FLAWS SEEN IN GRENADA INVASION - REPORT SAYS FIELD DECISIONS PREVENTED DISASTERS IN NICK OF TIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807470047-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: March 12, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807470047-8
WASHINGTON POST
12 March 1985
ARTICL$
ON PAGE-~,
Flaws Seen in Grenada Invasion
Report Says Field Decisions Prevented Disasters in Nick of Time
By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Grenada invasion was far
from the well-oiled operation adver-
tised at the time but was frequently
saved from disaster by last-minute
decisions of commanders in the
field, including one that kept the
Marines from blowing up the Vene-
zuelan Embassy.
The picture of troops feeling
their way into hostile territory
without the benefit of maps, accu-
rate intelligence, functional radios
or protective artillery emerges
strongly from a Marine after-action
report obtained under a Freedom of
Information Act request.
In separate interviews, officers
involved in the Grenada operation
underscored the lack of preparation
and said casualties would have been
much higher than the toll of 19
killed and 115 wounded had it not
been for the ability of some officers
on the ground and plain luck.
A big 1gsson of Grenada, accord-
ing to the written reports and high-
ranking ifficials interviewed, is that
the world's least developed nations
can obtain enough modern weapons
to down helicopters. Therefore,
sending helicopters into hostile ar-
eas without first suppressing de-
fenses can be disastrous.
In the Grenada invasion, which
started Oct. 25, 1983, the Marines
lost three helicopters, two Cobra
gunships and a CH46E, to enemy
fire. The Army lost one Blackhawk
troop-helicopter and had five others
damaged, four seriously.
A high-ranking Navy officer on
the scene said the guns on Navy
ships standing off Grenada should
have been used to suppress enemy
fire before Army Blackhawk heli-
copters were sent in and before
Army Rangers parachuted onto the
the Point Salines airfield. The Army
Rangers jumped from 500 feet,
missing antiaircraft fire that Cubans
had set for targets at 800 feet, of-
ficials said. The Rangers then ran
into into heavy fire and armored
vehicles on the ground.
Under the battle plan, code-
named Operation Fury, the Marines
were to secure the northern half of
Grenada and the Army the southern,
half, with Air Force support. High-
ranking critics said the Grenada
operation would have been much
smoother had only the Navy and
Marines been involved rather than
making it the kind of four-service
enterprise that also complicated the
unsuccessful 1980 attempt to res-
cue American hostages from Teh-
ran.
"The wisdom is that everything
has to be a four-service show," one
top official said.
The Marine after-action report,
obtained in the form of an unclas-
sified report sent to Marine com-
mands, documents how the 22nd
Marine Amphibious Unit was
caught by surprise as it was or-
dered to reverse course from Leb-
anon to Grenada. But it improvised
on. the ground to solve problems
and avoid disaster.
The report states that charts of
Grenada were "ungridded, small-
scale or very outdated .... The
original plan for the assault at
Pearls airfield was to land one com-
pany by helicopter directly on the
runway to achieve maximum shock
effect .... Reasoning that an as-
sault directly onto the runway could
result in disaster if the airfield was
heavily defended by enemy troops
or protected by antiaircraft artillery
sites, the decision was made to uti-
lize another landing zone approx-
imately 700 to 800 meters south-
east of the Pearls airstrip. As it
turned out, the airfield was pro-
tected by light AAA [antiaircraft-
artillery.]"
The two Marine assault compa-
nies climbed into helicopters aboard
the USS Guam and flew toward
their landing zone in the pre-dawn
dark of the 1983 D-Day, to land on
what the charts and maps showed
as a smooth race track.
"But when the helicopters
dropped toward the landing zone,
they encountered tali palm trees
and unexpectedly high scrub
brush," the report states. Pilots
wearing special glasses that en-
hance night vision found a flat spot
and landed the first Marines there.
Just as the Marines who secured
the Pearls airfield were handi-
capped by inaccurate maps ano
charts, the ones flown toward Gren-
ville to the south found that the
landing zone chosen from the maps
was unusable. The helicopter com-
mander made a quick change and
landed on a soccer field in the mid-
dle of the town without drawing
fire.
1NW
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807470047-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807470047-8
"Throughout D-Day," states the
report, the Marine battalion land-
ing-team commander on shore "was
restricted in the command and con-
trol of his remaining unlanded as-
sets" still on the ships offshore ,be-
cause he was not able to maintain
adequate communications with
them" by radio.
Two days after D-Day, Marines
looked for armed Cubans believed
to be in the St. George's area of
Grenada. For lack of hard int ni_
ence on the Cubans' wherea
a Manne commander looked with
suspicion on Fort Adolohuc hero Je
it was flvii an "unknwn tvue" of
flag.
The company commander con-
sidered using preparation fires to
soften what he believed to be a pos-
sible Cuban stronghold," the report
said. "This consideration was re-
versed and prep fires were not
used. This decision not to precede
the attack with preparation fires
was sound because, as it turned out,
Fort Adolphus was the Venezuelan'
Embassy."
The report said the Cuban com-
mander was not incompetent, but
had not had time to prepare his de-
fenses before the United States in-
vaded the island and thus, with mi-
nor exceptions; "was forced to con-
duct a purely static defense. Given
more time, the enemy would have
been much better prepared."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807470047-8