GETTING ON WITH GORBACHEV

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 7, 2011
Sequence Number: 
8
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 18, 1985
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7.pdf181.23 KB
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STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90 18 March 1985 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR on with Gorbachev By Dimitri K. Simes I T is important for the United States to start on the right foot with the new Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Of course. initially at least, his personal imprint is going to be limited. The new general secretary will be no more than the first among equals on the Polit- buro where the Old Guard maintains considerable power. Yet Mr. Gorbachev has an opportunity to consolidate his position rather quickly. With Konstantin U. Chernenko's death, the Politburo has shrunk to 10 members. Several vacancies on this top executive-legislative committee of the Soviet system will have to be filled in the near future. For instance, with the, exception of Gorbachev, there is only one member of the key Party Central Committee Secretariat - Grigory V. Romanov - who has a seat on the Politburo. One or two more Central Committee secretaries will have to be added soon. Also, five out of 10 Politburo members are in their seventies. Prime Minister Nikolai A. Tikhonov is 79, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko is 76. To put the Politburo age factor into perspective, one should take into account that the average longevity of Soviet males is currently just around 62 years. Ac- cordingly, several departures from the ranks of the leadership can be easily anticipated. Finally, the Party Con- gress is scheduled to convene before the end of this year. And party con-` gresses are traditionally used by the leadership to make personnel changes. Chances are that at first Gorbachev will have to be careful to consult oth- ers in determining additions to the Po- litburo. But the general secretary's job is uniquely positioned both institution- ally and symbolically to allow an accu- mulation of personal power. Literally - in a matter of months, the balance in the Politburo may shift to Gorbachev's advantage, giving him a relatively free hand in making new top appointments. No outsider can predict whether the new leader will move fast to ex ploit the opportunity to pack the Politburo witli his allies and clients. But the opportunity is there and has to be considered by American policymakers. . What can and should the Reagan administration do to impress Mr. Gorbachev with the seriousness of the- US intent in seeking a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union? The first thing to do is to avoid ill-conceived gestures which only create confusion and false expectations on both sides. The President's instinct not to attend the Chernenko funeral was correct. He neither knew the man person- ally nor enjoyed a warm relationship with him. And Chernenko was not a political giant whose funeral was a must to attend. More importantly, Reagan's encounter with Gorbachev would have to be brief and primarily ceremonial. Nothing of substance could be realistically accomplished. Instead, the So 'ets would be guessing what the Presi- dent was up to. T ?would undoubtedly be pleased-that the anti-Communist President felt obliged to contribute to the prestige of their regime by paving a visit: Except, being unsentimental and suspicious, they would prob- ably fear that his motive was not to have an opening with the Kremlin" but rather, by appearing in a peacenik's mantle, to more effectively sell the MX missile to the US Congress and "star wars" to the West Europeans. More- over, scores of congressmen and hundreds of media peo- ple, feeling obliged to accompany the President would find themselves with little to do in Moscow. Some would go to visit dissidents and Jewish activists, only to be roughed up by Soviet police and security agents. Mutual recriminations would inevitably follow No unilateral US concessions to Gorbachev are in or- der. If he is interested in improving US-Soviet relations there is plenty he can do without surrendering any of the ,Kremlin's important interests. Engaging in serious nego- tratioirs under UN auspices regarding terms of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan could be one encouraging signal. Releasing Anatoly Shcharansky could be another. But as long as Gorbachev continues the foreign and inter- nal policies of his predecessors which the US found of- fensive, there is no reason for the Reaganadministration to rush toward accommodating him. There is no need for a major reassessment of the US policy toward the Soviet regime simply because there is a new more vigorous and impressive party leader in Mos- cow On the other hand, precisely because the new gen- eral Secretary can become both a more formidable rival and a more promising partner, it makes sense to improve the conduct of the administration's Soviet diplomacy and to make sure that Gorbachev clearly understands where the United States stands vis-a-vis his country. The arms control talks, which started in Geneva last week, provide one important format for communication with the new leader. There are two arms control steps the . administration should consider. First, it is time to stop exuberant rhetoric about the great po- tential of the Strategic Defense Initia- tive. Nobody knows exactly what SDI technologies will evolve in the course of the research and development ef- fort. A consensus exists in the US and among the allies that research should 1 continue. Anyway, there is no. way that limits on research could be veri- fied through any feasible form of in- spection. But the way the President' and some of his associates talk about making nuclear weapons obsolete goes considerably beyond the scope of what is being done in practi /y.,ate.,:_ Mr. _#ea gan: { . - - VVII4..4 V~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7 is entitled to his vision of switching from deterrence to an impenetrable de- fense against everything nuclear. But the gap between what the administra- tion actually does about "star wars" and its pronouncements is counterpro- ductive. It needlessly provokes the Russians, confuses the West Europe- ans, and creates fertile ground for all kinds of Soviet peace offensives. Nothing would be sacri- ficed by adopting a more modest and businesslike tone in discussion of the, strategic defense options Second, the administration should do its best to nego- tiate an extension of the SALT II treaty which expires on Dec. 31. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, the whole arms control regime is likely to disintegrate, intensifying the nuclear competition and superpower animosity. The US delegation may offer Moscow a trade-off - the extension should be coupled with an amendment allowing the de- ployment of the second mobile ICBM. Only one is currently permissible. Such an amendment would give a green light to the Midgetman missiles on the American side and would eliminate the controversy regarding the new Soviet SSX-25 mis- siles. The US claims this missile violates SALT II provisions, while the USSR ar- gues that it is no more than a modernized model of the earlier SS-13. An attempt should also be made to reach some com- promise regarding the new Soviet radar currently under construction in the proximity of Krasnoyarsk in Eastern Siberia. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger tells anyone willing to listen that this radar represents a vi- cious and militarily- meaningful violation of the 1972 ABM treaty. A number of CIA experts, however dis- a ree on both counts. The issue has to be raised with the Soviet delegation. Surely, with some ingenuity, a formula can be found which, without forcing the Soviet Union to stop the construction, will include modifications in the design acceptable to the American side. Caution in selling the SDI and flexibility on extending SALT II will not require a single substantive concession to the Soviets. On the contrary, by demonstrating good faith on arms control, the administration will be better placed in getting appropriations for strategic programs, some crucial in their. own right and some useful as a bar- gaining chip in Geneva. And arms control talks with Gorbachev would start on a positive note contributing to an overall stabilization of the US-Soviet relationship. Dimitri'K. Simes is senior associate at. the Carne- gie Endowment for International Peace., ._; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7