in a country
embroiled in conflict with South Africa, may or may not
have broad, bipartisan support. We'll never know unless
it is discussed fully.
Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R) of Maryland is
on the Foreign Relations Committee and Sen. Pat-
rick J. Leahy (D) of Vmwwnt is vice-chairmannrthe P
Approved For Release 2010/07/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000303560062-8