U.S. DENIES POLISH CLAIM IT ALLOWED SOLIDARITY ARRESTS BY KEEPING SILENT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000403590001-3
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 12, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 5, 1986
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000403590001-3.pdf86.94 KB
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403590001-3 WASHINGTON TIMES ON `-(A- 5 June 1986 U.S,, denies ' Polish clann it allowed Solidarity ' arrests by keeping sal By Bill Kritzberent TH NMSHINOTON TIME h to De artment yesterday dis- aim t at the Reagan admtntstration allowed the martial law su cession o f o i a t t to take niace by failing to advance information received frotc mith _CIA mole in Poland's army A State Department spokesman said the charges were "trumped-up" to divert blame from the real culprit, Poland. Polish spokesman Jerzy Urban told UPI and the Washington Post the spy had informed the United States about the martial law plan a month before it was imposed. Alerted by the mole's subse- quent disappearance, the Warsaw gov- ernment suspected that the Americans had advance knowledge and waited for them to divulge it, said Mr. Urban. But Washington never spoke up. Soli- darity was never alerted and thousands of its members were arrested the night martial law was imposed Dec. 13, 1981. Washington's decision to keep quiet about the plan "constituted a sort of reti- cent go-ahead on their part;' Mr. Urban told UPI. He said Washington knew the martial law plans by Nov 6 that year. A State Department spokesman re- tused comment on the story of the VIA mole, saying it was an "intelligence mat- tie said the United States " a ho definitive information" that martial law would be imposed. He called Mr. Urban's version "a self- serving attempt to lay the blame for mar- tial law in Poland somewhere else than where it belongs, that is with the Polish government." The spokesman also noted that Mr. Ur- ban's statement acknowledged "that the Polish authorities had laid plans for mar- tial law months in advance, compiling lists of the thousands of Solidarity lead- ers to be arrested. "He points out Soviet complicity in planning martial law. Such admissions are more damaging to the reputation of the Polish government than any trumped- up charges that Urban has leveled at the United States." The department statement, read by fused" months leading up to martial law , "We were well aware of the possibility of imposition of martial law, but had no de- finitive information as to whether or when such a step might actually be taken" In the absence of definitive word on what would happen, the statement said, "our objective was to convince the Polish government to work out a solution with Solidarity." "The United States was aware of the Polish situation;' Mr. Urban said in a tele- phone conversation with UPI referring to the possibility of Soviet intervention at the time to quash Solidarity. As Solidarity grew in strength through 1981, the Soviet Union had repeatedly warned of intervention to restore order in Poland, but Poland's own imposition of martial law warded off such a direct So- viet intervention. Mr. Urban named the CIA spy as U a ys s ~ for ----- .also L11 ICU the CIA plant-al s Co. a saw u to ski she was a "mo e" for t e Staff Mr. Urban said Mr. Kuklinski had "dis- appeared" from Warsaw by the time se- curity services became suspicious. His home and the farms of his two sons were deserted and the whole family had left the country by Nov 6, 1981. Mr. Urban said that when the Kuklin- skis were withdrawn from Poland, the authorities thought the Americans would announce he had gone to the United States and that they would announce the plans and warn Solidarity and the Catholic Church. "That of course would have made the imposition of martial law impossible;' Mr. Urban said. "We waited and waited, and they never announced the plans. We then came to the conclusion that they decided to be dis- creet. "Owing to this, we were able to impose martial law," he said. Asked whether he meant the U.S. gov- ernment had indirectly helped the Polish government impose martial law, Mr. Ur- ban replied, "I would say it was a sort of a reticent permission on their part. "Later we listened with surprise to the voices of condemnation and everything that followed in the U.S. reaction." Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403590001-3