'IRON FELIX' AS A SOVIET ROLE MODEL, IS STILL FEARSOME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 8, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160005-0
wri rHrta:u 8 November 1985
\ n?t ~. n: r l
`I
ron Felix,' as a Soviet Role Model, Is Still Fearsome
3 By DIMITRI;K. sa-m
Is it possible that the whole affair concerning the
defection of Col. Vitaly Yurchenko was a KGB setup? An
editorial in Kommunist, the Soviet party's top monthly,
suggests an answer.
The editorial reveals who Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his
bunch of Communist yuppies take for a role model. His
name is Felix E. Dzerdzhinski, and he was none other than
the founding father of CHEKA, the dreaded Bolshevik
secret police. "The Iron Felix," as Dzerdzhinski was called
at the time, was a cunning man of exceptional ruthlessness.
Yet, according to Kommunist, Dzerdzhinski was a model
Communist, a revolutionary of great integrity and dedi-
cation, and a true "knight of the revolution," as Vladimir I.
Lenin used to describe his favorite hatchetman.
There is an element of truth to this image. Unlike the
pure thugs who succeeded him during Josef Stalin's era,
Dzerdzhinski was not corrupt in the sense of compromising
his duty. He would not blackmail women into sex, as did
Lavrenti P. Beria. He would not abuse his office to go after
personal rivals. And his "sword of the revolution," as
CHEKA was described by its masters, was used strictly to
promote the Bolshevik cause rather than to destroy the
party faithful as it was done under Stalin.
It is no wonder that Kommunist recommends Dserdzhin-
ski as a standard for the ideal party functionary. He was
honest with his party comrades. He was also effective in
destroying all real and potential enemies of Bolshevik rule.
Mercy was not among his virtues. The purge of "class Mikhail
enemies" that he presided over was so wholesale that it
would impress even Pol Pot. And, very importantly, he
died early enough from natural causes (or so we believe)
to avoid being destroyed and disgraced by Stalin.
If Gorbachev wants to change the Soviet Union with a
sweeping stroke, his enthusiasm for Dzerdzhinski may be
understandable. After all, it is not unusual for reformers in
Russia to employ the most barbaric means to modernize
the country. Just recall the rule of Peter the Great.
But as far as the Western world is concerned, Gorba-
chev's potential as a reformer-still unclear at this
point-is not good news in itself. Giving Soviet communism
moire punch, without making it more benign and humane,
would hardly be in the American interest. And here
Gorbachev's choice of role models is of more than purely
academic interest. Under Dzerdzhinski's direct orders,
thousands upon thousands of innocent people-women
and children included-were butchered by CHEKA
.
simply because they came from "the exploiting classes."
Massacring them was one of the more efficient ways of
terrorizing the nation in the name of creating the "csardom
of freedom.'.
If Dzerdzhinski was a loyal colleague to the party, to
everyone else he was evil incarnate. One of his greatest
contributions was the invention of the Gulag. He was no
less inventive in tricking Bolshevik opponents abroad.
CHEKA organized what was prOobly the ultimate
disinformation operation of all times. Under the code name
TRUST, Dzerdzhin ski and associates created a fake
organization devoted to overthrowing the Bolsheviks.
Allegedly working against CHEKA, TRUST was in fact
its brainchild and obedient tool.
A number of Western intelligence services, not accus-
tomed to such deception par excellence, became TRUST's
devoted admirers. The emigre community's efforts were
neutralized as a result of the struggle between TRUST's
supporters (including outright agents) and detractors. In
S. Gorbachev ANTI a0. awi m Lyles
the end, everyone in the emigre community suspected
everyone else.
And once Western intelligence services had been
sufficiently duped and emigre organizations sufficiently
discredited. TRUST was used to lure some of the
Bolsheviks' enemies into the Soviet Union, where they
met their deaths.
Granted, times have changed considerably. But .if
Yurchenko-as was suggested by his extraordinary
self-confidence and cool professionalism during his press
conference in Washington on Monday-was a KGB plant
from the beginning, then Gorbachev is not above repeating
the Dsetdl~xhinski tricks.
A gr s! power like the Soviet Union has many ways of
using influence to change circumstances. If the opportunity
for new influence arose, by what means and toward what
end would it be directed? The Soviet superpower remains,
and there are no signs that it will collapse or change in the
foreseeable future. No rational alternative exists to talking
to Gorbachev and, moreover, to seeking deals with him
when American and Soviet interests overlap.
Still, as long as Soviet leaders are trying to fin Dzerd-
hinski's shoes, the East-West relationship is bound to-be
dominated by rivalry. The lesson of the Yurchenko affairs
shows us that, pre-summit cheerleading notwithstanding,
no historic opportunity to transform adversaries into
friends is on the horizon.
Kommunist's praise for Dzerfthinaki is a powerful
reminder that the source of international tension is not
some unfortunate misunderstanding. On the contrary, it
is exactly because we understand each other all too well
that the heirs of Washington and the heirs of Dzerdzhinsld
have difficulty living together in harmony.
DhnlM K. Simes is a senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Pesos in Washington.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160005-0