SOVIET SPIES ARE A THREAT-AND AN OBVIOUS WEAKNESS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160006-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 7, 2011
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 26, 1985
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160006-9.pdf119.63 KB
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STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160006-9 r ARTICLE A5 LT IL ON PAGE J-r'~ LOS ANGELES TIMES 26 July 1985 Soviet Shies Are a Threat- and an Obvious Weakness By DIMITRI K. SIMES It is an open season on spies in Washing- ton. Currently, more people are awaiting trial on espionage charges than at any time since 1945. The Administration and Con- gress alike are announcing steps with the newly discovered threat. The threat is real. So is political exploita- tion. Ideologues of the right are only too eager to exploit the situation to expose "the evil empire. And quite a few liberals are using espionage as a safe way to demon- strate their hard-line credentials. of KGB Ironically, the omnipresence operatives reflects the systemic weakness- es of Soviet society. The Kremlin does not trust its own subjects, including diplomats. In fact, the Soviet Union doubts the loyalty of its diplomats so much that in both New York and Washington it houses them in special carefully guarded complexes with- out private phones. With the exception of the ambassador, his deputies and several senior counselors, most Soviet diplomats in Washington are confined to their embassy. is not ElprigpS that the KGB per- forms some unctions that in the United States would-be among rou ne rensi- bilities of ore' rvice officers. Normal m ence- mmnuz al eC political : Lem- -ROB'- its among the, a duties. The KGB's insatiable appetite for Ameri- can technology is a reflection of another profound Soviet failure. Long gone are the heady days of Sputnik and the first manned space flight, when Nikita S. Khrushchev boasted that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in the field of high technology. Despite Moscow's tre- mendous investment in science, the Soviet Union has fallen even further behind during the last two decades. Is-there a chance to ut an end to the KGB's spying in America. "Nothing can done ~__reduce the level of espionage says Harry Rositzke, former cgB4qerQbI CIA chief Soviet 2WEUons. indeed, a& long as the Soviet Union remains weak on self-confidence and o ogy. u strong on securit services the Politburo will keep trying like it or not, the greed tees t e KGB ]actor alone guaraj _ m some eager R;c is among Americans. The United States must wage a protract- ed war against Soviet espionage. This war requires a cool head, professionalism and patience rather than harried and hysterical responses. Unfortunately, there are plenty of voices trying to outdo each other in demanding extremist solutions. This would only make the KGB smile. The House voted in favor of the death penalty for spies tried by military courts in peacetime. Not ex- treme enough, some claim: Let's extend executions to civilian traitors as well. And the executions should be made public via television and radio. This profound advice comes from Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska). All this in addition to the House's vote to expand the use of polygraph tests on more than 4 million people with security clear- ances at the Department of Defense and defense contractors. Forget about decency and civil ri hts for a moment. Disregard a r18 K o a and, in t o case of the Indiscriminate use lie detectors and kTemised executions, of eon the practices o the Soviet ce state. How o would it take before Rah the pendulum o public o wourd swing back and would an outcry over counterintelligence abuses? An ec- tive struggle against espionage is a struggle that could sustained by the U.S. political process. KGB spymasters, like terror- ists rarel fear indiscriminate counter- measures. One of their purposes is to erode the internal fabric of Western societies, to trigger hysteria and wholesale suspicion. There are some practical and ethical ways to address the espionage problem: First, reduce the number of Soviet diplomatic personnel in the United States. There are legitimate reasons for why there are many more Soviet officials in America than U.S. officials in the Soviet Union, such as the presence of the United Nations in New York and the Soviet Union's practice of bringing in its own support staff rather than hiring locals. Still, the current gap- about 1,075 officials versus 300, in Mos- cow's favor-is disturbing. The Adminis- tration should also think carefully before entering agreements with Moscow to open additional consulates. The one that the Soviets have in San Francisco, with 41 officials, is a nest of spies. Second, the number of FBI counter- intelligence en should increased- but not in naBte. Quality as impo as quantity. east tning a we need are more Mr. Millers on the FBI payroll. Too few r' agen speak Russian or have any systematic training in Soviet studies. Third, common sense dictates the need to reduce both the numbers of classified documents and persona with clearances. Yet, no foolproof defense against espio- nage conceivable. e Soviet case a huge security apparat as much a problem as a solution. The 2wressive regime enates the Soviet Union's best ushi of antest. A _ a ewthem into the ane CIA. Obsession with security es one lees secure. Dimitri K. Shnes 1s a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160006-9