SANDINISTAS PREPARING FOR A BIGGER WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 16, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430003-6
. r r " "'.P? 'QED
LOS ANGELES i INES
16 December 1986
Contras No Match for Them, Analysts Say
Sandinistas Preparing for a Bigger War
By MARJORIE MILLER, Times Staff Writer
MANAGUA, Nicaragua-The
signs of preparation are every-
where:
-At a training camp near Mana-
gua. 800 new army reservists
kicked up clouds of dust, marching
on a sun-scorched field. The men,
some middle-aged with thickening
girths. practiced awkwardly with
82-millimeter mortars. "Every day
we are more qualified to overthrow
imperialism," said Jose Espinoza,
34.
-To the north, in the rich farm
countryside of northern Esteli
province, a few dozen peasants
lugging AK-47 rifles dug latrines
and hammered houses for the co-
operative they were building in the
war-battered region. "We are here
to produce as well as to defend."
said Froylan Cruz Reyes, 50.
-At the 25th-anniversary cele-
bration of the Sandinista National
Liberation Front, the front's nine
commanders reviewed the Sovi-
et-built tanks, trucks, artillery and
helicopters that rolled by. About
7,000 troops, militia and reserves
marched past a crowd of thousands
that chanted a revolutionary slo-
gan: "A free fatherland, or death!"
For months, the Nicaraguan
government has been preparing
politically and militarily for a
,d-up .var ?.~ith the contras,
th _.S.-'hacked :nsurgents fight-
.ng the Sandinistas :ri the country-
side. Army reserves, farm coopera-
tives and a growing arsenal are all
part of the Sandinistas' readiness
campaign.
"They are like a runner on his
mark at the starting line of a race."
a European diplomat said.
American officials in Washing-
ton use similar imagery to describe
the contras. likening them to "a
coiled spring" about to be released
by $100 million in U.S. military aid
and training by U.S. Special Forc-
es. Under the direction of the CIA.
the contras plan to broaden their
guerrilla ?.var to overthrow the
Marxist-led Sandinistas.
But Western military analysts
and military officers say that while
the contras undoubtedly will make
more war with their added re-
sources, they are not a match for
the Sandinista Popular Army.
Since the last time the CIA ran
contras operations in 1984, the
Sandinista army has grown in size
and strength and improved -its
mobility, firepower and intelli-
gence capabilities to fight a con-
ventional war as well as a guerrilla
war. Through the army and civilian
mass organizations, the Sandinistas
have developed a militant political
base, with tens of thousands of
supporters determined to defend
the seven-year-old revolutionary
regime.
It is difficult to quantify political
support for the Sandinistas. Opin-
ion polls are not allowed here, and
many opposition figures have left
the country. Certainly the revolu-
tionary government has lost its
glow and promise for many since
1979, when the Sandinistas spear-
headed a popular uprising to oust
dictator Anastasio Somoza and end
more than four decades of rule here
by the Somoza family.
Many Nicaraguans are dissatis-
fied with the Sandinistas' leftist
politics, bureaucracy and state-
controlled economy. Particularly
here in the capital, complaints
about inflation and scarcity are
widespread.
The contras say that the extent
of anti-Sandinista sentiment is
kept hidden because of repression.
They say Sandinista army deser-
tions are high. They and some of
their backers believe that if the
insurgents begin to show success
on the battlefield. they can create a
"bandwagon effect." drawing po-
litical support from civilians.
Included in the new U.S. -contras
program is a 50,000-watt rebel
radio station that sources say will
be based in El Salvador to carry the
contras' message to ordinary Nica-
raguans.
Return to the Past
But discontent with the Sandin-
istas does not necessarily translate
into support for the contras, whom
many view as a return to the past.
Members of Somoza's old National
Guard figure prominently among
the contras' military leaders.
Among their financial backers are
members of the old oligarchy and
onetime major landowners.
Some analysts say that the ex-
tensive Sandinista intelligence net-
work, together with the contras'
lack of a clear political program.
will stymie the rebels' progress.
"The [contras'] principal limita-
tion is their incapacity to create an
internal front to gain the necessary
support within the towns in the
areas where they operate, this
being a vital factor in a guerrilla
war to operate effectively in cells
or small independent units." one
Latin American diplomat reported
to his government.
"Because of a lack of doctrine,
they lack true motivation, which
influences their moral and combat
abi. , v." he wrote.
Two-thirds of Nicaragua's esti-
mated 3 million people live in the
countryside and provincial cities.
Early in their regime, the Sandinis-
tas angered many independent
peasants by imposing price controls
and forcing them to sell their
produce to state agencies. They
introduced collective farming-a
foreign concept that many viewed
with hostility-and in 1984 some of
these farmers provided food and
cover for contras operating in the
mountainous northern provinces.
But in the last two years, the
Sandinistas have forcibly relocated
tens of thousands of peasants from
the area, isolating the contras from
their potential social base and re-
ducing their logistical support. Last
spring, the Sandinistas arrested
dozens of opposition political party
workers on charges of aiding the
contras, sending a clear message to
others who might consider helping
the rebels.
Meanwhile, new collective
farms, such as La Union in Esteli.
have been built by Sandinista sup-
porters; on these farms, peasants
are armed with rifles as well as
hoes.
Many farmers have been won
over to the Sandinista side-or at
least wooed away from the con-
tras-with an ambitious agrarian
reform program. Agriculture and
Agrarian Reform Minister Jaime
Wheelock says that the govern-
ment has distributed 4.6 million
acres to 9,700 families.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430003-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430003-6
And while the government still
prefers collective farming, Whee-
lock says "the tendency is to hand
over land to individual farmers"-
the way the farmers prefer to
work.
"They have changed the whole
land tenure system of the country,"
a Western diplomat said.
"The Sandinistas can go out to
the farmers and say, 'You may hate
or love us, but do you want the
contras to come and bring all of the
landowners back from Miami, or do
you want to keep what we've given
you?' It's a very powerful tool," he
said.
The government also sends
Peace Corps-style Sandinista work
brigades into the countryside to
build warehouses and breed politi-
cal good will. The contras, mean-
while, risk losing support in the
countryside by using land mines
that have killed or wounded scores
of civilians this year.
One issue that has pushed hun-
dreds and possibly thousands of
farmers into the ranks of the
contras is Nicaragua's conscription
into the armed forces of young men
17 and older. Many still leave the
country to avoid the two-year
military service, but the Sandinis-
tas have taken steps to lessen the
blow of the draft.
The Sandinista newspaper Barri-
cada widely publicizes the return of
soldiers at the end of their tours of
duty. "They Wert and They Con-
quered," said a recent headline
when 300 draftees were released
from service T'-e m.vntten mes-
;ago Your boy; viii come home.
.".li.:,g w,th full-page ads an-
no.:n-ir.g draft registration, the
ne.-papers run ads for the Sandin-
ista eauivalent of the GI Bill.
oifecng benefits to about 8,000
veterans.
Defense Minister Humberto Or-
tega said in i recent interview
ptJblished here that nearly 300,000
Nicaraguans are under arms in the
army, reserves and militia. Military
observers say the true figure is
about half that.
"What we have are thousands of
men in their territory, in their
cooperative, in their militia, in the
reserve-organized," Ortega told a
Mexican television reporter. "This
is the capacity (we have] to domi-
nate our topography, our cities, our
towns. to defend them from an
aggressor."
The backbone of the army's
counterinsurgency campaign is 12
to 15 Irregular Warfare Battalions,
led by experienced army regulars
and filled with draftees, many of
whom have been replaced in the
last five months.
"When the contras hit them,
they will be replenished units with
combat experience, without turn-
over problems in the middle of a
contra offensive," said a military
analyst.
Commander Enrique Bermudez
of the Nicaraguan Democratic
Force, the largest contras organi-
zation, said the Sandinista army
has a morale problem because
recruits are pressured to join.
When the war picks up, so will
draft evasion and desertions, he
recently predicted.
In the last year, the Sandinistas
have increasingly called up 25- to
40-year-olds for 30 to 45 days of
reserve training. The men, as well
as some women volunteers, are
organized into reserve battalions
and trained to use rifles and artil-
lery to defend the cities against an
attack.
Like the army. the reserve train-
ing includes political education.
Each night after dinner. the re-
servists hear a 10-minute lecture
on topics from agrarian reform to
the constitution.
"We let them know the historic
values of the revolution and how
the Sandinista Front won the right
to be the vanguard of the revolu-
tion," said Lt. Rolando Lopez. di-
rector of the Pancasan Military
Training Center.
The military, which eats up
nearly half of Nicaragua's national
budget, is a huge strain on an
economy squeezed by mismanage-
ment, regional economic problems
and a U.S. embargo. Agriculture
Minister Wheelock says that
200,000 men and women work for
the military rather than in produc-
tive jobs, and he puts the total cost
of the war at almost $2.4 billion.
The economy is one of the San-
dinistas' more vulnerable points,
and the contras hope to exploit it,
forcing further military spending
and zeroing in on economic targets
such as farm cooperatives.
Last June and July, the economy
hit an all-time low, with soaring
inflation and most basic foods in
scarce supply. The government,
well aware of rising public anger
and even hunger. reallocated some
export crops for internal consump-
tion, and, diplomats say. the Soviet
Union and other countries stepped
in with food donations.
Now there is more food in the
nsarkets, and lines for many items
l$ve disappeared, although infla-
tion continues to be a serious
problem.
'Ortega acknowledges that the
country is vulnerable to military
al cults on economic targets such
ai the country's oil pipeline off-
shore at Puerto Sandino, the oil
refinery on the outskirts of Mana-
a. the port of Corinto on the
Pacific Coast, bridges and energy
pylons.
Analysts who monitor the con-
tras say the rebels currently do not
have the ability to carry out such
commando raids, although they
Could be trained to do so.
To show their might. the contras
must increase their presence in
Kkaragua with more ambushes
*d attacks on military and politi-
ait targets such as the Sandinista
?'runt offices and state security
stations. They must broaden their
leas of operation, occupy a town,
ditribute propaganda and leave
'affiti, cut a strategic road or
winch a spectacular raid. analysts
sue. And, they say, the rebels must
also reduce the number of civilian
casualties they cause.
A Different Strategy
Some strategists would like to
see the contras take territory, most
likely in the north or along the
Atlantic Coast, to install a provi-
sional government that would al-
low the Reagan Administration to
break diplomatic relations with the
Sandinistas and officially recognize
the contras.
"I wouldn't ignore that possibili-
ty, but right now I wouldn't give it
more than a 20% chance." a West-
ern diplomat said.
The towns most often mentioned
as likely targets are Jalapa or
Ocotal in the northern province of
Nueva Segovia and Puerto Cabezas
on the Atlantic.
The contras are up against an
army that can mobilize much more
quickly than it could in 1984, using
East German Ifa trucks and about
34 Soviet MI-8 and MI- 17 transport
helicopters, according to Pentagon
figures. The Sandinistas also have
10 to 15 MI-24 armored helicopter
gunships.
Although the Sandinistas are
said to have a shortage of trained
pilots and problems with ground-
to-air communications that have
resulted in the shooting down of
their own aircraft, the Soviet-sup-
plied helicopters have been as
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430003-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0504430003-6
important to the Sandinista army
as American-supplied helicopters
are to El Salvador's armed forces.
In both countries, the helicopters
have given the army the advantage
of mobility, medical evacuation and
firepower.
In the last two years, the Sandin-
istas also have developed thorough
military and urban intelligence.
The Interior Ministry, which over-
sees state security, has uncovered
CIA agents and several attempts to
set up an internal front. The army
has infiltrated contras units and
regularly intercepts contras com -
munications-a practice the CIA
hopes to end with computer-coded
radios.
"Secure communications- that
is one of the biggest things the CIA
can do for the contras," said a
Western diplomat.
Sampling of Artillery
At the Nov. 8 anniversary cele-
bration of the Sandinista Front's
founding, the army paraded a sam-
pling of its artillery, which analysts
say was used effectively in six days
of bloody combat in late October.
According to the analysts, at least
70 people were killed and 350 were
wounded in fighting that took place
across the border in Honduras.
More and more, the Sandinistas
have been fighting the contras near
the rebels' base camps in Honduras
in an effort to keep them from
penetrating into the interior of
Nicaragua and to try to prevent
them from resupplying their men
already inside this country.
Ten days ago, the fighting flared
into a border battle between Hon-
duras and Nicaragua, with Nicara-
gua attacking Honduran army out-
posts and Honduran planes
bombing military installations up to
16 miles inside Nicaragua.
The jungles of Nicaragua's fron-
tiers, along Honduras to the north
and Costa Rica to the south, pro-
vide good cover for guerrillas,
something the Sandinistas them-
selves took advantage of in their
fight against Somoaa.
The Sandinistas contend that
there are fewer than 6,000 armed
contras and that only 2,400 of those
are inside Nicaragua-1,500 of
them in the Jorge Salazar Front in
central Boaco, Chontales and Ze-
laya provinces. The contras say
they have 5,000 men in the Jorge
Salazar Front and a total of 18,000
armed rebels.
The Sandinistas also are trying
to stop the contras from supplying
their.forces in central Nicaragua by
air. On display at the military
parade were SAM-7 ground-to-air
missiles like the one used in early
October to bring down an Ameri-
can-piloted transport plane that
was carrying arms and ammunition
to the contras.
The Sandinistas were reported tc
have acquired more powerful an-
ti-aircraft missiles, but they have
not been shown publicly. Pentagon
spokesman Robert Simons said last
month that "there are indications"
that the Sandinistas now are oper-
ating SAM-14 ground-to-air mis-
siles, which have a range of 14.000
feet.
Military analysts say that the
downing of a C-123 transport plane'
Oct. 5 hampered supply flights, but
the CIA is expected to furnish the
contras with larger planes.
equipped with electronic devices to
confuse radar and heat-seeking
missiles.
Risk of Confrontation
In focusing their fighting on the
border, the Sandinistas not only
risk further confrontations with
Honduras but also the possibility of
giving the Reagan Administration
a pretext for escalated U.S. in-
volvement in the war. If the con-
tras prove unable to threaten the
Sandinistas militarily, even with
extensive U.S. aid and training, the
Administration will be left with
two options-to negotiate with the
government or to intervene.
The Sandinistas have long be-
lieved that direct U.S. intervention
here is inevitable, either in the
form of air strikes or the sending of
U.S. troops. They believe that
Honduras has relinquished sover-
eignty over its southern border
area, leaving the zone to the con-
tras and, thus, open to attack. But
should the Reagan Administration
opt for intervention, officials could
invoke regional treaties to defend
Honduras against attack.
Diplomatic sources in the region
speculate that any decision by the
United States to intervene would
not be made for at least a year, or
until it becomes clear how the
contras will manage with their new
aid.
Analysts say that if they were to
conduct an air strike, the Ameri-
cans would probably lose some
aircraft but would likely achieve
their military objective. Nicaragua
has no intercept aircraft, and the
Reagan Administration has threat-
ened to destroy any advanced
combat jets delivered to Nicaragua.
A site often mentioned here as a
likely target for any possible air
strike is the Punta Huete military
air strip on the northeastern edge
of Lake Managua.
Analysts, however, agree with
the Sandinistas when they say that
the nationalistic Nicaraguans
would fight fiercely against any
invasion by U.S. ground troops.
"We have a strategy of active
resistance to confront a Yankee
intervention-not of a classic war
of positions, not a conventional war
in a battle of Waterloo, where
logically we would lose to the
enormous material power of the
United States-but we would act in
undefined lines, in an irregular war
of active movements, in a war of
mosquitoes, continuously bleeding
the invader," Ortega said.
The army, reserves, militia and
armed farmers all would be called
out for such a war to protect the
cities as well as the countryside.
"In an urban war around Mana-
gua," said a European diplomat, "it
would be a dogfight between the
Marines and secondary school stu-
dents."
Even one of the Indian contras
leaders, Brooklyn Rivera, said in an
interview that despite his dislike of
the Sandinistas, he and his Misr.
asata rebels would fight against
American intervention.
Veterans of the guerrilla war jug,
released from the army said that
they, too, would be willing to fight
again in can of any direct U.&
intervention.
"We served and we will keep on
serving," said Isidro Mejda, 23, on
the day of his release. "The strug-
gle is not over. In the motmtains or
in the city, we are ready."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0504430003-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430003-6
&Ar
Concentrations of contra
troops of the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force.
Lake
Managua
PUNTA
HUETE
AIRSTRIP
Managua 4
L MANAGUA
AIRPORT
Bases for Sandinista
troops.
Bases for Soviet-made
MI-24 helicopter
gunships.
CHONTALES
/ PROV /
// / / /
San
Carlos
,Puerto'
Cabezas
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430003-6