EDEN PASTORA'S HARD CHOICES--INTERVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880035-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: June 14, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880035-0
ARTICLE APPEARED
1N PAGE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITO
14 June 1984
Aden Pastora's hard choices iiit~~i~W
By Denn!svaman
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Caracas
"To have the ability and moral authority to democra-
tize the Sandinista government, we must first democra-
tize the opposition."
This was one of the key points made by
Nicaraguan insurgent leader Eden Pastora
Gomez in an exclusive interview with The
Christian Science Monitor and in an ensuing
--series of short press conferences here.
The sessions were held at the Caracas
hospital where he is recovering from a May
30 bomb attempt on his wife - the guest of
former Venezuelan President and Socialist
International leader Carlos Andres Perez.
Eden Pastora returned to this theme sev-
eral times as the crux of his independent po
sition. It is a position that has pitted him aim would be to reunite with the Sandinista front after
against both the ent of Nicaragua Pastors: Nicaragua some of its more radical elements had been removed
govern must be democratized
and the Reagan administration. And it now from the top leadership.
forces Pastora and his followers to make some.very diffi- All indications are, however, that Pastora would want
cult choices. such an arrangement only if a general democratization
The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARRDE),
Pastora's guerrilla group operating on the Costa Rican-
Nicaraguan border, has been strapped for funds since,
according to press reports, the CIA stopped financing it
more than a month ago. The agency has cut off funds in
an attempt to force ARDE to unite with the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the
other anti-Sandinista guerrilla group, which
is dominated by former supporters of dicta-
tor Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The FDN
operates in the Honduran-Nicaraguan bor-
der area.
Pastore and his followers, however, have
refused to unite with the FDN unless it is
purged of its pro-Somocista and right-wing
leadership. In spite of ARDE's bleak finan-
cial situation, Pastora and his closest advis-
ers have emerged from several days of bed-
side conferences in the Caracas hospital still
saying they are determined that ARDE will
not unite with an unpurged FDN...
What ARDE will do has not yet been fully decided.
But this correspondent's long discussions with-ARDE
leaders and the interview with Pastora himself show that
some general policy directions are emerging.. ? ,
ARDE will continue to pursue its main goal of:push-
ing the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) toward more democratization and fewer ties to
the Soviet bloc - a return to what ARDE perceives as
the "goals" of the Sandinista revolution.
Pastore says that he will attempt to do so by "political
means." If this fails, he says, he will "go back to the
mountains" to continue fighting.
A clue as to what-"political means" might be is gi ven.
by top Pastora adviser Carlos Coronet Kautz, a former
Sandinista minister of fisheries and guerrilla leader who
fought with Pastora on the southern front in the
Sandinista struggle against Somoza.
"The Americans want to turn Eden into a counter.
revolutionary," he says, "and that is something no one
can do. The great weakness of the FSLN is that because
of, among other things, factional differences, it has never
been able to really define what Sandinismo is. However,
Jaime Wheelock, Humberto Ortega, Daniel Ortega [all
members of the Sandinistas' FSLN Directorate], and
Eden Pastora are the vital ingredients of the Sandinista
synthesis."
This statement fits in with the opinion of many ana-
lysts in Latin America and in Washington: that negotia-
tions with the less radical members of the FSLN Direc-
torate are a strong possibility on Pastora's agenda. The
and moderation of the revolution accompanied a leader-
ship reshuffle.
This view is reinforced by the comments of another
top Pastora adviser, Donald Castillo Rivas, a leading
Nicaraguan intellectual: "The' most important thing is
that the Sandinistas themselves get rid of some of the
most orthodox Marxist-Leninist sectors, the sectors least
interested in an authentically national revolution. We,
Eden's group, should draw closer to the responsible sec-
tors of the FSLN."
Some analysts believe that the powerful and politi-
cally pragmatic Ortega brothers would find a rapproche-
ment with Eden Pastora as good a reason as any to get
rid of fellow directorate members Tomas Borge Martinez
and Ballardo Arce Castano. Burge and Arce are the lead-
ers of a more radical Sandinista faction and the Ortega
brothers' main rivals in the struggle for, political
predominance. .:
? As Pastora himself says, "In the Managua govern-
ment there are many different currents, some of them
derrmocratic. - .. If I could send a. message to the
cornandantes, it would'be that they should reflect on how
peace can be brought to Nicaragua and to the region.", , -.
He goes on to cite differences between his, group.and,
the Honduras-based FDN guerrillas.
? "We are Sandinistas. We support revolutionary.
changes. We support, the gains already made by the
Nicaraguan revolution. We are not interested in
overthrowing the government in Managua for the sake of
overthrowing it. We want rather to democratize the
Sandinista revolution."
"Managua," says Pastora, "should look for a solution
within Nicaragua with us, the Nicaraguans. But the
problem is that there is a wing of the opposition [in Hon-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880035-0