C.I.A. NOMINEE TIED TO '85 MEMO URGING IRAN ARMS DEALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 23, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820022-8
as "a __ n I
C.I.A. NOMINEE TIED
TO'85 MEMO URGING
IRAN ARMS DEALS
STAT
By STEPHEN ENGELBE
The New York Times
ASHINGTON, Feb. 22 - RoT be-rt M.
s, the nominee to be Director of
STAT
Central Intelligence, agreed to send the
White House a memo in 1985 that fa-
vored arms dealings with Iran, even
though he knew its reasoning was at
odds with conclusions reached by his
analysts at the Central Intelligence
Agency, intelligence sources said to-
day.
The memo was sent out with the sig-
STAT nature of William J. Casey, then the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence. But the
sources said Mr. Gates, as chairman of
the agency's National Intelligence
Council, had played a direct role in the
decision to circulate the memo within
the Government.
One source said the agency had been
repeatedly asked by the White House in
recent years whether the Soviet Union
was making greater inroads in Iran
and had said this was not true.
STAT
STAT
r analyst, suggested that the United
States should permit Western allies to
Written as 'Think Piece'
But the 1985 memo, written as a
think piece" by Graham Fullor_ a sen-
sell arms to Iran as a means of enhanc-
ing Western influence and blocking the
efforts of the Soviet Union.
The memo led to the first National
Security Council planning for dealings
with the revolutionary authorities in
Iran, even though the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee report said the docu-
ment was rejected as "perverse" by
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
and "absurd" by Secretary of Defense
Caspar W. Weinberger.
It was not clear what motivated Mr.
Gates to send the Fuller memo to the
White House, although former senior
intelligence officials said it was not un-
usual for views at odds with the consen-
sus opinion to be circulated.
Motivation Is Questioned
One source contended that Mr. Gates
had sent the Fuller memo to the White
House as a means of winning political
avor with senior officials.
But Kathy Pherson, a C.I.A. swkees-
man, said it was "absurd" to suggest
Mr. Gates had forwarded the memo to
the White House for political pur er.
"It's. our job to pas& on different
points of views to l~ icv_ mgkeers..'_ she
said. "To say this memo was sent to
NEW YORK TIMES
23 February 1987
She added that such memos were
clearly identified as one person's opin-
ion and not the conclusions of the C.I.A.
The issue of how Mr. Gates handled
the memo is significant because mem-
bers of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee, which is considering whether to
confirm Mr. Gates as Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, have publicly ques
tioned whether he is sufficiently inde-
pendent.
At the confirmation hearing last
week, Mr. Gates was questioned about
the Fuller memo, and asked why its
reasoning appeared to closely resem-
ble a paper provided to the National Se-
curity Council by Adrian M. Khashoggi,
a Saudi arms dealer who was later a
1 prominent figure in the American
arms dealings with Teheran.
Mr. Gates told the Senate committee
that he had not seen the Khashoggi
document. He also said the agency en-
couraged senior analysts, or national
intelligence officers, to write "think
pieces" that countered accepted views.
National intelligence officers like
Mr. Fuller make up the National Intel-
)igence Council. At the time, Mr. Gates
,was both its chairman and the C.I.A.'s
chief of analysts in his position as
deputy director for intelligence, and he
was thus directly familiar with the
views of other agency analysts about
Iran.
One source said the decision to circu-
te particular "think pieces" through
the Government was routinely made
by Mr. Gates, although other sources
said Mr. Casey sometimes also did so
on his own.
The issue of Mr. Gates's willingness
to contradict more senior officials was
raised repeatedly in his confirmation
hearings, mostly in the context of
whether he should have notified Con-
gress about suspected irregularities in
the Iran operation.
At one point in the tense sessions, Mr.
Gates insisted that he was not a "syco-
phant" and that his candid advice, not
a propensity to please his superiors,
was the reason for his rapid rise in the
C.I.A.
Several members of the Senate Intel-
ligence Committee, who asked not to be
identified, said in interviews that they
had questions about Mr. Gates's inde-
pendence.
While no members of the committee
were prepared to say that the nomina-
tion of Mr. Gates was in trouble, both
Republican and Democratic sources on
the committee suggested that the issue
had caused considerable disquiet
among members of the panel. The
members are also concerned that they
might confirm Mr. Gates and then
learn that his role in the Iran-contra af-
fair was larger than he has acknowl-
edged.
Robert C. Byrd, the Senate majority
leader, who is a member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, said in an in-
terview, "The Administration should
not have sent up someone so close to
this situation in the first place."
"He's probably quite capable and all
that, but having been in the No. 2 posi
tion at the agency in the last year pu
him under a cloud," said B r
a West Virginia Democrat. " t pu
every member of the Senate in a diffi-
cult situation. We don't know what the
facts are and won't know when we
vote."
The committee plans to hold a closed
session to interview Mr. Gates further,
and some members said another open
hearing on the nomination might be
scheduled. The committee has delayed
its vote until after the Presidential
commission examining the National
Security Council issues its report on
Thursday.
The New York rimes
Robert M. Gates
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820022-8