ARGENTINA LINKED TO RISE IN COVERT U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST SANDINISTAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880099-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 99
• Publication Date: April 8, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0504880099-0
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STAT
8 APFTL 1983
Argentina Linked to Rise in Covert .. coons
Against Saridinists
goal never hidden, was to entice
His ,
maia. Beginning last 'fall, the officials
said. United States dollars, personnel the former Sandinist commander Eden
and direction were added, first to sus- pastora G6mez to lead the guerrillas in ;
By LESLIE H. GELB
Spe alwTheNewYes!Timex
WASHINGTON, April 7 - United
States involvement in'covert guerrilla
activities against Nicaragua increased
sharply last year after Argentina
'largely halted its assistance to the
rebels, according to Administration of-
ficials. The Argentine move. was in
reaction to president Reagan's support
for Britain in the Falkland war, the offi-
cials said.
Until the early months of 1982, the of-
ficias said, Argentina had primary re-!
sporsibility for financing and training
the antiSandinist guerrillas to inter-
cept military supplies going through
*Cicaragua to El Salvador and Guate-
to s goj,_ of tntercep g cAnve~vCUC to run the opera-!
l: ritev States was thus brought into a "It was
potential direct con ontation with tions through the Argentinians," a high-
Nic`ragua. I ranking intelligence agency official
To prevent precisely this outcome, said. "We didn't have to ask questions
the officials said, a number of Adminis- about their goals that we couldn't es-
tration members had fought hard burin cape asking about our own goals when
vain to persuade Mr. Reagan not to side we took over."
openly with Britain against Argentina. In 1979 and 1980, the Carter Adminis-
Ar gentina attacked the Falkland Is-, tration had undertaken to expand
is^ds on April 2. 1982, and surrendered American intelligence collection activi-
or aria 1L. ties in Central America and to provide
Complicated and Confusing funds and other support to anti-Govern- i
The Administration officials related merit, democratic individuals and
these details over the past few days in groups in Nicaragua. By this time, rein-
bons had
at. effort to show there was no deliber- already begun to cool between
Washington and the Sandinists, whom
ate effort within violate the the law Reagan barring ic ac- - President Carter had backed in the
tons to to rnm ant of. closing days of their revolution against
Nicaragua, oesas some as sowCongressional the Goveernme crit- i the long-time dictator 'Anastasio
! Somoza Debayle.
icr have suggested. On March 9, 1981, President Reagan
The officials described complicated was said to have reaffirmed these cov-
than and often three years of years of c cover-Lrt American erican mom, ert programs and to have taken an im-
? tons in Nicaragua and against its Gov- portant step beyond them, authorizing,
ernment. the-start of covert military action to in-
T he centerpiece, the officials said, tercept arms supplies moving through be- Nicaragua to El Salvador and Guate-
Administration out and d main The budget for these efforts was
was tweenan the Reagan g arrangement
weset at S19.5 million.
the Argentine ruling junta led by Presk- Against the backdrop of what officials
dent , Argentina aid they saw as a stalemated situation
Under the do pact, Arwould bsI '
responsible, with some American funds I at best, but more likely a deteriorating
=s a result, the officials said, the
United States found itself providing din-
rect aid to a guerrilla operation whose
- the overthrow of the Sandinist
Gnverrsnent - wit beyond Washing-
arms The
tam the interdiction operations and
late- to expand them.
en senor
advis-
ers met on Nov. 16, 1981. Mr. Reagan
adopted a 10-point program, later to be
embodied in National Security Decision
Document 17. It called, in general. jar
increasing economic and military aid to
the region.
&Caoeession to wig
The doceme>it also .approved the
development of contingency .plans to
deal with "Unacceptable military Ac,
'bons" by Cuba. This was described as a
nominal 'cession to Secretary of
State Alexander M. Haig-Jr. -
Mr. Haig had proposed going further
and taking unspecified actions against
Cuba, which he termed "the source" of
trouble in Central America.
But the 10-point program, the of5-
cials said, also called for issuing a '?
"finding" to Congressional intelligence
committees notifying them of plans to
step up covert intelligence actions in
the region. Such a finding, or document,
is required by law and gives Congress
an opportunity to raise obiections.
When the finding was submitted in
December, several members of the in-
telligence committees were said to
question whether the coven operations
could be limited to interdiction of arms
supplies or might evolve into a broader
i campaign against the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment.
The finding granted the C.I.A. broad
authority.tosupport and conduct "poiit-
icai and paramilitary operations
against Cubans and Cuban supply
lines" in Nicaragua and elsewhere in
Central America. The' C.I.A. was also
empowered to wort: with other ggveri-
menu. The other Governments mainly
involved were Argentina and Honduras,
although Venezuela and Colombia
showed interest as well.
Restrictions on Spending
Under the finding, the C.I.A. was a]-
lowed to spend $19.95 million for all cov-
ert actions in the region. It was not
clear from the officials' comments I
whether this figure was related to the
similar amount mentioned in comet- i
Lion with the March 9, 1991, meeting. In'
any event, some of it was to serve as '
"seed money" to finance a 500-man
force of Latin Americans. This force
would later be joined with a 1,000-man
unit then being trained and financed in
Honduras, largely by Argentina. The
finding told the C.I.A. to work "pri-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0504880099-0
and intelligence support, for attacking
the flow of supplies moving through
Nicaragua to El Salvador and Guate-
mala. Guatemala, El Salvador's neigh-
bor to the north, had been battling a left-
in-led guerrilla movement that pre-
dated by several years the one in El Sal-
vador. The United States took for itself
the tasks of curtailing Nicaraguan ac-
tions against Honduras, for providing
money to political opposition groups in
Nicaragua and for maintaining liaison
with Nicaraguaneules.?
The officials said the Administration
was clear about the difficulties inherent
in the arrangement. General Galtier.'s
support for the anti-Sandinist guerrillas
I an attempt to overthrow inc Sanduusts.
According to Administration officials,
this goal was shared by a number of
Reagan policy-makers and Central In-'
I telligence Agency operatives, but it was
never adopted as official policy.
'It Was Convenient'