'STAR WARS' AND ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605150003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 6, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605150003-5
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 February 1986
`Star wars' and arms control
The US faces
several policy.
choices over how
-to proceed-with
President
Reagan's
Stategic Defense
Initiative, a defen-
sive system
against incoming
missile attacks.
These options
give various de-
grees of impor-
tance to arms
control. But will
the final decision,
whatever it is,
promote. stability
or increase the
risk of nuclear
destruction?
By Elizabeth Pond
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
STAR wars could be the greatest impetus
to arms control in a dozen years.
Or it could be the greatest barrier.
It all depends on what happens next.
So far, President Reagan's Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI, or "star wars") has been a con-
spicuous incentive to arms control. Judging
from the vehemence of Soviet attacks on it, it
seems to be the major prod that got the Soviets
back to the negotiating table after they stalked
out in 1983.
At the same time, though, the Soviets are in-
sisting that no agreement on deep cuts in nu-
clear offensive weapons is possible unless the
United States gives up any notion of a space-
and land-based defense against Soviet intercon-
tinental missiles.
And what is the lesson of this?
To hard-liners in the Reagan administration
- primarily Pentagon civilians and Air Force
officers directing the SDI program - the Soviet
opposition proves that SDI is a good thing and
should at all costs be preserved intact. To
moderates in the administration, it shows that
SDI could be a valuable lever to extract - for
the first time in the nuclear age - major reduc-
tions in nuclear weapons rather than just ceil-
ings on huge existing arsenals.
To sort out the conflicting points of view, sev-
eral issues must be addressed:
? What SDI options are technically feasible?
? What would be the effect of each of these
on nuclear stockpiles and the threat of nuclear
holocaust?
? What policy alternatives - or what com-
binations of SDI and arms control - are there?
FeasMty
In the four decades of the nuclear era, no
physical "defense" against an enemy's attack
has thus far been possible, simply because of
the scale of nuclear blast. The 10 or 30 or even
50 percent attrition of enemy planes that was ef-
fective in halting air raids in World War II has
no meaning, when a leakage of even 1 percent of
10,000 strategic, nuclear warheads through to-
day's defense lines would bring the devastation
of 1, 000 Hiroshimas.
Thus, in the past four decades, prevention of
nuclear war - "deterrence" - has replaced
physical "defense" as the central military mis-
sion. And both sides' inhibitions against attack-
ing the enemy have rested precisely on the
knowledge that, since no defense is possible,
any attack. would call forth an intolerable
reprisal.
Will technological advances change this and
once again make physical defense conceivable?
Last fall's report on "Ballistic Missile De-
fense Technologies" by the Congressional Of-
fice of Technology Assessment (available for
$12 from the Superintendent of Documents, US
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402) tries to answer this question by assess-
ing four potential SDI programs. These range
from a modest protection of some land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles to a very am-
bitious defense of civilians in cities.
The last goal was what Mr. Reagan originally
envisioned in his speech launching SDI in
March 1983.
Administration spokesmen have since low-
ered their sights, however, and are now aiming
for a system that would be only partially effec-
tive: strategic defense combined with targeted
cuts of 50 percent in the superpowers' offensive
weapons. Such a combination could increase
Soviet uncertainty; it would not actually re-
pulse an.attack.
The OTA study says that the most modest
option that of defending some ICBMs - is
highly feasible "with technologies now fairly
ContinVd
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well understood." A middle goal of protecting i nub, even u we ui lust, an or as iruiu-uasea
all major military installations would be much missiles in a surprise attack, three-fourths of its
more demanding and would "require major arsenal would still survive on planes and sub-
technological advances." However, a defense marines to retaliate against the Soviet Union. If
"of all or nearly all US cities in the face of the Soviet Union lost all of its land-based mis-
unconstrained Soviet nuclear offensive forces siles in a surprise attack, however, only one-
... does not appear feasible." fourth of its arsenal would survive to retaliate.
In brief, the reasons for this judgment-run as Hence the Soviet objection that SDI threat a_
follows: ens to overthrow, at least temporarily, the roug4i.
A full defense is theoretically possible in strategic equality of the past decade and a half;
terms, of abstract physical laws - and even the and to restore the American superiority of the
needed gigantic "improvements in hardware late 1960s. At the November superpower sum-
performance" are conceivable. The likelihood is mit in Geneva, Communist Party General Sec-
remote, however, of designing the 21st-century retary Mikhail Gorbachev complained to
computer software that would be sufficiently Reagan that SDI, despite its billing as purely
fast, reliable, and survivable in a hostile envi- defensive, could be used for attack - and a few
ronment to command the complex "star wars" American scientists have in fact recently been
hardware - especially since the 10 million lines speculating about a future offensive capability
of program instructions could never be coher- of SDI space lasers to ignite fire storms on
ently tested and debugged prior to the ultimate earth.
test of Armageddon itself. In addition, the nec- More fundamentally, perhaps, Soviet spe-
essary space-based sensors and other compo- cialists have been complaining that a "leaky"
nents tend to be more vulnerable to attack and American strategic defense - the only feasible
countermeasures than are the missiles they version at this point - makes sense only as an
would be trying to hit. ominous guarantee of an American first strike.
Some SDI advocates fault the OTA study That is, a "leaky" American strategic defense
for being too skeptical of SDI. Some SDI crit- that could not possibly protect the US against a
ics, on the other hand, are far more mistrustful Soviet attack with all 10,000 warheads might
of official optimism about SDI feasibility than prove highly effective against only 2,500 resid-
is the OTA - especially in light of recent ual Soviet warheads after an American first
charges that key SDI tests have been contrived strike. Soviet retaliation - and Soviet ability to
to produce positive results. deter an initial American attack - would no
Impact of SDI on the nuclear standoff longer assured.
Rea 's long-term for SDI is to inau- SDI a enthusiasts would be quite happy with
goal this disparity. And they argue that a final equi-
gurate a new nuclear era in which "defense" librium in which both sides possessed extensive
would supplant "deterrence" to produce "as- strategic defense would also be satisfactory, be-
sured security" instead of "assured destruc- cause the two superpowers would then cancel
tion." But in the two decades or so that it will out each other's capabilities.
take to get from here to there, the stated Ameri- SDI critics, on the other hand, believe that
can policy is in fact to shore up "deterrence" this disparity would'make the nuclear balance
and rescue it from the uncertainty that befell it highly "unstable," especially in any crisis. The
in the 1980s, when fixed land-based missiles be- Soviets can be expected to imitate an American
came theoretically vulnerable to a "first strategic defense (probably with a lag of some
strike." five to eight years). The result, critics say,
Basically, the combination of multiple war- would be a leaky strategic defense on both sides
heads on a single launcher and new accuracies for another two decades or so. This balance
gave the giant Soviet SS-18s and other missiles
the capacity to destroy some 80 percent of would be highly "unstable," they believe, espe-
American ICBMs in any surprise attack ("first cially in any crisis. They reason that although
strike") in which the American missiles stay partial defenses on both sides could not ward
put in their silos for half an hour. This was what off an initial attack, whichever side shot first
the incoming Reagan administration decried as could ward off a weak "second strike" from
a "window of vulnerability." the enemy. Whoever waited to fire second
As the new, highly accurate American Tri- would suffer a disadvantage.
dent II and MX missiles now come on line, the Presumably neither side would be so rash as
Soviet Union in turn faces a "window of vulne'r- to gamble on a premeditated surprise attack -
ability." The US, too, is acquiring the theoreti- but each would worry that the other might
cal capacity to destroy Soviet land-based mis- launch a panicky preemptive attack. In a crisis
siles in a first strike - theoretical because in which confrontation was escalating, with
everything would have to work perfectly in a missiles poised, the pressures would be enor-
mass firing never before tested, and in polar mous to "`use 'em or lose 'em." Trigger fingers
trajectories never before tested. The prospect is would be itchy. The structure of the nuclear bal-
far more threatening to the Soviet Union in the ance - which once would have permitted delay
late 1980s than it was to the US in the early and allowed rational assessment of computer
'80s. The US has only a fourth of its strategic reports of an incoming attack - would increase
warheads in this vulnerable basing mode, but nervousness and compel an instant decision to
the Soviet Union has three-fourths of its strate- launch or not to launch.
gic warheads in this mode.
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based elements of an SDI battle management,
system were preprogrammed to react within
three to five minutes of even an ambiguous sig-
nal - as they would have to be if they were to
begin destroying enemy missiles in the crucial
initial boost phase. .
Thus, as the OTA study put it, "The motive
for a Soviet decision to escalate a crisis to a cen-
tral nuclear war might not be to gain a clear po-
litical or military objective: Instead, it may be
to reduce what they fear could be a severe loss.
In_ time of crisis we would not want the Soviet
leadership to calculate that its least bad option
was to start a nuclear war."
. The most ardent SDI enthusiasts dismiss
these concerns by arguing that American tech.
nological exuberance and. dynamism so far
outshine Soviet innovation that Washington
,can always stay ahead of Moscow and domi-
nate confrontations.
The arms control options
The spectrum of SDI and arms control
choices that now face the superpowers ranges
from unhindered strategic defense and no arms
control, a course American hard-liners could
support, to offensive arms limits but no strate-
gic defense whatever, the course Moscow cur-
rently espouses. In between are various poten-
tial trade-offs of mutual cuts in offensive
weapons against mutual restraints on strategic
defense.
? The first extreme - all SDI and no arms
control - is the probable result if the US con-
tinues to insist that SDI is non-negotiable. In
the most comprehensive unclassified study of
Soviet reactions to date (an Adelphi Paper of
the International Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies), Stephen Meyer of the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology argues that the Soviets will
never agree to deep offensive cuts unless SDI is
curtailed. This impasse would lead to open-
ended proliferation of offensive systems by
both sides as the cheapest and quickest foil to
the adversary's developing strategic defense.
Hard-liners would view such an outcome
with equanimity. They argue that the US would
win this race, since the US is almost twice as
rich and leads the Soviet Union in almost all
categories of technology important for nuclear
weapons and defense (according to Pentaton
listings).
The moderates in Washington - primarily
some activist ex-officials, the State Depart-
ment, and, on occasion, members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff - are far less convinced of this
scenario. They point to a Central Intelligence
Agency study indicating that the Soviet Union
would quickly outpace the US in unrestrained
production of missiles because of ready Soviet
assembly lines and the traditional Russian fe-
tish of quantity over a itv Political c ture,
too, would work against the US in an
unconstrained arms race, given Americans'
cyclical preference for butter over guns - and
the ability of the authoritarian Kremlin to im-
pose sacrifice on Soviet citizens.
in the defensive race that would accompany
the offensive race, virtually everyone agrees
considerable cost. Already $33 billion is being.
sought by the Reagan administration for pre- .
liminary research during the first six years of
SDI. The total price tag for a deployed system
is hard to tally, but some estimates run as high
as $1 trillion.
? The other. extreme - all arms control and
no strategic defense - is only a hypothetical al-
ternative. No one is advocating this within the
Reagan administration, not even moderates,
and no Western Kremlinologist believes this re-
presents anything other than a negotiating ploy
by Moscow, given the Soviets' own vigorous re-
search in strategic defense.
What some moderates in Washington do ad-
vocate, however - and what Soviet leaders
keep hinting at in public (though never in offi-
cial negotiations) is some trade-off of mutual
restraints on SDI for mutual deep cuts in offen-
sive nuclear weapons.
Moderates say this would make sense both
for arms control and for strategic defense -
since indications are that strategic defense
would prove effective only against a limited and
predictable number of warheads. As the OTA
study put it (citing Reagan administration con-
currence), "an all-out attack can be overcome
only if the attack is limited by restraints on the
quantity and quality of the attacking forces."
Washington is in fact proposing to Moscow
at this point that the two superpowers agree on
a mix of strategic defense and deep cuts (though
just how negotiable SDI might eventually be-
come is not yet clear). Various moderates argue
that a mix of warhead restraints and limited
SDI - probably confined to ICBM defense to
strengthen rather than undermine deterrence -
would be far more effective and cheaper in sta-
bilizing relations and preventing nuclear war
than an all-out race. They also contend that ver-
ification of arms control compliance could be
made reliable enough so that anything beyond
marginal cheating would be detected.
Hard-liners, by contrast, fear that any equal
limits on both the superpower arsenals would,
in practice, hobble Washington much more than
Moscow, since the closed Soviet society can
more easily cheat than can the US. If the cost of
agreed offensive cuts is mutual restraint on
SDI, then that cost is too high, they say.
As the OTA study concluded, the choices in
SDI and arms control require "a balance of op-
portunities against risks. The SDI offers an op-
portunity to substantially increase our nation's
safety if we obtain great technological success
and a substantial degree of Soviet coopera-
tion.... The SDI carries a risk [that it] could
bring on an offensive and defensive arms race
[and that] deployment, if it took place without
Soviet cooperation, could create severe
instabilities."
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