NO LESSON IN COVERT AID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 13, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25 :CIA-RDP99-014488000401580005-6
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N~o Lesson in Covert Aid
A dangerous mythology is developing in the
United States to the effect that the right combina-
tion ~of covert military assistance ensures success
fpi? diplomatic initiatives. The proof is Afghanistan.
{~ui?veyors of the concept say, rushing to apply the
Same formula to an analysis of events in Angola
and 1~iicazagua.
~'he trouble with this is that Afghanistan is
unique, beazing little resemblance to the situa-
tions in Angola and Nicaragua. In Afghanistan a
neighboring superpower, the Soviet Union, un-
leashed amilitary invasion. The brazen breach of
international law invited a firm response from the
world at large, including the almost unanimous
condemnation by the membership of the United
Nations. The military conquest was resisted from
the start by a substantial popular base within
.Afghanistan, supported with increasing flows of
arms from outside. The internal resistance, helped
by foreign arms, made the cost of the conquest far
greater that Moscow could have imagined. But
what probably was decisive in Moscow's decision
to withdraw was the realization that the negative
consequences were undermining other Soviet
efforts to create a new relationship with the West-
ern democracies. In other words, diplomacy ap-
pears to have been more important that weapons,
even in Afghanistan.
In both Angola and Nicaragua, Marxist-oriented
governments have enjoyed substantial support
from the Soviet Union and its allies, and have been
challenged in open warfare by opposing elements
receiving military and economic assistance from
the United States. Much has been made of the
presence of Cuban troops in Angola, but it would
be a mistake to confuse their role with that of the
Soviet army of occupation in Afghanistan. Fur-
thermore, the Angolan and Nicaraguan govern-
ments enjoy the support of most of their neighbors
and are recognized by the United Nations, while
the U.S.-supported guerrillas in those countries
are largely isolated, enjoying only limited approval
from a few other nations.
The contrast with Afghanistan _is most evident
in Nicaragua, where the Contras, supported by
Washington, appear to be opposed by virtually
every other nation in the region. Indeed, the peace
plan contrived by the Central American presi-
dents themselves called for an end to this sort of
guerrilla warfaze while at the same time asking all
nations, the Soviet Union included, to terminate
arms supplies to the area.
U.S. militaTy~support for iUNITA_ in Angola and
for the Contras in Nicaragua has, in sum, done
more harm than good. Indeed, the United States
,must share responsibility for the terrible toll of
civilians as well as the destruction of property that
has characterized the wazfaze in both Angola and
Nicaragua. The military commitment to these
guerrilla movements has been out of all proportion
to any risk to international security posed by the
nascent Marxism of the governments in the two
impoverished, puny nations.
The development of peaceful settlements in both
regions of the world can best be facilitated by an
end to insurgency and a commitment to inter-
national negotiations. The new interest in detente
in Moscow reinforces this opportunity.
This is not to argue that the United States can
forgo clandestine armed intervention in all cases.
But it is to argue that history already judges these
adventures badly. Rarely do they work. That is a
lesson of_particular importance for Vice President
George ~Bush~ whose involvement in covert activ-
ities while director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may weaken the resistance that every
President should have to these dangerous, and too
often counterproductive, operations.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25 :CIA-RDP99-014488000401580005-6