KISSINGER: ON FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100030077-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 77
• Publication Date: July 31, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

/ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100030077-4
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Kissinger: On foreign policy
By Robert Bendiner end result was that the negotiations stopped en-
A. Kissinger and to this day the Cyprus situation is
Henry L
has probably exercised totally stalemated. Now I can't prove that those
greater power than any U.S. secretary of state. negotiations in 1974 would have succeeded, but
Having served under Presidents Nixon and with every passing month the position of those
Ford, the elder statesman is returning to who occupied the territory became more firmly
government service. President Reagan has established.
named Kissinger chairman of a bipartisan Q: What do you see as the proper role for some
commission aimed at seeking support for the of the agencies that were not created for the
administration's policies in Central America. purpose of making policy-like vA?
In this exclusive interview, . Kissinger offers A: I don't want the CIA to be involved in policy-
In
on subjects ranging from the role of making aking at all, factual.aThenalyse es CIA of should political be situations confined to
and.
the CIA in Latin America to the secret of tom giving its views about the likely consequences
diplomacy. The interview was conducted short- of proposed courses of action. Now that second
ly before Kissinger's appointment to the com- role is admittedly close to the area of poli-
mission on Central America. cyrnaking, but I am extremely distrustful of
getting the CIA involved in the po'iicy process as a
-chief player, because there is the great -danger.
Bendiner: Traditionally, historically, foreign that Intelligence will then tend to follow policy
policy has been made by the president and his rather than guide it with objective information. I
secretary of state. But now we have a National would think a major effort has to be made to keep
Security Council and a CIA and a Defense Depart- Intelligence and policymaking as far apart as
ment, as well as the Senate and even to .some possible.
extent the House of Representatives, all taking a Q: Would you say that that has been achieved?
very active hand in the process. Are there too Is that the relationship between the CIA and the
many cooks for the good of the broth? [State] Department?
Kissinger: Let's make a distinction between the A: No. I'm afraid it's gone the other way. I
management of foreign policy in the executive shudder every time I see a CIA report published
branch and the management of foreign policy as in order to support a policy, because that really
between the executive and legislative branches. means there is a subconscious pressure or the
With respect to the executive branch, it is impossi- agency to write reports that fit in with official
ble today for any one man or one department to preconceptions. Furthermore, no CIA report
encompass all the disciplines and interests that should ever be declassified for any purpose until
have to be reflected in foreign policy. Inevitably, a maybe 10 years after the event.
president has to consider many aspects of a The CIA analysts should write their reports for
problem and also take into account a visers who the president of the United States, and the presi-
reflect still other aspects that have not occurred to dent should never use them in a public forum to
him. support his position. He might use their informa-
This process contains a twofold danger. First, in tion but he should not identify it as coming from
order to settle a problem, the president may the CIA.
accept the least common denominator by way of Q: Could you say whether this is the tack that
bureaucratic compromise. Secondly, each issue you took with regard to the CIA? Say, in Latin
tends to be dealt with on its individual merits. America?
There is not necessarily among the various A: More or less. You know, when the CIA tells
contenders for presidential attention a representa- you that the consequence of a communist govern-
tive speaking for the most important of all aspects ment in Chile will be to upset the political equili-
of foreign policy: the relationship of various brium in neighboring countries, this is an implicit
measures to each other over an extended period of policy recommendation. That cannot be helped.
time. A sense of nuance and of strategy is very But. as a general proposition, I think separation of
difficult to develop in the modern government. policymaking and Intelligence is the tack that I
As between the Congress and the executive took. If I dig take another one from time to time,
branch, there is no doubt, in my mind at least, it was wrong.
that the Congress is asserting an excessive influ. Q: is open diplomacy possible, and if not, how
ence over the day-to-day tactical management of far can secrecy be carried in a democratic state?
foreign policy. ' A: -I don't believe the question permits a clear.
Q: Are you thinking of things like Congress' cut answer. In a democracy the results of negotia-
refusal to appropriate money for some 'Central' tions obviously have to be made available to the
American states unless they improve their human public. Except in the rarest of cases, secret
rights record? agreements will not stand the test of crisis if the
A: I don't want to go into which specific public has not been informed about them. So,
decisions would fall into this category, but I can clearly, the results of negotiations should be
mention one from the period I was in office-just public. The process by which these results are
to take the discussion away from immediate . achieved generally should have a private phase
controversies. We were attempting to negotiate an and then it may have a public phase.
agreement between Greece and Turkey on I believe that it is terribly important in a
Cyprus. The Congress, in the middle of the negoti- negotiation for one's interlocutor to understand
ations, voted an embargo on arms to Turkey. The - one's real purpose. In fact, that is infinitely more
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100030077-4