STRUGGLE FOR NICARAGUA: ESCALATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 10, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760018-7
-;`^l .E APPEARED N
A
JOSEPH C. HARSCH
Struggle for Nicaragua: escalation
ACCORDING to the back files of the Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
there were 200 Cuban soldiers deployed in
Nicaragua in 1981 when Ronald Reagan came to
Washington and took over American foreign policy.
The number went to 1,000 in 1983 and then to
3, 000 in 1984. The latest edition of the annual IISS
report on "The Military Balance" again carries the
figure of 3.000.
In other words, the presence of Cuban troops in
Nicaragua in support of the present Sandinista gov-
ernment of Nicaragua is not new But it climbed as
the Reagan administration in Washington organized
and deployed a counterrevolutionary force against
that Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
There was a flurry of excitement in Washington
last week over those Cuban troops in Nicaragua.
United States Assistant Secretary of State Elliott
Abrams, testifying before a congressional committee
on Dec. 5, said that the Cubans were, and had been
for some time, taking part in combat. Surprisingly,
he used the figure of 2,500 for Cubans in Nicaragua.
Normally in such matters, United States government
officials use the highest figure available, particularly
when they want more money from Congress.
The flurry of renewed interest in the story of the
United States vs. Nicaragua had started earlier in
the week, on Monday, Dec. 2, when the US-backed
rebels, or "contras," successfully shot down a So-
viet-built helicopter. The contras used a Soviet-built
SA-7 guided missile for the shooting.
aircraft weapon. It has been deployed for over 10
years. It is widely used in the armed forces of theSo-
viet Union and its clients worldwide. Apparently it
can be bought on the open market. The story offered
in Washington of how the contras obtained a Soviet-
built SA-7 is that it was probably bought in
Portugal.
The use of the SA-7 by the contras was appar-
ently a shock to the Nicaraguans. Nicaraguan Presi-
dent Daniel Ortega Saavedra promptly denounced it
as an act of "escalation."
That takes us back a ways. There has been steady
escalation in and around Nicaragua for some time. It
began with the 1981 decision of the Reagan adminis-
tration to organize and mount an anti-Sandinista
force. Deployment of that force in Honduras began
in 1982. It reached its peak of effectiveness in mid-
summer of 1984. At that time, contra raids pene-
trated within some 40 miles of the capital.
That phase of contra activity had been made pos-
sible by light planes capable of supplying the rebels
well inside Nicaragua. They could, with supply by
air, stay "inside" for days, even weeks at a time. But
in war there is often a new answer to a new move.
The Soviet SA-7 is a lightweight hand-held anti-
The United States supplied the supply planes to
the contras. The Soviets responded by sending heli-
copter gunships to the Sandinistas. Those gunships
put the contras into a winter lull. Their supply
planes fell easy victim to the Sandinista gunships.
The contras have had a quiet season in which to
regroup.
They were revived when Congress reluctantly au-
thorized $27 million for "humanitarian" help. How
"humanitarian" help got translated into Soviet SA-7
weapons is a story that lies hidden in that realm of
action called covert in the current jargon of Washing-
ton. But obviously the SA-7s are an answer to the
gunships.
So there has been steady escalation back and
forth ever since 1982. The United States built the
contra force. The Cubans sent 3, 000 soldiers to help
the Nicaraguans. The United States provided the
contras with the capability of supply by air. The So-
viets answered with gunships. The contras got
SA-7s.
Where does it lead? US Secretary of State George
P Shultz has gone off on a trip to Europe, leaving be-
hind a hint that he might come back and ask Con-
gress to provide overt United States military aid to
the contras on the ground that the Cubans have es-
calated their role-by going into combat with the
Nicaraguans.
It begins to look as though the Sandinista regime
in Nicaragua can be brought down only by actual
overt use of US troops. So long as United States aid
is supposedly "clandestine" and "covert," it is pos-
sibie for Moscow and Havana to countermove by a
new move.
At some point, Mr. Reagan will probably either
have to give up in Nicaragua or send in the United
States Marines, plus a big chunk of the United
States Army. The Sandinistas now have about
60,000 men under arms, with steadily improving
training and equipment.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760018-7